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Abstract 
This​ ​study​ ​is​ ​a​ ​descriptive​ ​account​ ​and​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ideas​ ​and​ ​arguments​ ​of​ ​Canadian 
philosopher​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith​ ​(1970​ ​-​ ​)​ ​in​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Using​ ​Smith’s 
published​ ​texts,​ ​the​ ​study​ ​examines​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​problems​ ​he​ ​sees​ ​with​ ​these​ ​concepts​ ​from 
different​ ​subfields​ ​of​ ​philosophy​ ​and​ ​evaluates​ ​Smith’s​ ​proposed​ ​solutions.  
 
The​ ​study​ ​begins​ ​with​ ​a​ ​discursive​ ​overview​ ​of​ ​the​ ​issues​ ​scholars​ ​face​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of 
religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Next,​ ​the​ ​study​ ​examines​ ​Smith’s​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​theological 
traditions​ ​and​ ​postmodern​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​critique​ ​the​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular, 
followed​ ​by​ ​Smith’s​ ​articulation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​“liturgical”​ ​anthropology​ ​as​ ​a​ ​model​ ​for​ ​understanding 
religion​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​practices.​ ​The​ ​final​ ​chapter​ ​explores​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​analysis 
and​ ​his​ ​advocacy​ ​of​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​1)​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​2)​ ​the​ ​public​ ​square, 
and​ ​3)​ ​religious​ ​conflict. 
 
The​ ​study​ ​finds​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​cogently​ ​employs​ ​postmodern​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​deconstruct​ ​the 
foundationalist​ ​epistemology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​he​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​relies 
upon​ ​an​ ​unsubstantiated​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​closed,​ ​autonomous​ ​nature​ ​that​ ​gives​ ​secular​ ​theorizing 
and​ ​science​ ​an​ ​unwarranted​ ​privileged​ ​epistemic​ ​status.​ ​Modern​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology 
is​ ​also​ ​found​ ​to​ ​be​ ​overly​ ​cognitive,​ ​and​ ​Smith​ ​proposes​ ​an​ ​original​ ​model​ ​emphasizing 
embodiment​ ​in​ ​which​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​desiring​ ​beings​ ​shaped​ ​by​ ​formative​ ​practices 
(“liturgies”).  
 
With​ ​these​ ​results,​ ​Smith’s​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​shows​ ​that 
common​ ​distinctions​ ​between​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​misleading.​ ​A 
liturgical​ ​framework​ ​may​ ​provide​ ​better​ ​conceptual​ ​tools​ ​to​ ​locate​ ​and​ ​explain​ ​human 
behavior,​ ​including​ ​religious/secular​ ​violence,​ ​with​ ​some​ ​complications​ ​requiring​ ​further 
research.​ ​His​ ​analysis​ ​suggests​ ​a​ ​normative​ ​post-secularism​ ​which​ ​allows​ ​space​ ​for​ ​religious 
identities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​could​ ​potentially​ ​meet​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​of​ ​pluralism​ ​and 
religious​ ​conflict.  
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Many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​influential​ ​figures​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nineteenth​ ​century—Marx,​ ​Durkheim,​ ​Weber,​ ​and 
others—believed​ ​that​ ​religion​ ​would​ ​fade​ ​away​ ​as​ ​societies​ ​industrialize. ​ ​Since​ ​World​ ​War 1
II,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​widely​ ​agreed​ ​that​ ​religious​ ​affiliation,​ ​identification,​ ​and​ ​participation​ ​in​ ​Europe​ ​and 
parts​ ​of​ ​North​ ​America​ ​has​ ​declined​ ​significantly.​ ​Scholars​ ​have​ ​debated​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​such 
decline,​ ​often​ ​known​ ​as​ ​“secularization,” ​ ​is​ ​inherently​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​modernization.​ ​Peter​ ​Berger,​ ​a 2
leading​ ​sociologist​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​was​ ​once​ ​a​ ​proponent​ ​of​ ​this​ ​theory,​ ​yet​ ​has​ ​sinced​ ​renounced 
it.​ ​He​ ​claims​ ​that,​ ​outside​ ​Europe,​ ​the​ ​world​ ​“is​ ​as​ ​furiously​ ​religious​ ​as​ ​it​ ​ever​ ​was,​ ​and​ ​in 
some​ ​places​ ​even​ ​more​ ​so.” ​ ​Empirical​ ​data​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​couple​ ​decades​ ​has​ ​led​ ​many​ ​to 3
doubt​ ​the​ ​theory,​ ​or​ ​at​ ​least​ ​the​ ​strongest​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​it. ​ ​Scholar​ ​José​ ​Casanova​ ​has​ ​also 4
written​ ​about​ ​the​ ​“resurgence”​ ​of​ ​religion—and​ ​of​ ​public​ ​religion ​ ​in​ ​particular—indicating 5
that​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​its​ ​place​ ​in​ ​modern​ ​society​ ​will​ ​likely​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​spark​ ​debate 
into​ ​the​ ​foreseeable​ ​future. 
Scholarly​ ​research​ ​on​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​taking​ ​place​ ​alongside 
popular​ ​discussions​ ​about​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​conflicts.​ ​Across​ ​the​ ​Western 
world,​ ​secularizing​ ​countries​ ​have​ ​been​ ​wrestling​ ​with​ ​their​ ​own​ ​histories​ ​and​ ​traditions​ ​as 
they​ ​negotiate​ ​the​ ​place​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​their​ ​national​ ​identity​ ​and​ ​political​ ​life.​ ​One​ ​can​ ​see 
from​ ​the​ ​controversies​ ​over​ ​the​ ​inclusion​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​preamble​ ​to​ ​the​ ​European 
Constitution,​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​inclusion​ ​of​ ​Turkey​ ​in​ ​the​ ​European​ ​Union,​ ​and​ ​others​ ​examples 
that​ ​the​ ​place​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​far​ ​from​ ​clear​ ​or​ ​settled.​ ​Within​ ​Europe,​ ​the​ ​public​ ​presence​ ​of 
religion​ ​has​ ​taken​ ​many​ ​forms.​ ​Some​ ​countries​ ​still​ ​have​ ​established​ ​state​ ​churches,​ ​while 
others​ ​have​ ​severed​ ​such​ ​institutional​ ​ties.​ ​In​ ​many​ ​German​ ​schools,​ ​teachers​ ​are​ ​banned​ ​from 
1​ ​See​ ​Steve​ ​Bruce,​ ​ed.,​​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​Modernization​​ ​(Oxford:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​1992),​ ​170-94; 
Alan​ ​Aldridge,​​ ​Religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Contemporary​ ​World​​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​Polity​ ​Press,​ ​2000),​ ​Chapter​ ​4. 
2​ ​There​ ​is​ ​debate​ ​whether​ ​secularization​ ​refers​ ​merely​ ​to​ ​the​ ​privatization​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​decreased 
public​ ​significance,​ ​or​ ​to​ ​decreasing​ ​affiliation​ ​and​ ​participation.​ ​For​ ​a​ ​discussion,​ ​see​ ​Bryan​ ​S.​ ​Turner,​ ​​Religion 
and​ ​Modern​ ​Society:​ ​Citizenship,​ ​Secularization​ ​and​ ​the​ ​State​​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​Cambridge​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2011), 
10-11. 
3​ ​Peter​ ​Berger,​ ​ed.,​ ​​The​ ​Desecularization​ ​of​ ​the​ ​World:​ ​Resurgent​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​World​ ​Politics​ ​​(Grand 
Rapids:​ ​Eerdmans,​ ​1999),​ ​2.  
4​ ​But​ ​Berger​ ​claims​ ​it​ ​should​ ​have​ ​been​ ​known​ ​earlier:​ ​“By​ ​the​ ​late​ ​1970s​ ​it​ ​had​ ​been​ ​falsified​ ​with​ ​a 
vengeance.​ ​As​ ​it​ ​turned​ ​out,​ ​the​ ​theory​ ​never​ ​had​ ​much​ ​empirical​ ​substance​ ​to​ ​begin​ ​with.”​ ​See​ ​idem., 
“Sociology:​ ​A​ ​disinvitation?”​ ​​Society​​ ​30,​ ​no.1​ ​(1993),​ ​15. 
5​ ​José​ ​Casanova,​ ​​Public​ ​Religions​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Modem​ ​World​​ ​(Chicago:​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Chicago​ ​Press,​ ​1994). 
3 
 
wearing​ ​religious​ ​garb. ​ ​In​ ​France,​ ​that​ ​ban​ ​extends​ ​to​ ​students​ ​in​ ​classrooms,​ ​and​ ​Muslim 6
women​ ​on​ ​public​ ​beaches​ ​have​ ​been​ ​forced​ ​to​ ​remove​ ​their​ ​“burkinis,”​ ​viewed​ ​by​ ​some​ ​as​ ​a 
violation​ ​the​ ​French​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​​laïcité​.​ ​The​ ​United​ ​States,​ ​by​ ​contrast,​ ​maintains​ ​a 
comparably​ ​high​ ​level​ ​of​ ​religiosity,​ ​while​ ​a​ ​strong​ ​institutional​ ​separation​ ​of​ ​church​ ​and​ ​state 
is​ ​vigorously​ ​defended.​ ​The​ ​vastly​ ​different​ ​arrangements​ ​of​ ​these​ ​modern​ ​societies​ ​indicates 
that​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of​ ​secularization​ ​has​ ​unfolded​ ​in​ ​myriad​ ​ways​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​public​ ​place​ ​of 
religion​ ​takes​ ​many​ ​forms.​ ​Many​ ​of​ ​these​ ​same​ ​countries​ ​are​ ​increasingly​ ​dealing​ ​with 
understanding​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​violence​ ​and​ ​terrorism​ ​done​ ​in​ ​the​ ​name​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​what​ ​the 
appropriate​ ​political​ ​responses​ ​are.​ ​And​ ​around​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​conflicts​ ​such 
as​ ​Israel/Palestine,​ ​the​ ​Sunni/Shia​ ​divide,​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​African​ ​Republic,​ ​and​ ​Myanmar​ ​(to 
name​ ​a​ ​few)​ ​remains​ ​disputed.​ ​These​ ​events​ ​and​ ​trends​ ​of​ ​the​ ​last​ ​several​ ​decades​ ​have​ ​led 
scholars​ ​like​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas,​ ​the​ ​foremost​ ​theorizer​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​what 
(renewed?)​ ​relevance​ ​religion​ ​may​ ​have​ ​modern,​ ​secular​ ​societies.   7
One​ ​growing​ ​concern​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​several​ ​decades​ ​has​ ​been​ ​the​ ​legitimacy​ ​and 
coherence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​categories​ ​of​ ​“secular”​ ​and​ ​“religion/religious.”​ ​As​ ​is​ ​the​ ​case​ ​in​ ​many 
academic​ ​fields,​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​debate​ ​are​ ​crucial.​ ​Though​ ​many​ ​popular​ ​level​ ​discussions​ ​in 
the​ ​media​ ​and​ ​political​ ​rhetoric,​ ​particularly​ ​since​ ​9/11,​ ​assumes​ ​their​ ​coherence​ ​and​ ​validity, 
scholars​ ​in​ ​the​ ​fields​ ​of​ ​political​ ​science,​ ​philosophy,​ ​sociology,​ ​and​ ​others​ ​have​ ​little 
agreement​ ​over​ ​how​ ​to​ ​define​ ​and​ ​use​ ​these​ ​contested​ ​terms​ ​and​ ​categories.​ ​Without​ ​some 
consensus​ ​as​ ​to​ ​what​ ​constitutes​ ​religion​ ​or​ ​what​ ​is​ ​considered​ ​secular,​ ​negotiating​ ​religion’s 
place​ ​in​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​society​ ​and​ ​its​ ​role​ ​in​ ​conflict​ ​will​ ​be​ ​difficult.​ ​To​ ​improve​ ​research​ ​and 
debate​ ​on​ ​religion’s​ ​role​ ​in​ ​fomenting​ ​conflicts​ ​or​ ​its​ ​potential​ ​to​ ​help​ ​resolve​ ​them,​ ​scholars 
need​ ​more​ ​nuanced​ ​theories,​ ​definitions,​ ​and​ ​conceptual​ ​tools​ ​for​ ​understanding​ ​religion​ ​and 
clarity​ ​regarding​ ​what​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​reasoning​ ​or​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​secular​ ​or​ ​religious. 
 
 
6​ ​“Discrimination​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Name​ ​of​ ​Neutrality​ ​Headscarf​ ​Bans​ ​for​ ​Teachers​ ​and​ ​Civil​ ​Servants​ ​in 
Germany,”​ ​Human​ ​Rights​ ​Watch,​ ​February​ ​26,​ ​2009. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/02/26/discrimination-name-neutrality/headscarf-bans-teachers-and-civil-servan
ts-germany 
7​ ​See​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas​ ​and​ ​Joseph​ ​Ratzinger,​ ​​The​ ​Dialectics​ ​of​ ​Secularization:​ ​On​ ​Reason​ ​and​ ​Religion 
(San​ ​Francisco:​ ​Ignatius​ ​Press,​ ​2006);​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas,​ ​​Between​ ​Naturalism​ ​and​ ​Religion:​ ​Philosophical 
Essays​,​ ​trans.​ ​C.​ ​Cronin​ ​(Oxford:​ ​Polity​ ​Press,​ ​2008);​ ​idem,​ ​“Religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Public​ ​Sphere,”​ ​​European​ ​Journal 
of​ ​Philosophy​ ​​14,​ ​no.​ ​1​ ​(April​ ​2006):​ ​1-25;​ ​idem,​ ​“An​ ​Awareness​ ​of​ ​What​ ​is​ ​Missing,”​ ​in​ ​ ​Faith​ ​and​ ​Reason​ ​in​ ​a 




This​ ​study​ ​has​ ​been​ ​written​ ​as​ ​part​ ​of​ ​a​ ​master’s​ ​program​ ​in​ ​Religion,​ ​Conflict,​ ​and​ ​Dialogue. 
The​ ​program​ ​takes​ ​a​ ​normative​ ​perspective​ ​which,​ ​like​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​conflict​ ​research,​ ​seeks​ ​to 
better​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​conflicts​ ​and​ ​the​ ​role​ ​(if​ ​any)​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​them​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to 
promote​ ​dialogue​ ​and​ ​peace.​ ​The​ ​impetus​ ​behind​ ​the​ ​research​ ​for​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​came​ ​from​ ​a 
sense​ ​that​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​and​ ​categories​ ​used​ ​in​ ​these​ ​discussions​ ​are​ ​often​ ​unclear​ ​and​ ​unhelpful. 
The​ ​aim,​ ​then,​ ​was​ ​to​ ​interrogate​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​“religion”​ ​and​ ​the​ ​corresponding​ ​concept​ ​of 
the​ ​“secular”​ ​with​ ​hopes​ ​of​ ​finding​ ​useful​ ​applications​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​this​ ​program.​ ​As 
such,​ ​this​ ​study​ ​critically​ ​analyzes​ ​the​ ​discourse​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​religion​ ​used​ ​in​ ​academic 
and​ ​political​ ​contexts,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​secularism​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​violence.  
To​ ​make​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​the​ ​study​ ​sufficiently​ ​narrow,​ ​I​ ​chose​ ​one​ ​contemporary​ ​scholar, 
James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​who​ ​writes​ ​cogently​ ​about​ ​these​ ​concepts,​ ​particularly​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of 
the​ ​issues​ ​mentioned​ ​above.​ ​The​ ​study​ ​is​ ​a​ ​descriptive​ ​account​ ​and​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​ideas 
and​ ​arguments​ ​in​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​The​ ​sources​ ​that​ ​I​ ​use​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​this 
examination​ ​will​ ​come​ ​primarily​ ​from​ ​Smith’s​ ​published​ ​works:​ ​books,​ ​chapters​ ​in​ ​edited 
volumes,​ ​and​ ​journal​ ​articles.​ ​Texts​ ​which​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​religion 
make​ ​up​ ​a​ ​considerable​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​his​ ​work​ ​and​ ​have​ ​been​ ​selected​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​to​ ​unpack​ ​his 
potential​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​these​ ​discussions.​ ​A​ ​critical​ ​evaluation​ ​of​ ​some​ ​of​ ​Smith's 
conclusions​ ​on​ ​relevant​ ​points​ ​will​ ​also​ ​be​ ​given​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​further​ ​the​ ​aims​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study. 
When​ ​useful,​ ​I​ ​give​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​the​ ​intellectual​ ​context​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​contributions​ ​and​ ​their 
place​ ​in​ ​broader,​ ​ongoing​ ​conversations. 
Though​ ​Smith’s​ ​corpus​ ​has​ ​breadth,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​thread​ ​of​ ​a​ ​persistently​ ​critical 
perspective​ ​toward​ ​secular​ ​modernity​ ​and​ ​how​ ​it​ ​has​ ​influenced​ ​various​ ​academic​ ​disciplines 
and​ ​discourses.​ ​Unlike​ ​some​ ​critics,​ ​a​ ​considerable​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​work​ ​also​ ​offers 
constructive,​ ​specific,​ ​and​ ​practical​ ​proposals.​ ​This​ ​makes​ ​his​ ​projects​ ​and​ ​analysis 
potentially​ ​valuable​ ​for​ ​theorists​ ​and​ ​practitioners​ ​alike.  
1.3.​ ​Defining​ ​Terms:​ ​Whose​ ​religion?​ ​Which​ ​secularity?  8
As​ ​this​ ​study​ ​will​ ​be​ ​engaging​ ​with​ ​the​ ​highly​ ​contested​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​its 
relationship​ ​vis-a-vis​ ​religion,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​clarify​ ​how​ ​these​ ​terms​ ​will​ ​be​ ​used.​ ​Though 
8​ ​A​ ​nod​ ​to​ ​Alasdair​ ​MacIntyre,​ ​​Whose​ ​Justice?​ ​Which​ ​Rationality?​ ​​(University​ ​of​ ​Notre​ ​Dame​ ​Press, 
1988),​ ​whose​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​traditioned​ ​rationality​ ​is​ ​indeed​ ​germane​ ​the​ ​topic.  
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it​ ​has​ ​Latin​ ​roots​ ​which​ ​can​ ​be​ ​traced​ ​back​ ​for​ ​well​ ​over​ ​a​ ​millennium,​ ​academic​ ​and​ ​popular 
discourses​ ​use​ ​​secular​​ ​in​ ​a​ ​variety​ ​of​ ​ways.​ ​Because​ ​it​ ​of​ ​its​ ​influence​ ​and​ ​cogency,​ ​Charles 
Taylor’s​ ​taxonomy​ ​in​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​ ​​provides​ ​a​ ​helpful​ ​starting​ ​point.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​way​ ​that 
secular​​ ​can​ ​be​ ​used​ ​is​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​societal​ ​differentiation,​ ​which​ ​we​ ​can​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​as 
secular​1​. ​ ​In​ ​contrast​ ​to​ ​pre-modern​ ​societies​ ​in​ ​which​ ​“political​ ​organization…​ ​was​ ​in​ ​some 9
way​ ​connected​ ​to,​ ​based​ ​on,​ ​guaranteed​ ​by​ ​some​ ​faith​ ​in,​ ​or​ ​adherence​ ​to​ ​God,​ ​or​ ​some​ ​notion 
of​ ​ultimate​ ​reality,​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​state​ ​is​ ​free​ ​from​ ​this​ ​connection.” ​ ​Thus,​ ​in​ ​a​ ​modern​ ​secular​1 10
country,​ ​“the​ ​political​ ​society​ ​is​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​that​ ​of​ ​believers​ ​(of​ ​all​ ​stripes)​ ​and​ ​non-believers 
alike…​ ​[Y]ou​ ​can​ ​fully​ ​engage​ ​in​ ​politics​ ​without​ ​ever​ ​encountering​ ​God.” ​ ​The​ ​United 11
States,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​its​ ​tradition​ ​of​ ​the​ ​separation​ ​of​ ​church​ ​(i.e.,​ ​religious​ ​institutions)​ ​and​ ​state, 
is​ ​thus​ ​a​ ​secular​1​​ ​country,​ ​even​ ​though​ ​the​ ​populace​ ​itself​ ​is​ ​religious,​ ​particularly​ ​by​ ​Western 
standards.​ ​This​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​​secular​​ ​can​ ​also​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​through​ ​the​ ​sacred/profane​ ​paradigm 
in​ ​which,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​church-related​ ​activities​ ​and​ ​vocations​ ​are​ ​sacred,​ ​while​ ​carpentry​ ​or 
medical​ ​jobs​ ​are​ ​secular​1​.  
The​ ​term​​ ​secular​ ​​can​ ​also​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​“falling​ ​off​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​belief​ ​and​ ​practice.”  12
This​ ​second​ ​sense—secular​2​—is​ ​distinctly​ ​modern,​ ​and​ ​also​ ​accompanies​ ​modern​ ​notions​ ​of 
religion.​ ​The​ ​secular​2​​ ​in​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​more​ ​than​ ​a​ ​mere​ ​separation​ ​of​ ​institutions​ ​and 
vocations​ ​and​ ​suggests​ ​a​ ​distinct​ ​epistemological​ ​status.​ ​Secular​2​​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​knowledge,​ ​for 
example,​ ​are​ ​religiously​ ​neutral​ ​and​ ​not​ ​dependent​ ​upon​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​tradition.​ ​A​ ​secular​2 
person​ ​does​ ​not​ ​look​ ​to​ ​religious​ ​texts​ ​or​ ​traditions​ ​or​ ​the​ ​supernatural​ ​for​ ​knowledge,​ ​truth, 
or​ ​meaning​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​to​ ​secular​2​​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​values​ ​derived​ ​from​ ​reason.​ ​A​ ​secular​2​​ ​public 
space​ ​uses​ ​only​ ​non-sectarian,​ ​a-religious​ ​language​ ​and​ ​reason​ ​that​ ​universally​ ​accessible.​ ​It 
is​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​​secular​​ ​which​ ​will​ ​be​ ​examined​ ​in​ ​this​ ​study.​ ​The​ ​secularization​ ​thesis,​ ​for 
example,​ ​posits​ ​that​ ​societies​ ​will​ ​become​ ​not​ ​only​ ​secular​1​,​ ​but​ ​secular​2​.​ ​So​ ​while​ ​the 
institutions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​are​ ​secular​1​,​ ​Americans​ ​are​ ​less​ ​secular​2​ ​​than​ ​much​ ​of​ ​Europe. 
Note​ ​also​ ​that​ ​in​ ​this​ ​study,​ ​“modern”​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​mere​ ​description​ ​of​ ​time​ ​(as​ ​in 
9​ ​This​ ​subscript​ ​notation​ ​is​ ​taken​ ​from​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​​How​ ​(Not)​ ​To​ ​Be​ ​Secular​​ ​(Grand​ ​Rapids: 
Eerdmans,​ ​2014),​ ​21. 
10​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor,​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​Harvard​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​Belknap​ ​Press,​ ​2007),​ ​1. 
11​ ​Ibid.,​ ​1. 
12​ ​Taylor​,​ ​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​,​ ​2.​ ​But​ ​it​ ​goes​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​sociological​ ​phenomenon​ ​of​ ​decreased​ ​identification 
with​ ​organized​ ​religion. 
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“contemporary”),​ ​but​ ​generally​ ​referring​ ​to​ ​the​ ​thought​ ​and​ ​societal​ ​changes​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​the 
Enlightenment,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​closely​ ​related​ ​to​ ​“secular.”  13
There​ ​are​ ​a​ ​host​ ​of​ ​derivative​ ​terms​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​​secular​,​ ​some​ ​of​ ​them​ ​already 
mentioned:​ ​secularism,​ ​secularist,​ ​secularization,​ ​secularity.​ ​This​ ​study​ ​focuses​ ​on​ ​the​ ​secular 
as​ ​defined​ ​above​ ​and​ ​will​ ​at​ ​points​ ​interact​ ​with​ ​these​ ​related​ ​terms​ ​which​ ​will​ ​be​ ​used​ ​in​ ​the 
sense​ ​of​ ​secular​2​.​ ​So​ ​secularism​ ​(or​ ​secularism​2​—examined​ ​in​ ​chapter​ ​2)​ ​will​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​the 
normative​ ​view​ ​that​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​should​ ​be​ ​secular​2​ ​​.​ ​A​ ​secularist​ ​would​ ​support​ ​that 
view.​ ​Secularization​ ​entails​ ​not​ ​just​ ​institutional​ ​differentiation​ ​but​ ​declining​ ​religious​ ​belief, 
participation,​ ​etc. ​ ​There​ ​are​ ​of​ ​course​ ​other​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​secularism.​ ​As​ ​Saba 14
Mahmood​ ​has​ ​noted,​ ​“secularism​ ​is​ ​a​ ​historically​ ​shifting​ ​category​ ​with​ ​a​ ​variegated 
genealogy,”​ ​which​ ​is​ ​why​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​must​ ​be​ ​clear.   15
So​ ​what​ ​is​ ​“religion”?​ ​While​ ​the​ ​scholarly​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​has​ ​producing​ ​shelves​ ​full 
of​ ​literature,​ ​researchers​ ​have​ ​yet​ ​to​ ​find​ ​consensus​ ​on​ ​the​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​or​ ​on​ ​what 
rituals,​ ​practices,​ ​or​ ​beliefs​ ​should​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​religious.​ ​Particularly​ ​since​ ​the​ ​advent​ ​of 
postmodernism,​ ​many​ ​have​ ​sought​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​essentialistic​ ​definitions​ ​or​ ​characterizations​ ​of 
religion​ ​as​ ​​sui​ ​generis​.​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​a​ ​prominent​ ​religious​ ​studies​ ​scholar, 
makes​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​“religion​ ​has​ ​no​ ​independent​ ​existence​ ​apart​ ​from​ ​the​ ​academy.”​ ​He​ ​says 
that 
while​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​staggering​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​data,​ ​phenomena,​ ​of​ ​human​ ​experiences​ ​and​ ​expressions​ ​that 
might​ ​be​ ​characterized​ ​in​ ​one​ ​culture​ ​or​ ​another,​ ​by​ ​one​ ​criterion​ ​or​ ​another,​ ​as​ ​religion​ ​—​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no 
data​ ​for​ ​religion.​ ​Religion​ ​is​ ​solely​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​scholar’s​ ​study.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​created​ ​for​ ​the​ ​scholar’s 
analytic​ ​purposes​ ​by​ ​his​ ​imaginative​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​comparison​ ​and​ ​generalization.​ ​Religion​ ​has​ ​no​ ​existence 
apart​ ​from​ ​the​ ​academy.  16
While​ ​these​ ​claims​ ​are​ ​boldly​ ​stated,​ ​they​ ​reflect​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​scepticism​ ​among​ ​some​ ​scholars​ ​of 
religion​ ​that​ ​a​ ​category​ ​of​ ​“the​ ​religious”​ ​can​ ​be​ ​clearly​ ​demarcated​ ​and​ ​cordoned​ ​off​ ​from 
secular​ ​objects,​ ​people,​ ​practices,​ ​and​ ​ideologies. ​ ​Anthropologist​ ​Talal​ ​Asad​ ​similarly​ ​has 17
13​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​“modern”​ ​and​ ​“secular”​ ​epistemology​ ​would​ ​essentially​ ​be​ ​the​ ​same​ ​thing​ ​in​ ​Smith’s 
writing.​ ​“Modern”​ ​is​ ​broader​ ​in​ ​its​ ​connotations,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​secular/religious​ ​distinctions​ ​and​ ​debates​ ​take​ ​place​ ​in 
the​ ​advent​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​and​ ​within​ ​its​ ​context. 
14​ ​Note​ ​that​ ​Taylor’s​ ​entire​ ​project​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​“secular”​ ​in​ ​a​ ​​third​ ​​sense.​ ​In​ ​​ ​a​ ​“secular 
age,”​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Taylor,​ ​religious​ ​belief​ ​is​ ​simply​ ​an​ ​option​ ​among​ ​many​ ​others.​ ​The​ ​“plausibility​ ​structure” 
has​ ​changed​ ​such​ ​that​ ​religious​ ​belief​ ​is​ ​contested.​ ​Taylor’s​ ​massive​ ​tome​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​narrate​ ​the​ ​story​ ​of​ ​how​ ​and 
why​ ​secularization​ ​in​ ​this​ ​third​ ​sense​ ​has​ ​occurred. 
15​ ​Saba​ ​Mahmood,​ ​“Secularism,​ ​Hermeneutics,​ ​and​ ​Empire:​ ​The​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Islamic​ ​Reformation,” 
Public​ ​Culture​ ​​18,​ ​no.​ ​2​ ​(2006),​ ​332n11. 
16​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith,​ ​​Imagining​ ​Religion:​ ​From​ ​Babylon​ ​to​ ​Jonestown​ ​​(Chicago:​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Chicago 
Press,​ ​1982),​ ​xi.  
17​ ​Besides​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith,​ ​see​ ​William​ ​C.​ ​Smith,​ ​​The​ ​Meaning​ ​and​ ​End​ ​of​ ​Religion​ ​​(New​ ​York: 
Macmillan,​ ​1962);​ ​Daniel​ ​Dubuisson,​ ​​The​ ​Western​ ​Construction​ ​of​ ​Religion​,​ ​trans.​ ​William​ ​Sayers​ ​(Baltimore: 
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written​ ​that​ ​“there​ ​can​ ​be​ ​no​ ​universal​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​not​ ​only​ ​because​ ​its 
constitutional​ ​elements​ ​and​ ​relationships​ ​are​ ​historically​ ​specific,​ ​but​ ​because​ ​that​ ​definition 
is​ ​itself​ ​the​ ​historical​ ​product​ ​of​ ​discursive​ ​processes.”  18
What​ ​value​ ​is​ ​there​ ​to​ ​studying​ ​religion​ ​if​ ​it​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​defined?​ ​The​ ​contested​ ​nature 
of​ ​concepts​ ​and​ ​phenomena​ ​does​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​deem​ ​scientific​ ​inquiry​ ​into​ ​them​ ​as​ ​useless. 
Even​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith,​ ​cited​ ​above,​ ​recognizes​ ​that​ ​though​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​a​ ​constructed​ ​concept, 
scholars​ ​must​ ​nonetheless​ ​have​ ​disciplinary​ ​horizons. ​ ​Reacting​ ​against​ ​what​ ​he​ ​considers 19
the​ ​postmodern​ ​trend​ ​to​ ​deny​ ​to​ ​reality​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​altogether,​ ​sociologist​ ​Steve​ ​Bruce​ ​says 
that​ ​a​ ​definition​ ​should​ ​come​ ​from​ ​“broad​ ​contemporary​ ​common-sense​ ​reflection​ ​on​ ​the 
matter”​ ​and​ ​judged​ ​by​ ​the​ ​explanatory​ ​power​ ​provided​ ​by​ ​a​ ​definition/theory.​ ​​ ​He​ ​offers​ ​the 
following:​ ​Religion​ ​“consists​ ​of​ ​beliefs,​ ​actions​ ​and​ ​institutions​ ​which​ ​assume​ ​the​ ​existence 
of​ ​supernatural​ ​entities​ ​with​ ​powers​ ​of​ ​action,​ ​or​ ​impersonal​ ​powers​ ​or​ ​processes​ ​possessed​ ​of 
moral​ ​purpose.” ​ ​The​ ​definition​ ​resonates​ ​with​ ​common​ ​Western​ ​sensibilities​ ​about​ ​the 20
nature​ ​of​ ​religion.​ ​But​ ​there​ ​​are​​ ​issues​ ​with​ ​the​ ​explanatory​ ​power​ ​of​ ​this​ ​and​ ​many​ ​other 
definitions,​ ​as​ ​will​ ​be​ ​discussed​ ​below. 
These​ ​varying​ ​definitions,​ ​theories,​ ​and​ ​approaches​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion 
demonstrate​ ​the​ ​complexity​ ​of​ ​a​ ​understanding​ ​its​ ​relationship​ ​to​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Yet​ ​the 
contested​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​concepts​ ​has​ ​not​ ​ended​ ​scholarly​ ​and​ ​popular​ ​discussions​ ​the 
important​ ​issues​ ​of​ ​religion’s​ ​role​ ​in​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​society​ ​and​ ​its​ ​relationship​ ​to​ ​violence​ ​and 
conflict.​ ​As​ ​these​ ​topics​ ​remain​ ​in​ ​headlines​ ​and​ ​among​ ​the​ ​most​ ​persistent​ ​social​ ​and 
political​ ​issues​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​an​ ​interrogation​ ​of​ ​these​ ​concepts​ ​and​ ​their​ ​theoretical 
background​ ​is​ ​needed​ ​more​ ​than​ ​ever.​ ​To​ ​pursue​ ​this,​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​turns​ ​to​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​James​ ​K. 
A.​ ​Smith. 
 
Johns​ ​Hopkins​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2003);​ ​William​ ​Arnal​ ​and​ ​Russell​ ​McCutcheon,​ ​​The​ ​Sacred​ ​Is​ ​the​ ​Profane:​ ​The 
Political​ ​Nature​ ​of​ ​'Religion'​ ​​(Oxford:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2012);​ ​Christopher​ ​R.​ ​Cotter​ ​and​ ​David​ ​G. 
Robertson,​ ​​After​ ​World​ ​Religions:​ ​Reconstructing​ ​Religious​ ​Studies​ ​ ​(Basingstoke:​ ​Routledge,​ ​2016). 
18​ ​Talal​ ​Asad,​ ​​Genealogies​ ​of​ ​Religion:​ ​Discipline​ ​and​ ​Reasons​ ​of​ ​Power​ ​in​ ​Christianity​ ​and​ ​Islam​. 
(Baltimore:​ ​Johns​ ​Hopkins​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​​1993),​ ​9. 
19​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​that​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“second-order,​ ​generic​ ​concept​ ​that​ ​plays​ ​the​ ​same​ ​role​ ​in 
establishing​ ​a​ ​disciplinary​ ​horizon​ ​that​ ​a​ ​concept​ ​such​ ​as​ ​‘language’​ ​plays​ ​in​ ​linguistics​ ​or​ ​‘culture’​ ​plays​ ​in 
anthropology.​ ​There​ ​can​ ​be​ ​no​ ​disciplined​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​without​ ​such​ ​a​ ​horizon.”​ ​See​ ​his​ ​“Religion, 
Religions,​ ​Religious,”​ ​in​ ​​Critical​ ​Terms​ ​for​ ​Religious​ ​Studies​,​ ​ed.​ ​Mark​ ​C.​ ​Taylor​ ​(Chicago:​ ​University​ ​of 
Chicago​ ​Press,​ ​1998),​ ​281-282. 
20​ ​This​ ​and​ ​the​ ​above​ ​quotation​ ​are​ ​from​ ​​Steve​ ​Bruce,​ ​“Defining​ ​Religion:​ ​A​ ​Practical​ ​Response.” 
International​ ​Review​ ​of​ ​Sociology​​ ​21,​ ​no.​ ​1​ ​(2011):​ ​112. 
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1.4.​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith 
As​ ​a​ ​contemporary​ ​philosopher,​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith’s​ ​projects​ ​have​ ​challenged​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of 
the​ ​secular,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​modern​ ​understandings​ ​of​ ​religion.​ ​Through​ ​an​ ​engagement​ ​with 
postmodern​ ​French​ ​philosophy,​ ​phenomenology,​ ​and​ ​thinkers​ ​from​ ​his​ ​own​ ​Christian 
tradition,​ ​Smith​ ​has​ ​published​ ​a​ ​numbers​ ​of​ ​articles,​ ​essays,​ ​and​ ​books​ ​which​ ​have​ ​sought​ ​to 
re-tool​ ​the​ ​disciplines​ ​of​ ​philosophy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​sociology​ ​of​ ​religion.​ ​His​ ​work​ ​is 
highly​ ​critical​ ​of​ ​the​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​reason​ ​on​ ​those​ ​scholarly​ ​disciplines, 
and​ ​his​ ​projects​ ​are​ ​directly​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​discussions​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​and​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​between 
religion​ ​and​ ​conflict.  
Smith​ ​interacts​ ​with​ ​and​ ​appropriates​ ​the​ ​work​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​distinct​ ​traditions​ ​and 
individual​ ​thinkers.​ ​His​ ​interlocutors​ ​often​ ​include​ ​Martin​ ​Heidegger,​ ​Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty,​ ​Pierre​ ​Bourdieu​ ​and​ ​others​ ​influenced​ ​by​ ​postmodern​ ​thought.​ ​This​ ​tradition 
is​ ​made​ ​up​ ​mostly​ ​of​ ​thinkers​ ​with​ ​no​ ​confessional​ ​(religious)​ ​commitments,​ ​but​ ​who 
nonetheless​ ​offer​ ​(sometimes​ ​implicit)​ ​critiques​ ​of​ ​certain​ ​varieties​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and 
secularism.​ ​Smith​ ​has​ ​also​ ​been​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy,​ ​a​ ​“traditionalist” 
movement​ ​or​ ​theological​ ​sensibility​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​John​ ​Milbank,​ ​Catherine​ ​Pickstock,​ ​and 
others​ ​who​ ​have​ ​used​ ​postmodern​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​critique​ ​modernity.  
Other​ ​important​ ​theological​ ​influences​ ​on​ ​Smith​ ​are​ ​the​ ​(Dutch)​ ​Reformed​ ​tradition 
and​ ​pentecostalism.​ ​While​ ​notably​ ​different​ ​in​ ​theology​ ​and​ ​practice,​ ​Smith​ ​identifies​ ​with 
each​ ​of​ ​these​ ​Protestant​ ​traditions​ ​in​ ​different​ ​ways.​ ​The​ ​former​ ​has​ ​an​ ​intellectual​ ​heritage 
dating​ ​back​ ​the​ ​nineteenth​ ​century,​ ​with​ ​figures​ ​like​ ​Abraham​ ​Kuyper​ ​and​ ​Herman 
Dooyewerd​ ​offering​ ​unique​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​social​ ​and​ ​political​ ​philosophy.​ ​Pentecostalism​ ​(or 
charismatic​ ​Christianity)​ ​lacks​ ​the​ ​intellectual​ ​heritage​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Reformed​ ​tradition​ ​but 
nonetheless​ ​exemplifies​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​challenge​ ​to​ ​secular​ ​modernity​ ​with​ ​its​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​the 
activity​ ​of​ ​God​ ​through​ ​the​ ​Holy​ ​Spirit​ ​(and​ ​the​ ​rise​ ​of​ ​pentecostal​ ​Christianity​ ​globally​ ​has 
also​ ​contributed​ ​to​ ​doubts​ ​about​ ​secularization​ ​in​ ​modernizing​ ​countries).​ ​In​ ​addition,​ ​Smith 
sees​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​manifestations​ ​of​ ​both​ ​an​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​embodiment​ ​in​ ​their​ ​worship​ ​services 
(liturgical​ ​and​ ​charismatic),​ ​which​ ​will​ ​be​ ​an​ ​important​ ​part​ ​of​ ​his​ ​philosophical 
anthropology.  
In​ ​all​ ​of​ ​these​ ​traditions,​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​a​ ​common​ ​thread:​ ​Saint​ ​Augustine.​ ​As​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the 
most​ ​important​ ​figures​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Western​ ​intellectual​ ​tradition,​ ​this​ ​may​ ​not​ ​be​ ​surprising.​ ​But​ ​as 
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a​ ​philosopher​ ​and​ ​theologian​ ​working​ ​in​ ​a​ ​pre-modern,​ ​pluralistic​ ​environment,​ ​Smith​ ​sees 
Augustine’s​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​his​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​love/desire​ ​as​ ​important 
resources​ ​for​ ​grappling​ ​with​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​of​ ​modernity.​ ​Smith​ ​sees​ ​an​ ​Augustinian​ ​influence 
on​ ​phenomenology​ ​and​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy,​ ​and​ ​considers​ ​him​ ​the​ ​“patron​ ​saint​ ​of​ ​the 
Reformers.”  21
A​ ​thread​ ​tying​ ​together​ ​many​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​project​ ​has​ ​been​ ​the​ ​desire​ ​to​ ​“call​ ​into 
question​ ​the​ ​foundational​ ​metaphysical,​ ​epistemological,​ ​and​ ​anthropological 
assumptions—or​ ​what​ ​we​ ​might​ ​call​ ​‘faith​ ​commitments’—that​ ​undergird​ ​modernity.”  22
Working​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​different​ ​disciplines​ ​and​ ​traditions,​ ​Smith​ ​articulates​ ​a​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the 
secular​ ​that​ ​scholars​ ​both​ ​in​ ​and​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​traditions​ ​have​ ​engaged.​ ​He​ ​has​ ​sought​ ​to 
re-tool​ ​disciplines​ ​which​ ​study​ ​religion​ ​to​ ​overcome​ ​the​ ​methodological​ ​limitations​ ​of 
viewing​ ​religion​ ​through​ ​a​ ​modern​ ​construal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person,​ ​thereby​ ​opening​ ​up​ ​space 
to​ ​see​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​places​ ​overlooked.​ ​Other​ ​projects​ ​of​ ​his​ ​have​ ​questioned​ ​the​ ​epistemological 
and​ ​ontological​ ​assumptions​ ​undergirding​ ​secularism.​ ​His​ ​work​ ​also​ ​offers​ ​positive 
formulations​ ​of​ ​what​ ​“post-secular”​ ​public​ ​space—in​ ​the​ ​academy,​ ​politics,​ ​etc.—might 
entail. 
An​ ​important​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​work​ ​is​ ​its​ ​position​ ​vis-a-vis​ ​academia​ ​and 
practice-oriented​ ​literature.​ ​Though​ ​Smith​ ​has​ ​published​ ​multiple​ ​academic​ ​books​ ​and​ ​tens​ ​of 
articles,​ ​he​ ​has​ ​also​ ​published​ ​books​ ​and​ ​articles​ ​at​ ​the​ ​popular​ ​level.​ ​Some​ ​of​ ​his​ ​work 
straddles​ ​the​ ​middle​ ​ground​ ​of​ ​these​ ​styles.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​the​ ​project​ ​analyzed​ ​mostly​ ​in 
chapter​ ​3—the​ ​Cultural​ ​Liturgies​ ​trilogy—is​ ​in​ ​this​ ​third​ ​category​ ​(and​ ​unfortunately,​ ​the 
third​ ​installment​ ​was​ ​not​ ​published​ ​until​ ​after​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​was​ ​handed​ ​in).​ ​As​ ​he​ ​notes​ ​in​ ​the 
introductions,​ ​Smith’s​ ​aim​ ​is​ ​a​ ​renewal​ ​of​ ​practice​ ​in​ ​education,​ ​ecclesial​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​research. 
There​ ​are​ ​proposals​ ​and​ ​elements​ ​intended​ ​for​ ​scholars,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​is​ ​conscious​ ​and​ ​deliberate 
limitation​ ​in​ ​an​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​make​ ​somewhat​ ​of​ ​a​ ​hybrid.​ ​Because​ ​of​ ​this,​ ​some​ ​specialized 
conversations​ ​and​ ​clarifications​ ​are​ ​placed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​footnotes,​ ​and​ ​some​ ​nuance​ ​may​ ​be​ ​lost. 
This​ ​thesis​ ​has​ ​attempted​ ​to​ ​be​ ​charitable​ ​by​ ​considering​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​project,​ ​and 
sought​ ​to​ ​use​ ​his​ ​corresponding​ ​academic​ ​publications​ ​to​ ​fill​ ​out​ ​some​ ​details.  
21​ ​Smith,​ ​​Imagining​ ​the​ ​Kingdom:​ ​How​ ​Worship​ ​Works​​ ​(Grand​ ​Rapids:​ ​Baker,​ ​2013),​ ​7. 
22​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“What​ ​Hath​ ​Cambridge​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​Azusa​ ​Street?​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​ ​and 




Another​ ​important​ ​consideration​ ​is​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​often​ ​writes​ ​from​ ​an​ ​openly​ ​theological 
and​ ​Christian​ ​perspective.​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​Cultural 
Liturgies​ ​series,​ ​was​ ​written​ ​with​ ​the​ ​intention​ ​of​ ​helping​ ​churches​ ​and​ ​Christian​ ​educational 
institutions​ ​reform​ ​their​ ​practices. ​ ​But​ ​because​ ​much​ ​of​ ​his​ ​analysis​ ​is​ ​not​ ​directly 23
dependent​ ​on​ ​his​ ​personal​ ​commitments​ ​and​ ​draws​ ​heavily​ ​on​ ​philosophers​ ​and​ ​scholarship 
from​ ​outside​ ​his​ ​own​ ​tradition,​ ​it​ ​can​ ​easily​ ​be​ ​appropriated​ ​and​ ​endorsed​ ​by​ ​those​ ​who​ ​do​ ​not 
share​ ​his​ ​confessional​ ​commitments.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​outside​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​the 
relationship​ ​between​ ​Smith’s​ ​theological​ ​orientation​ ​and​ ​arguments​ ​and​ ​his​ ​scholarship.​ ​Thus, 
confessional​ ​references​ ​are​ ​generally​ ​omitted​ ​even​ ​when​ ​they​ ​are​ ​directly​ ​embedded​ ​in 
sentences​ ​and​ ​texts.   24
1.5.​ ​Relevance​ ​to​ ​Religion,​ ​Conflict,​ ​and​ ​Dialogue 
How​ ​does​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​conflict,​ ​and​ ​dialogue?​ ​Globalization, 
modernization,​ ​and​ ​post-colonial​ ​conditions​ ​have​ ​produced​ ​new​ ​challenges​ ​to​ ​politics​ ​and 
social​ ​relations.​ ​In​ ​Western​ ​societies,​ ​various​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​secularist​ ​political​ ​regimes​ ​are​ ​in 
force​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​diversity​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​increase.​ ​Europe​ ​still​ ​struggles​ ​to 
grapple​ ​with​ ​the​ ​legacy​ ​of​ ​Christianity,​ ​its​ ​own​ ​religious​ ​identity,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​increased​ ​attention 
given​ ​to​ ​Islam​ ​and​ ​Muslims​ ​in​ ​the​ ​wake​ ​of​ ​9/11​ ​and​ ​refugees​ ​from​ ​wars​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Middle​ ​East. 
These​ ​challenges​ ​demand​ ​thorough​ ​and​ ​interdisciplinary​ ​analysis​ ​to​ ​better​ ​understand 
religion,​ ​secularity,​ ​and​ ​how​ ​the​ ​two​ ​relate​ ​in​ ​modern​ ​society.  
An​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​how,​ ​or​ ​whether,​ ​religion​ ​relates​ ​to​ ​conflict​ ​at​ ​any​ ​level​ ​intensity 
must​ ​begin​ ​with​ ​and​ ​adequate​ ​definition​ ​or​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​religion.​ ​Most​ ​discussions,​ ​whether 
popular​ ​or​ ​scholarly,​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​violence​ ​or​ ​conflict​ ​take​ ​for​ ​granted​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​some​ ​other 
kind​ ​of​ ​conceptual​ ​distinction​ ​to​ ​be​ ​made​ ​with​ ​other​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​violence.​ ​Yet​ ​in​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​half​ ​of 
the​ ​twentieth​ ​century,​ ​much​ ​theoretical​ ​work​ ​has​ ​posed​ ​serious​ ​questions​ ​about​ ​these​ ​modern 
23​ ​See​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom:​ ​Worship,​ ​Worldview,​ ​and​ ​Cultural​ ​Formation​​ ​(Grand 
Rapids:​ ​Baker​ ​Academic,​ ​2009).  
24​ ​Smith’s​ ​arguments​ ​do​ ​not​ ​generally​ ​require​ ​presupposing​ ​the​ ​truth​ ​of​ ​Christian​ ​claims.​ ​But​ ​Smith 
would​,​ ​however,​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​all​ ​scholarship​ ​rests​ ​upon​ ​presuppositions,​ ​faith​ ​commitments,​ ​and—to​ ​use 
Foucault’s​ ​term—“unthoughts,”​ ​so​ ​the​ ​prohibition​ ​of​ ​“religious”​ ​perspectives​ ​from​ ​the​ ​academy​ ​is​ ​actually​ ​an 
impediment​ ​to​ ​a​ ​robust​ ​pluralistic​ ​public​ ​sphere.​ ​Indeed,​ ​central​ ​to​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​is 
that​ ​​all​​ ​perspectives​ ​and​ ​the​ ​people​ ​that​ ​hold​ ​them​ ​are​ ​ultimately​ ​confessional,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​the​ ​need​ ​to​ ​move​ ​beyond 





categories,​ ​raising​ ​doubts​ ​that​ ​conflict​ ​and​ ​violence​ ​can​ ​be​ ​clearly​ ​as​ ​religious​ ​or​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​is 
commonly​ ​thought.  
As​ ​a​ ​philosopher​ ​writing​ ​from​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​tradition​ ​and​ ​with​ ​the​ ​influence​ ​of 
postmodern​ ​thought,​ ​Smith’s​ ​interrogates​ ​the​ ​concepts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​religion​ ​throughout 
his​ ​work.​ ​His​ ​analysis​ ​challenges​ ​these​ ​categories​ ​and​ ​the​ ​theories​ ​which​ ​have​ ​sought​ ​to 
explain​ ​them.​ ​Yet​ ​Smith’s​ ​also​ ​offers​ ​a​ ​​con​structive​ ​project​ ​that​ ​has​ ​potential​ ​application​ ​in 
the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​conflict.​ ​With​ ​this​ ​part​ ​of​ ​his​ ​work,​ ​he​ ​aims​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​theoretical​ ​tools 
which​ ​better​ ​explain​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​human​ ​social​ ​behavior​ ​than​ ​typical​ ​modern​ ​theories.​ ​With 
an​ ​improved​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​what​ ​constitutes​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​drives​ ​human​ ​action,​ ​scholars 
could​ ​better​ ​able​ ​to​ ​analyze​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​conflict.​ ​This​ ​theoretical 
frame​ ​could​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​fruitful​ ​research​ ​into​ ​how​ ​to​ ​address​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​and 
mechanisms​ ​by​ ​which​ ​people​ ​are​ ​recruited​ ​into​ ​extremists​ ​groups​ ​which​ ​commit​ ​acts​ ​of 
violence​ ​and​ ​terrorism.​ ​It​ ​could​ ​similarly​ ​point​ ​to​ ​ways​ ​of​ ​countering​ ​these​ ​trends,​ ​promoting 





























2.​ ​The​ ​Roots​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secular 
Introduction 
What​ ​is​ ​the​ ​connection​ ​between​ ​secular​ ​political​ ​projects​ ​and​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​accounts​ ​of 
reality​ ​and​ ​knowledge​ ​that​ ​arose​ ​in​ ​modernity?​ ​In​ ​a​ ​book-length​ ​exposition​ ​of​ ​and 
engagement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​ ​project,​ ​a​ ​theological​ ​school​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​associated 
with​ ​the​ ​scholar​ ​John​ ​Milbank, ​ ​Smith​ ​summarizes​ ​their​ ​“Story”​ ​of​ ​philosophy:​ ​“Behind​ ​the 25
politics​​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​(liberal,​ ​secular)​ ​is​ ​an​ ​​epistemology​​ ​(autonomous​ ​reason),​ ​which​ ​is​ ​in 
turn​ ​undergirded​ ​by​ ​an​ ​​ontology​​ ​(univocity​ ​and​ ​the​ ​denial​ ​of​ ​participation).” ​ ​It​ ​is​ ​an​ ​axiom 26
which​ ​Smith​ ​himself​ ​endorses​ ​and​ ​defends, ​ ​and​ ​which​ ​unpacks​ ​and​ ​interrogates​ ​using​ ​the 27
tools​ ​of​ ​his​ ​theological​ ​and​ ​philosophical​ ​traditions.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​the​ ​first​ ​level​ ​of​ ​critique​ ​aimed​ ​at 
the​ ​secular,​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​expounded​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​the​ ​political​ ​project​ ​of​ ​secularism.​ ​Section 
2.1​ ​examines​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​an​ ​epistemic​ ​category​ ​(and​ ​as​ ​a​ ​metanarrative) 
and​ ​his​ ​constructive​ ​account​ ​of​ ​postmodern​ ​epistemology.​ ​Section​ ​2.3​ ​assesses​ ​his 
understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​disenchanted​ ​autonomy​ ​and​ ​his​ ​constructive 
account​ ​of​ ​reenchantment.​ ​Finally,​ ​section​ ​2.4​ ​will​ ​examine​ ​how​ ​these​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​secular 
relate​ ​to​ ​the​ ​political​ ​project​ ​of​ ​secularism. 
2.1.​ ​Epistemology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secular 
“Behind​ ​the​ ​​politics​​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​(liberal,​ ​secular)​ ​is​ ​an​ ​​epistemology​.” 
In​ ​his​ ​writing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​Smith​ ​distinguishes​ ​between​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​an​ ​epistemic 
category​ ​and​ ​as​ ​a​ ​politics.​ ​The​ ​two​ ​are​ ​conceptually​ ​distinct​ ​but​ ​closely​ ​linked. ​ ​Smith 28
25 ​ ​​Milbank’s​ ​​Theology​ ​and​ ​Social​ ​Theory:​ ​Beyond​ ​Secular​ ​Reason​ ​​(Oxford:​ ​Blackwells,​ ​1990)​ ​contains 
much​ ​of​ ​the​ ​critique​ ​that​ ​would​ ​come​ ​to​ ​characterize​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy.​ ​Graham​ ​Ward​ ​and​ ​Catherine​ ​Pickstock 
are​ ​also​ ​key​ ​figures​ ​who​ ​edited​ ​the​ ​first​ ​collection​ ​of​ ​essays​ ​with​ ​Milbank​ ​with​ ​such​ ​a​ ​title.​ ​See​ ​their​ ​​Radical 
Orthodoxy:​ ​A​ ​New​ ​Theology​ ​​(London:​ ​Routledge,​ ​1999).  
26 ​ ​​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy:​ ​Mapping​ ​a​ ​Post-Secular​ ​Theology​ ​ ​(Grand 
Rapids:​ ​Baker​ ​Academic,​ ​2004),​ ​99-100.​ ​In​ ​his​ ​exposition​ ​of​ ​the​ ​theological​ ​school​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​(or​ ​possibly,​ ​as 
Smith​ ​notes,​ ​a​ ​“movement”​ ​or​ ​“sensibility”),​ ​Smith​ ​expresses​ ​wide​ ​agreement,​ ​though​ ​with​ ​his​ ​own 
Reformational​ ​caveats. 
27 ​ ​​James​ ​K.A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity,”​ ​​Journal​ ​for​ ​Cultural​ ​and 
Religious​ ​Theory​​ ​6,​ ​no.​ ​3,​ ​(Fall​ ​2005),​ ​117n3.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​a​ ​review​ ​of​ ​Talal​ ​Asad,​ ​​Formations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secular: 
Christianity,​ ​Islam,​ ​Modernity​​ ​(Stanford:​ ​Stanford​ ​University​ ​Press),​ ​2003.​ ​Smith​ ​generalizes​ ​it​ ​here​ ​by​ ​noting 
that​ ​“a​ ​politics​ ​is​ ​rooted​ ​in​ ​an​ ​epistemology,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​in​ ​turn​ ​rooted​ ​in​ ​an​ ​ontology.”​ ​On​ ​this​ ​account,​ ​​no​ ​​politics 
can​ ​be​ ​without​ ​an​ ​epistemology​ ​or​ ​ontology,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​unarticulated. 




suggests​ ​that​ ​secularism​ ​flows​ ​from​ ​secular​ ​epistemology—not​ ​necessarily​ ​chronologically, 
but​ ​conceptually.​ ​The​ ​epistemology​ ​is​ ​logically​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​political​ ​doctrine​ ​of​ ​secularism. 
Smith​ ​says​ ​that​ ​“our​ ​epistemologies​ ​and​ ​attendant​ ​theologies​ ​spawn​ ​political​ ​agendas,​ ​even 
where​ ​such​ ​political​ ​implications​ ​are​ ​neither​ ​suggested​ ​nor​ ​glimpsed.”   29
According​ ​to​ ​a​ ​more​ ​traditional​ ​model​ ​as​ ​outlined​ ​by​ ​[John]​ ​Rawls​ ​or​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​close 
link​ ​between​ ​the​ ​[secular​ ​epistemic​ ​category​ ​and​ ​secularism]​ ​and​ ​their​ ​emergence​ ​alongside​ ​(or​ ​as​ ​the 
condition​ ​of)​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​nation-state:​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​denotes​ ​a​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​knowing​ ​which​ ​is​ ​neutral​ ​with 
respect​ ​to​ ​religious​ ​commitments​ ​or​ ​‘visions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​good’​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​open​ ​and​ ​common​ ​to​ ​all.​ ​… 
Secular​ism​​ ​is​ ​the​ ​doctrine​ ​that​ ​mandates​ ​that​ ​public​ ​discourse​ ​be​ ​conducted​ ​according​ ​to​ ​the​ ​neutral, 
non-religious​ ​standards​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​reason.​ ​…​[E]pistemology​ ​precedes​ ​(perhaps​ ​even​ ​entails)​​ ​a​ ​distinct 
Enlightenment​ ​politics​ ​that​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​govern​ ​Europe.” ​ ​(italics​ ​mine) 30
As​ ​noted​ ​earlier,​ ​secularism​ ​is​ ​a​ ​word​ ​with​ ​several​ ​meanings.​ ​Slavica​ ​Jakelić​ ​has​ ​written​ ​that 
the​ ​word​ ​“may​ ​indicate​ ​a​ ​nonreligious​ ​worldview,​ ​an​ ​ideology,​ ​a​ ​political​ ​doctrine,​ ​a​ ​form​ ​of 
political​ ​governance,​ ​a​ ​type​ ​of​ ​moral​ ​philosophy,​ ​or​ ​a​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​the​ ​scientific​ ​method​ ​is 
solely​ ​sufficient​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​world​ ​in​ ​which​ ​we​ ​live.” ​ ​The​ ​secularism​ ​to​ ​which​ ​Smith 31
refers​ ​is​ ​the​ ​political​ ​doctrine​ ​which​ ​takes​ ​a​ ​normative​ ​view​ ​against​ ​religion’s​ ​presence​ ​in​ ​the 
public​ ​sphere.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​in​ ​Rawlsian​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​abiding​ ​by​ ​the​ ​rules​ ​of 
secularism​ ​would​ ​not​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​his​ ​or​ ​her​ ​“comprehensive​ ​doctrine”​ ​in​ ​debate​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​argue 
using​ ​a​ ​public​ ​reason​ ​accessible​ ​to​ ​all. ​ ​Thus,​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​public​ ​reason,​ ​or​ ​a​ ​secular 32
(i.e.,​ ​non-religious)​ ​reason,​ ​is​ ​presupposed​ ​in​ ​a​ ​secularist​ ​political​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public 
sphere. 
The​ ​connection​ ​between​ ​the​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​the​ ​move​ ​to 
secular​ism​ ​​is​ ​not,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​necessary.​ ​A​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​makes​ ​possible​ ​the 
political​ ​doctrine,​ ​and​ ​“perhaps”​ ​makes​ ​it​ ​inevitable,​ ​though​ ​Smith​ ​doesn’t​ ​go​ ​far​ ​as​ ​to​ ​affirm 
this. ​ ​Conceptual​ ​priority,​ ​then,​ ​belongs​ ​to​ ​the​ ​epistemic​ ​category.​ ​But​ ​secularism​ ​is 33
embedded​ ​in​ ​this​ ​epistemology,​ ​latent​ ​and​ ​available​ ​for​ ​unfolding,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​politics​ ​are​ ​not 
explicitly​ ​stated.​ ​To​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​political​ ​agenda​ ​of​ ​secularism,​ ​therefore,​ ​Smith 
interrogates​ ​secular​ ​epistemology. 
29 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​50. 
30 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity,”​ ​117. 
31 ​ ​​Slavica​ ​Jakelić,​ ​“Secularism,”​ ​in​ ​​Encyclopedia​ ​of​ ​Global​ ​Religion​,​ ​eds.​ ​Wade​ ​Clark​ ​Roof​ ​and​ ​Mark 
Juergensmeyer​ ​(London:​ ​SAGE​ ​Publications,​ ​2012),​ ​1142. 
32 ​ ​​Although​ ​Rawls’​ ​position​ ​on​ ​this​ ​changed​ ​over​ ​the​ ​years.​ ​He​ ​was​ ​particularly​ ​concerned​ ​about​ ​the 
limits​ ​of​ ​public​ ​reason​ ​on​ ​essential​ ​constitutional​ ​issues​ ​and​ ​questions​ ​of​ ​basic​ ​justice.​ ​See​ ​John​ ​Rawls,​ ​​Political 
Liberalism​​ ​(New​ ​York:​ ​Columbia​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​1993),​ ​214-215.​ ​The​ ​target​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​would​ ​include 
Rawls​ ​but​ ​more​ ​broadly​ ​the​ ​cultural​ ​shifts 
33 ​ ​​But​ ​Smith​ ​will​ ​contend​ ​that​ ​Asad’s​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​should​ ​accompany​ ​a​ ​rejection 
of​ ​secular​ism​.  
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As​ ​noted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​axiom​ ​stated​ ​above,​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​an​ ​epistemic 
category​ ​assumes​ ​an​ ​autonomous​ ​space​ ​of​ ​reason.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​secular​ ​space,​ ​“philosophical​ ​(or, 
more​ ​broadly,​ ​theoretical)​ ​thought​ ​operates​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘neutral’​ ​system​ ​of 
rationality—one​ ​that​ ​is​ ​autonomous​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​controlling​ ​factors​ ​such​ ​as​ ​tradition, 
religious​ ​belief,​ ​or​ ​other​ ​‘prejudices.’” ​ ​Even​ ​though​ ​people​ ​may​ ​have​ ​traditions,​ ​beliefs,​ ​and 34
prejudices,​ ​these​ ​can​ ​be​ ​“bracketed”​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​objective,​ ​universal​ ​reasoning​ ​untethered​ ​to​ ​the 
particularities​ ​of​ ​a​ ​subjective​ ​human​ ​experiences,​ ​identities,​ ​and​ ​communities.​ ​The​ ​bracketing 
allows​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​be​ ​radically​ ​free.​ ​Individual​ ​agents,​ ​liberated​ ​from​ ​authority​ ​structures​ ​(not 
just​ ​political,​ ​but​ ​social,​ ​philosophical,​ ​etc.)​ ​are​ ​able​ ​to​ ​think​ ​freely,​ ​their​ ​knowledge​ ​being 
bounded​ ​only​ ​by​ ​reason.​ ​Fundamentally,​ ​Smith​ ​sees​ ​this​ ​epistemological​ ​move​ ​as​ ​crucial​ ​to 
understanding​ ​modernity​ ​(and​ ​thus​ ​secularism),​ ​since​ ​the​ ​“core​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​is​ ​the 
Enlightenment,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​heart​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​is​ ​a​ ​‘prejudice​ ​against​ ​prejudice.’”   35
In​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​terms,​ ​this​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​is​ ​called​ ​foundationalism. 
According​ ​to​ ​philosopher​ ​Robert​ ​Audi,​ ​the​ ​thesis​ ​of​ ​foundationalism​ ​as​ ​that​ ​“the​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​a 
body​ ​of​ ​knowledge…​ ​is​ ​foundational,​ ​where​ ​this​ ​is​ ​taken​ ​to​ ​imply​ ​that​ ​any​ ​indirect​ ​(hence 
non-foundational)​ ​knowledge​ ​there​ ​is​ ​depends​ ​on​ ​direct​ ​(and​ ​thus​ ​in​ ​a​ ​sense​ ​foundational) 
knowledge.​ ​The​ ​superstructure,​ ​one​ ​might​ ​say,​ ​rests​ ​on​ ​the​ ​foundations.” ​ ​The​ ​foundation 36
must​ ​arise​ ​from​ ​certitude​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​foundational​ ​belief.​ ​Audi​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​stronger 
(i.e.,​ ​classical)​ ​and​ ​more​ ​moderate​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​foundationalism,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​allowing​ ​a 
broader​ ​account​ ​for​ ​how​ ​one​ ​acquires​ ​foundations​ ​for​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​justification.  37
Nevertheless,​ ​foundationalism​ ​as​ ​a​ ​whole​ ​has​ ​come​ ​under​ ​sustained​ ​critique​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last 
century.   38
34​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​144. 
35 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​32.​ ​The​ ​“prejudice​ ​against​ ​prejudice”​ ​comes​ ​from​ ​Hans-Georg​ ​Gadamer’s​ ​concise​ ​summary​ ​of 
the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​project. 
36 ​ ​​Robert​ ​Audi,​ ​​Epistemology:​ ​A​ ​contemporary​ ​introduction​ ​to​ ​the​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​​(2nd​ ​ed., 
London:​ ​Routledge,​ ​2003),​ ​193-194.  
37 ​ ​​Audi​ ​says​ ​that​ ​moderate​ ​versions​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​“alternative​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​foundational​ ​beliefs​ ​for​ ​different 
people​ ​and​ ​under​ ​different​ ​circumstances,”​ ​and​ ​leaves​ ​people​ ​open​ ​to​ ​the​ ​possibilities​ ​of​ ​mistakes.​ ​Thus,​ ​it 
avoids​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​dogmatism​ ​of​ ​stronger​ ​versions.​ ​See​ ​ibid.,​ ​212-213. 
38 ​ ​​Olli-Pekka​ ​Vainio​ ​says​ ​that​ ​the​ ​twentieth​ ​century’s​ ​philosophical​ ​upheaval​ ​was​ ​an​ ​“epistemological 
revolution​ ​caused​ ​by​ ​the​ ​full-scale​ ​collapse​ ​of​ ​Cartesian​ ​foundationalism.”​ ​See​ ​​Beyond​ ​Fideism:​ ​Negotiable 
Religious​ ​Identities​​ ​(Farnham​ ​Burlington:​ ​Ashgate,​ ​2010)​ ​65.​ ​Duncan​ ​Pritchard​ ​summarizes​ ​the​ ​problems​ ​with 
foundationalism​ ​is​ ​​What​ ​Is​ ​This​ ​Thing​ ​Called​ ​Knowledge?​ ​​(2d​ ​ed.,​ ​London:​ ​Routledge,​ ​2010),​ ​38:​ ​”Either​ ​we​ ​set 
the​ ​requirements​ ​on​ ​foundational​ ​beliefs​ ​quite​ ​high​ ​so​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are​ ​plausible,​ ​but​ ​then​ ​face​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​of 
explaining​ ​how​ ​such​ ​a​ ​narrow​ ​set​ ​of​ ​foundational​ ​beliefs​ ​can​ ​serve​ ​as​ ​a​ ​foundation​ ​for​ ​all​ ​the​ ​non-foundational 
beliefs;​ ​or​ ​else​ ​we​ ​set​ ​the​ ​requirements​ ​on​ ​foundational​ ​beliefs​ ​quite​ ​low,​ ​but​ ​then​ ​face​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​explaining 
just​ ​why​ ​such​ ​beliefs​ ​should​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​as​ ​foundational​ ​at​ ​all.” 
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Smith’s​ ​writing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​these​ ​critiques,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​he​ ​is​ ​confident​ ​claiming 
that​ ​foundationalism​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“no-longer-sustainable​ ​epistemology.”   39
The​ ​secular​ ​view​ ​of​ ​epistemology,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​is​ ​itself​ ​a​ ​story,​ ​a​ ​​mythos​,​ ​a 
narrative,​ ​a​ ​faith​ ​about​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​human​ ​rationality.​ ​Beyond​ ​mere​ ​reason,​ ​“what 
constitutes​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​is​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​extra-theoretical​ ​commitments​ ​or 
presuppositions.” ​ ​The​ ​secular​ ​has​ ​pre-theoretical​ ​starting​ ​points—presuppositions​ ​which 40
cannot​ ​be​ ​rationally​ ​demonstrated,​ ​only​ ​assumed.​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​these​ ​presuppositions 
qualify​ ​as​ ​religious.​ ​“All​ ​pretended​ ​autonomous​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​human​ ​nature​ ​or​ ​social​ ​life​ ​are 
funded​ ​not​ ​only​ ​by​ ​biases​ ​or​ ​prejudices​ ​but​ ​also​ ​by​ ​religious,​ ​even​ ​quasi-theological, 
commitments.” ​ ​But​ ​what​ ​are​ ​these​ ​commitments,​ ​and​ ​what​ ​make​ ​them​ ​religious? 41
These​ ​commitments​ ​have​ ​gone​ ​by​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​names.​ ​Among​ ​the​ ​theologians​ ​and 
philosophers​ ​Smith​ ​cites​ ​are: 
● “ground​ ​motives”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Herman​ ​Dooyewerd   42
● “worldviews”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Abraham​ ​Kuyper   43
● “control​ ​beliefs”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Reformed​ ​epistemology​ ​of​ ​Nicholas​ ​Wolterstorff​ ​and​ ​Alvin​ ​Plantinga   44
● “paradigm”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Thomas​ ​Kuhn   45
● “unthought”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Michel​ ​Foucault  46
What​ ​gives​ ​these​ ​pretheoretical​ ​commitments​ ​their​ ​religious​ ​status,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​is 
their​ ​“ultimacy.” ​ ​They​ ​are​ ​ultimate​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​that​ ​they​ ​can​ ​only​ ​be​ ​taken​ ​on​ ​faith,​ ​with​ ​no 47
possibility​ ​for​ ​rational​ ​demonstration.  
39 ​ ​​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Globalization,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Re-enchantment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​World,”​ ​​After 
Modernity?:​ ​Secularity,​ ​Globalization,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Re-enchantment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​World​,​ ​ed.​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith​ ​(Waco: 
Baylor​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2008),​ ​​9. 
40 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​144.​ ​These​ ​presuppositions​ ​are​ ​called​ ​“ground-motives”​ ​of​ ​a 
worldview​ ​by​ ​Herman​ ​Dooyeweerd,​ ​a​ ​philosopher​ ​within​ ​Smith’s​ ​own​ ​Reformational​ ​tradition.​ ​John​ ​Milbank 
uses​ ​the​ ​term​ ​“quasi-theologies”​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​the​ ​same​ ​faith-based​ ​views. 
41 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​147. 
42 ​ ​​The​ ​ground​ ​motives​ ​traced​ ​by​ ​Dooyeweerd​ ​include​ ​the​ ​following:​ ​the​ ​Greek​ ​form-matter​ ​motive;​ ​the 
scholastic​ ​nature-grace​ ​motive;​ ​and​ ​the​ ​humanistic​ ​nature-freedom​ ​motive.​ ​See​ ​Herman​ ​Dooyeweerd,​ ​​In​ ​the 
Twilight​ ​of​ ​Western​ ​Thought:​ ​Studies​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Pretended​ ​Autonomy​ ​of​ ​Philosophical​ ​Thought​,​ ​ed.​ ​James​ ​K.A. 
Smith,​ ​Collected​ ​Works,​ ​B/4​ ​(Lewiston:​ ​Edwin​ ​Mellen​ ​Press,​ ​1999),​ ​29-36. 
43 ​ ​​Abraham​ ​Kuyper,​ ​​Lectures​ ​on​ ​Calvinism​​ ​(Grand​ ​Rapids:​ ​Wm.​ ​B.​ ​Eerdmans​ ​Publishing,​ ​1943). 
44 ​ ​​Alvin​ ​Plantinga​ ​and​ ​Nicholas​ ​Wolterstorff,​ ​​Faith​ ​and​ ​Rationality:​ ​Reason​ ​and​ ​Belief​ ​in​ ​God​​ ​(Notre 
Dame:​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Notre​ ​Dame​ ​Press,​ ​1983);​ ​Alvin​ ​Plantinga,​ ​​God​ ​and​ ​Other​ ​Minds:​ ​A​ ​Study​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Rational 
Justification​ ​of​ ​Belief​ ​in​ ​God​​ ​(Ithaca:​ ​Cornell​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​1967). 
45 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​How​ ​(Not)​ ​To​ ​Be​ ​Secular,​​ ​70n15.​ ​Smith​ ​views​ ​a​ ​paradigm​ ​as“a​ ​background​ ​set​ ​of​ ​assumptions 
of​ ​what​ ​is​ ​taken​ ​for​ ​granted​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​​not​​ ​articulated​ ​or​ ​made​ ​explicit.”​ ​See​ ​Thomas​ ​S.​ ​Kuhn,​ ​​The​ ​Structure​ ​of 
Scientific​ ​Revolutions​​ ​(Chicago:​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Chicago​ ​Press,​ ​1962),​ ​in​ ​which​ ​he​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​paradigms​ ​are 
“incommensurable,”​ ​and​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​incapable​ ​of​ ​providing​ ​objective​ ​criteria​ ​by​ ​which​ ​to​ ​judge​ ​other​ ​competing 
paradigms.​ ​Paradigms​ ​are​ ​“how​ ​we​ ​perceive​ ​our​ ​world​ ​and​ ​what​ ​we​ ​consider​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​truth.”​ ​See​ ​also 
Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives,”​ ​362. 
46 ​ ​​Michel​ ​Foucault,​ ​​The​ ​Order​ ​of​ ​Things:​ ​An​ ​Archaeology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Human​ ​Sciences​.​ ​(London:​ ​Routledge, 
2002). 
47 ​ ​​This​ ​paragraph​ ​comes​ ​from​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​147n15. 
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Smith​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​using​ ​“religious”​ ​here​ ​in​ ​two​ ​senses.​ ​A​ ​belief​ ​or​ ​a​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​religious 
in​ ​an​ ​​epistemic​ ​​sense​ ​if​ ​it​ ​is​ ​presupposed​ ​without​ ​argumentation,​ ​i.e.​ ​taken​ ​on​ ​faith​ ​(common 
examples​ ​cited​ ​in​ ​these​ ​discussions​ ​include​ ​the​ ​reliability​ ​of​ ​human​ ​sense​ ​perception,​ ​memory 
as​ ​foundations​ ​for​ ​knowledge,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​induction,​ ​among​ ​others). ​ ​Note​ ​here​ ​that 48
holding​ ​a​ ​belief​ ​taken​ ​on​ ​“faith”​ ​does​ ​not​ ​entail​ ​fideistic​ ​assertions​ ​whereby​ ​any​ ​belief​ ​can​ ​be 
justified​ ​and​ ​any​ ​claim​ ​can​ ​be​ ​made​ ​without​ ​substantiation. ​ ​But,​ ​in​ ​addition,​ ​a​ ​belief​ ​can 49
also​ ​be​ ​religious​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​ultimate​ ​​commitment​.​ ​The​ ​connotations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​go 
beyond​ ​merely​ ​assenting​ ​to​ ​propositional​ ​content;​ ​rather,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​more​ ​of​ ​an​ ​existential 
identification​ ​(even​ ​if​ ​unarticulated),​ ​a​ ​commitment​ ​to​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​“comprehensive​ ​view”​ ​of 
the​ ​good,​ ​the​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​a​ ​“myth.”​ ​Secular​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​reason,​ ​Smith​ ​is 
saying,​ ​are​ ​ultimately​ ​a​ ​story​ ​with​ ​which​ ​people​ ​identify,​ ​to​ ​which​ ​they​ ​are​ ​committed 
extra​-theoretically.  
The​ ​main​ ​thrust​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​point​ ​is​ ​not​ ​toward​ ​defining​ ​“religious”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of 
the​ ​epistemological​ ​issues.​ ​His​ ​aim​ ​is​ ​rather​ ​to​ ​show​ ​that​ ​​whatever​​ ​is​ ​meant​ ​by​ ​“religious”​ ​in 
many​ ​academic​ ​and​ ​popular​ ​discussions​ ​​also​​ ​applies​ ​to​ ​“secular”​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​theories​ ​of 
knowledge.​ ​A​ ​value,​ ​belief,​ ​or​ ​view​ ​of​ ​the​ ​good​ ​always​ ​includes​ ​some​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​faith-based 
assumption.​ ​This​ ​contention​ ​becomes​ ​important​ ​when​ ​the​ ​lexicon​ ​of​ ​this​ ​debate​ ​is​ ​transferred 
to​ ​the​ ​political​ ​sphere,​ ​for​ ​Smith​ ​holds​ ​that​ ​“secular”​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​reason​ ​is​ ​typically 
conferred​ ​a​ ​superior​ ​status​ ​to​ ​religious​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​reason.​ ​What​ ​is​ ​admissible​ ​in​ ​a​ ​secular 
public​ ​sphere​ ​hinges​ ​on​ ​this​ ​epistemic​ ​status​ ​of​ ​citizens’​ ​beliefs. 
2.1.1​ ​The​ ​Secular​ ​as​ ​a​ ​Metanarrative 
As​ ​already​ ​noted,​ ​Smith​ ​views​ ​the​ ​epistemology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​story,​ ​a​ ​​mythos​.​ ​But​ ​there 
are​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​narrative​ ​assumed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​different​ ​than​ ​other​ ​accounts​ ​of 
knowledge,​ ​and​ ​Smith​ ​explains​ ​this​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​his​ ​interaction​ ​with​ ​Jean-François​ ​Lyotard’s 
language​ ​of​ ​“metanarrative.” ​ ​Writing​ ​about​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​metanarratives​ ​vis-a-vis 50
postmodernism,​ ​Smith​ ​writes​ ​that​ ​“metanarratives​ ​are​ ​a​ ​distinctly​ ​modern​ ​phenomenon:​ ​they 
are​ ​stories​ ​which​ ​not​ ​only​ ​tell​ ​a​ ​grand​ ​story​ ​(since​ ​even​ ​premodern​ ​and​ ​tribal​ ​stories​ ​do​ ​this), 
but​ ​also​ ​claim​ ​to​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​legitimate​ ​the​ ​story​ ​and​ ​its​ ​claims​ ​by​ ​an​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​universal 
48 ​ ​​And​ ​Smith​ ​believes​ ​that​ ​these​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​are​ ​ultimately​ ​impossible​ ​to​ ​avoid. 
49 ​ ​​See​ ​Vainio,​ ​​Beyond​ ​Fideism​,​ ​2-6​ ​(and​ ​the​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​book)​ ​for​ ​a​ ​discussion​ ​fideism.  
50 ​ ​​Jean-Fran​ç​ois​ ​Lyotard,​ ​​The​ ​Postmodern​ ​Condition:​ ​A​ ​Report​ ​on​ ​Knowledge​​ ​(Manchester: 
Manchester​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​1984). 
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Reason.” ​ ​The​ ​“story”​ ​corresponds​ ​to​ ​knowledge​ ​people​ ​can​ ​legitimately​ ​claim​ ​to​ ​possess. 51
So​ ​the​ ​legitimation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​story—in​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​of​ ​knowledge—​ ​is​ ​grounded​ ​by​ ​an 
autonomous​ ​sphere​ ​of​ ​reason.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​an​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​something​ ​​outside​​ ​of​ ​the​ ​story.​ ​But,​ ​Smith, 
alluding​ ​to​ ​Wittgenstein,​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​this​ ​attempted​ ​legitimation​ ​is​ ​merely​ ​another​ ​language 
game:​ ​“The​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​‘Reason’​ ​as​ ​the​ ​criterion​ ​for​ ​what​ ​constitutes​ ​knowledge​ ​is​ ​but​ ​one 
more​ ​language​ ​game​ ​among​ ​many,​ ​shaped​ ​by​ ​founding​ ​beliefs​ ​or​ ​commitments​ ​which 
determine​ ​what​ ​constitutes​ ​‘knowledge’​ ​within​ ​the​ ​game.” ​ ​The​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​impossible 52
get​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​these​ ​language​ ​games,​ ​impossible​ ​for​ ​finite​ ​humans​ ​to​ ​escape​ ​their​ ​particularity 
and​ ​the​ ​intersubjectivity​ ​this​ ​entails.​ ​This​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​legitimation​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​solved​ ​an​ ​“appeal 
to​ ​a​ ​higher​ ​court​ ​that​ ​would​ ​transcend​ ​a​ ​historical​ ​context​ ​or​ ​language​ ​game”​ ​as​ ​there​ ​is​ ​“no 
neutral​ ​observer​ ​nor​ ​‘God’s-eye-view’​ ​which​ ​can​ ​​legitimate​​ ​or​ ​​justify​​ ​one​ ​paradigm​ ​or​ ​moral 
language​ ​game​ ​above​ ​another.” ​ ​So​ ​even​ ​though​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​narrative​ ​claims​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​“game 53
above​ ​all​ ​games,” ​ ​it​ ​is,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​just​ ​another​ ​myth.  54
Note​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​not​ ​using​ ​“myth”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​“untrue.”​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​opposed​ ​to 
“fact.”​ ​Rather,​ ​he​ ​is​ ​using​ ​it​ ​in​ ​a​ ​“benign​ ​way​ ​as​ ​‘orienting​ ​commitments’​ ​or​ ​‘fundamental 
beliefs.’​ ​It​ ​makes​ ​no​ ​evaluation​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​‘truth’​ ​or​ ​‘falsity’​ ​of​ ​such​ ​beliefs.” ​ ​Even​ ​to 55
view​ ​“myth”​ ​in​ ​that​ ​light​ ​is​ ​already​ ​concede​ ​autonomous​ ​reason​ ​as​ ​the​ ​arbiter​ ​of​ ​knowledge. 
Smith​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​a​ ​myth​ ​or​ ​narrative​ ​is​ ​ultimately​ ​akin​ ​to​ ​a​ ​faith​ ​in​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​outside 
source​ ​of​ ​legitimation,​ ​no​ ​universal​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​be​ ​made.​ ​Even​ ​appeals​ ​to​ ​reason​ ​itself​ ​can​ ​only 
be​ ​self-referential:​ ​any​ ​legitimation​ ​of​ ​reason​ ​can​ ​only​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​itself,​ ​thus​ ​becoming​ ​circular 
and​ ​lacking​ ​external​ ​foundation.​ ​To​ ​ground​ ​reason​ ​itself,​ ​then,​ ​one​ ​can​ ​only​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​faith​ ​(or 
the​ ​narrative/myth).​ ​In​ ​the​ ​end,​ ​myths​ ​are​ ​auto-legitimating​ ​by​ ​necessity.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​built-in​ ​to​ ​the 
structure​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​itself,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​were.​ ​Smith​ ​isn’t​ ​saying​ ​that​ ​myths​ ​​should​​ ​be 
auto-legitimating,​ ​but​ ​that​ ​they​ ​​cannot​ ​be​ ​otherwise​.​ ​And​ ​because​ ​this​ ​auto-legitimation​ ​can 
only​ ​occur​ ​within​ ​one’s​ ​language​ ​game,​ ​from​ ​the​ ​“authority”​ ​of​ ​a​ ​narrator​ ​and​ ​the 
“homogeneity​ ​of​ ​a​ ​‘people,’”​ ​appealing​ ​to​ ​the​ ​rules​ ​of​ ​one’s​ ​own​ ​game​ ​does​ ​nothing​ ​to 
51 ​ ​​See​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives:​ ​Lyotard,​ ​Religion,​ ​and​ ​Postmodernism 
Revisited,”​ ​​Faith​ ​and​ ​Philosophy​​ ​18,​ ​no.​ ​2​ ​(2002),”​ ​354. 
52 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​360. 
53 ​ ​​Ibid. 
54 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​359.​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​Lyotard’s​ ​“narratives​ ​of​ ​legitimation”​ ​include​ ​the​ ​“humanistic​ ​metanarrative 
of​ ​emancipation​ ​(as​ ​found​ ​in​ ​Kant​ ​and​ ​Marx)”​ ​and​ ​the​ ​“life​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Spirit​ ​in​ ​German​ ​Idealism.”​ ​These​ ​are​ ​akin​ ​to 
the​ ​ground​ ​motives​ ​found​ ​in​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Dooyewerd. 
55 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​366n48. 
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persuade​ ​a​ ​“people”​ ​of​ ​another​ ​game. ​ ​And​ ​secular​ ​reason​ ​is,​ ​despite​ ​its​ ​claim​ ​to​ ​the​ ​contrary, 56
simply​ ​another​ ​game​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​a​ ​narrative,​ ​a​ ​myth. 
Following​ ​Lyotard,​ ​Smith​ ​writes​ ​that​ ​metanarratives​ ​should​ ​be​ ​viewed​ ​“as​ ​universal 
discourses​ ​of​ ​legitimation​ ​which​ ​mask​ ​their​ ​own​ ​particularity.”​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​they  
deny​ ​their​ ​narrative​ ​ground​ ​even​ ​as​ ​they​ ​proceed​ ​upon​ ​on​ ​it​ ​as​ ​a​ ​basis.​ ​In​ ​particular,​ ​we​ ​must​ ​note​ ​that 
the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​is​ ​not​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​metanarratives​ ​because​ ​they​ ​are​ ​really​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​narratives; 
on​ ​the​ ​contrary,​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​with​ ​metanarratives​ ​is​ ​that​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​own​ ​up​ ​to​ ​their​ ​own​ ​mythic​ ​ground. 
Postmodernism​ ​is​ ​not​ ​incredulity​ ​toward​ ​narrative​ ​or​ ​myth;​ ​on​ ​the​ ​contrary,​ ​it​ ​unveils​ ​that​ ​all 
knowledge​ ​is​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​such.  57
By​ ​Smith’s​ ​account,​ ​then,​ ​the​ ​story​ ​told​ ​by​ ​secularism​ ​is​ ​equally​ ​as​ ​“religious”​ ​as​ ​those​ ​told 
by​ ​other​ ​faith​ ​traditions​ ​because​ ​it​ ​ultimately​ ​appeals​ ​a​ ​narrative​ ​(story,​ ​myth,​ ​etc.)​ ​to​ ​ground 
its​ ​knowledge.​ ​But​ ​this​ ​religious​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​issue.​ ​The​ ​problem​ ​is​ ​that 
knowledge​ ​sourced​ ​from​ ​other​ ​narratives​ ​is​ ​deemed​ ​inadmissible​ ​(for​ ​example,​ ​in​ ​academia​ ​or 
politics)​ ​​because​​ ​they​ ​are​ ​explicitly​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​narrative.​ ​If​ ​secular​ ​epistemology’s 
grounding​ ​is​ ​unveiled​ ​as​ ​ultimately​ ​just​ ​as​ ​faith-based​ ​as​ ​all​ ​other​ ​religious​ ​worldviews,​ ​it 
loses​ ​its​ ​superior​ ​position​ ​as​ ​neutral​ ​arbiter​ ​of​ ​truth​ ​claims.​ ​It​ ​would​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​inconsistent​ ​to 
treat​ ​religious​ ​reasoning​ ​as​ ​inherently​ ​different​ ​from​ ​secular​ ​reasoning. 
One​ ​response​ ​that​ ​is​ ​common​ ​to​ ​these​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​post-foundationalist​ ​critiques​ ​of 
modern​ ​epistemology​ ​is​ ​to​ ​recognize​ ​the​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​culture​ ​and​ ​the​ ​well-known​ ​biases​ ​of 
human​ ​cognition,​ ​yet​ ​still​ ​assert​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​seeking​ ​facts​ ​and​ ​objective​ ​truths.​ ​Some 
may​ ​point​ ​to,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​the​ ​scientific​ ​method,​ ​peer-reviews,​ ​and​ ​other​ ​methods​ ​for 
minimizing​ ​the​ ​prejudices​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​known​ ​to​ ​carry​ ​into​ ​pursuits​ ​of​ ​knowledge.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​how 
Immanuel​ ​Kant​ ​sought​ ​to​ ​bridge​ ​the​ ​transcendental​ ​gap​ ​between​ ​phenomena​ ​(the​ ​perceived 
world)​ ​and​ ​noumena​ ​(the​ ​world​ ​as​ ​it​ ​really​ ​exists).​ ​While​ ​admitting​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​these 
guardrails​ ​in​ ​mitigating​ ​against​ ​the​ ​most​ ​basic​ ​of​ ​observational​ ​fallacies​ ​and​ ​biases,​ ​Smith’s 
approach​ ​would​ ​assert​ ​that​ ​every​ ​presentation​ ​of​ ​facts​ ​is​ ​an​ ​interpretation—possibly​ ​true,​ ​but 
always​ ​an​ ​interpretation.​ ​The​ ​issue​ ​is​ ​not​ ​merely​ ​the​ ​difficulty​ ​of​ ​presenting​ ​objective 
knowledge,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​the​ ​impossibility. 
Importantly,​ ​Smith​ ​does​ ​not​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​adherents​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​epistemology 
undergirding​ ​secular​ ​reason​ ​must​ ​abandon​ ​their​ ​approach.​ ​If​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​is 
correct,​ ​it​ ​“does​ ​not​ ​demand​ ​that​ ​modern​ ​thought​ ​relinquish​ ​its​ ​faith​ ​(a​ ​modern​ ​gesture​ ​to​ ​be 
56 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​359.  
57 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​360. 
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sure),​ ​but​ ​to​ ​own​ ​up​ ​to​ ​it​—​to​ ​openly​ ​confess​ ​its​ ​​credo​.” ​ ​Secular​ ​reason​ ​can​ ​continue,​ ​Smith 58
says,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​must​ ​cease​ ​to​ ​demand​ ​that​ ​its​ ​approach​ ​be​ ​the​ ​​only​​ ​form​ ​permissible​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public 
square. 
2.1.2.​ ​Postmodern​ ​Epistemology 
The​ ​deconstructive​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​Smith​ ​couples​ ​with​ ​a​ ​constructive 
project.​ ​What​ ​he​ ​articulates​ ​is​ ​an​ ​explicitly​ ​postmodern​ ​perspective​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​note 
what​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​postmodernism​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​​not​​ ​talking​ ​about.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​only​ ​a​ ​deconstruction​ ​of 
modernity​ ​as​ ​has​ ​been​ ​done​ ​in​ ​the​ ​works​ ​of​ ​thinkers​ ​like​ ​Foucault​ ​and​ ​Derrida.​ ​More​ ​than 
simply​ ​deconstructing​ ​assumptions​ ​of​ ​how​ ​we​ ​know​ ​which​ ​are​ ​built-in​ ​to​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​Smith 
attempts​ ​also​ ​to​ ​give​ ​a​ ​positive​ ​account​ ​of​ ​what​ ​counts​ ​as​ ​knowledge.  
Perhaps​ ​the​ ​most​ ​important​ ​resource​ ​Smith’s​ ​overall​ ​project—and​ ​his​ ​account​ ​of 
postmodern​ ​epistemology​ ​in​ ​particular—is​ ​Augustine.​ ​One​ ​prime​ ​reason​ ​this​ ​ancient​ ​source 
appears​ ​to​ ​play​ ​such​ ​a​ ​central​ ​role​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​work,​ ​and​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the 
secular​ ​modernity,​ ​is​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Bishop​ ​of​ ​Hippo’s​ ​pre-modern​ ​framework.​ ​Augustine’s 
thought​ ​had​ ​not​ ​yet​ ​been​ ​“contaminated​ ​by​ ​the​ ​invention​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular,”​ ​thus​ ​providing​ ​a 
worldview​ ​and​ ​language​ ​with​ ​which​ ​to​ ​articulate​ ​a​ ​​post​-secularism. ​ ​The​ ​cultural​ ​and 59
political​ ​milieu​ ​of​ ​Augustine’s​ ​context​ ​also​ ​reflects​ ​the​ ​West​ ​with​ ​its​ ​religious​ ​pluralism​ ​under 
a​ ​hegemonic​ ​power.​ ​Smith’s​ ​third​ ​reason​ ​is​ ​that  
the​ ​substance​ ​of​ ​Augustine’s​ ​thought—in​ ​particular​ ​his​ ​epistemology,​ ​his​ ​cultural​ ​analysis,​ ​and​ ​his 
theological​ ​vision—resonates​ ​with​ ​the​ ​post-foundationalist​ ​project​ ​that​ ​rejects​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​reason 
and​ ​hence​ ​also​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sociopolitical​ ​sphere.​ ​In​ ​short,​ ​for​ ​Augustine​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​secular, 
non-religious​ ​sphere​ ​as​ ​construed​ ​by​ ​modernity,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​only​ ​paganism​ ​or​ ​true​ ​worship.  60
The​ ​postmodern​ ​epistemology​ ​Smith​ ​puts​ ​forward​ ​adopts​ ​the​ ​Augustinian​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​the 
primacy​ ​of​ ​faith​ ​in​ ​understanding​ ​(​credo​ ​ut​ ​intelligam​).​ ​Cartesian​ ​certainty​ ​is​ ​no​ ​longer 
required.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​an​ ​“epistemology​ ​which​ ​is​ ​attentive​ ​to​ ​the​ ​structural​ ​necessity​ ​of​ ​faith​ ​preceding 
reason,​ ​believing​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​understand.” ​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​reason​ ​and​ ​knowledge​ ​must​ ​be​ ​grounded 61
by​ ​certain​ ​presuppositions​ ​from​ ​which​ ​human​ ​understanding​ ​can​ ​proceed.​ ​A​ ​postmodern 
approach​ ​to​ ​knowledge​ ​affirms​ ​what​ ​Smith​ ​calls​ ​this​ ​“Augustinian​ ​structure”​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​is 
58 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​362. 
59 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​46.  
60 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​47.​ ​Smith​ ​fundamentally​ ​disagrees​ ​with​ ​those​ ​who​ ​have​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​Augustine’s​ ​a​ ​precursor​ ​to 
Descartes​ ​and​ ​other​ ​modern​ ​thinkers.​ ​Justifying​ ​this​ ​reading​ ​of​ ​Augustine​ ​isn’t​ ​his​ ​core​ ​project,​ ​but​ ​he​ ​points​ ​to​ ​a 
work​ ​by​ ​Michael​ ​Hanby,​ ​​Augustine​ ​and​ ​Modernity​​ ​(London:​ ​Routledge,​ ​2003).  
61 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives,”​ ​362 
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recognized​ ​that​ ​“there​ ​are​ ​a​ ​plurality​ ​of​ ​faiths,​ ​as​ ​many​ ​as​ ​there​ ​are​ ​language​ ​games.” ​ ​Rather 62
than​ ​seeing​ ​all​ ​truth​ ​claims​ ​as​ ​relative​ ​in​ ​an​ ​absolute​ ​sense​ ​(a​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​relativism​ ​and,​ ​Smith 
argues,​ ​caricature​ ​of​ ​Derrida’s​ ​deconstruction),​ ​this​ ​Augustinian​ ​approach​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​place​ ​all 
claims​ ​truth​ ​and​ ​knowledge​ ​on​ ​the​ ​same​ ​level,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​were.​ ​Instead​ ​of​ ​dividing​ ​knowledge​ ​into 
objective/subjective,​ ​secular/religious,​ ​faith-based/reason-based,​ ​it​ ​separates​ ​claims​ ​simply​ ​as 
true-false​ ​(or,​ ​in​ ​Augustine’s​ ​terms,​ ​“true​ ​religion”​ ​vs​ ​paganism).​ ​All​ ​narratives​ ​are 
interpretations,​ ​but​ ​Smith​ ​still​ ​believes​ ​there​ ​can​ ​be​ ​a​ ​“true”​ ​interpretation. 
Having​ ​rejecting​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​of​ ​a​ ​universal​ ​and​ ​neutral​ ​standard​ ​of​ ​reason,​ ​Smith 
wants​ ​to​ ​recognize​ ​and​ ​affirm​ ​the​ ​particularity​ ​of​ ​knowledge,​ ​that​ ​foundational​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​a 
worldview​ ​can​ ​never​ ​be​ ​rationally​ ​demonstrated.​ ​A​ ​story​ ​or​ ​narrative​ ​could​ ​only​ ​ever​ ​be 
grounded​ ​in​ ​itself—auto-legitimation.​ ​He​ ​sees​ ​this​ ​approach​ ​as​ ​broadly​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​critiques 
of​ ​Enlightenment​ ​rationality​ ​from​ ​Heidegger​ ​to​ ​Thomas​ ​Kuhn,​ ​all​ ​of​ ​whom​ ​is​ ​sees​ ​as 
inheritors​ ​to​ ​some​ ​extent​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Augustinian​ ​tradition.​ ​As​ ​examined​ ​above,​ ​​Lyotard’s​​ ​​The 
Postmodern​ ​Condition​​ ​provides​ ​a​ ​prime​ ​example​ ​of​ ​how​ ​postmodern​ ​thought​ ​has​ ​approached 
questions​ ​of​ ​knowledge.​ ​Lyotard’s​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​a​ ​scientific​ ​and​ ​universal​ ​way​ ​to​ ​legitimate 
knowledge​ ​of​ ​historical,​ ​traditioned,​ ​and​ ​particular​ ​situations​ ​and​ ​facts​ ​is​ ​precisely​ ​how​ ​Smith 
approaches​ ​the​ ​epistemology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular. 
Several​ ​questions​ ​arise​ ​from​ ​Smith’s​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​knowledge.​ ​One​ ​concern​ ​is​ ​that 
humans​ ​appear​ ​trapped​ ​within​ ​their​ ​own​ ​traditions​ ​and​ ​historical​ ​situations.​ ​Wouldn’t 
dialogue​ ​and​ ​debate​ ​be​ ​pointless​ ​if​ ​we​ ​are​ ​all​ ​stuck​ ​in​ ​our​ ​own​ ​language​ ​games?​ ​Wouldn’t 
disagreements​ ​ultimately​ ​end​ ​in​ ​exasperation​ ​over​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​opponents​ ​are​ ​simply​ ​​unable 
to​ ​agree​ ​because​ ​of​ ​their​ ​presuppositions,​ ​which​ ​are​ ​just​ ​as​ ​“legitimate”​ ​as​ ​any​ ​other?​ ​How 
are​ ​discussions​ ​between​ ​religious​ ​communities​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​communities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere 
possible​ ​under​ ​such​ ​epistemic​ ​conditions?  63
Any​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​these​ ​questions​ ​and​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​and 
constructive​ ​project​ ​would​ ​require​ ​separating​ ​two​ ​issues.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​is​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​his 
analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​epistemic​ ​situation​ ​is​ ​correct.​ ​The​ ​success​ ​of​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and 
secularism​ ​hinges​ ​upon​ ​foundationalism​ ​being,​ ​as​ ​he​ ​argues,​ ​“no-longer​ ​sustainable.”​ ​​ ​If 
foundationalist​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​​have​​ ​withstood​ ​the​ ​assault​ ​of​ ​postmodern​ ​theorists​ ​in 
the​ ​twentieth​ ​century,​ ​then​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​need​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​further​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular 
62 ​ ​​Ibid. 
63 ​ ​​See​ ​Vainio’s​ ​​Beyond​ ​Fideism​ ​​for​ ​more​ ​on​ ​this​ ​problem​ ​in​ ​particular. 
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claims​ ​on​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere.​ ​If,​ ​as​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​modern​ ​epistemology​ ​is​ ​behind​ ​secular​ ​politics 
and​ ​forms​ ​its​ ​foundation,​ ​then​ ​a​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​means​ ​the​ ​secular 
remains​ ​intact.​ ​When​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​issues​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​realm,​ ​discussants 
simply​ ​rely​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​standard​ ​of​ ​a​ ​universal​ ​reason​ ​and​ ​scientific​ ​knowledge​ ​to​ ​arbitrate 
debates.​ ​For​ ​adherents​ ​to​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​distinction​ ​of​ ​faith​ ​and​ ​reason,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​Smith’s​ ​postmodern 
approach​ ​to​ ​knowledge​ ​which​ ​fails​ ​to​ ​make​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​convincing.​ ​After​ ​all,​ ​he 
says​ ​himself​ ​that​ ​“what​ ​is​ ​at​ ​stake​ ​in​ ​postmodernism​ ​is​ ​​the​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​faith​ ​and 
reason​”​ ​(emphasis​ ​original).  64
The​ ​second​ ​issue​ ​pertains​ ​the​ ​target​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique:​ ​to​ ​what​ ​extent​ ​is​ ​secularism​ ​as 
a​ ​political​ ​doctrine​ ​​actually​​ ​reliant​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​epistemology?​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​could​ ​one​ ​hold​ ​to 
a​ ​post-foundationalist​ ​account​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​still​ ​advocate​ ​secularism?​ ​Smith​ ​argues 
against​ ​such​ ​a​ ​possibility. ​ ​Indeed,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​that​ ​if​ ​one​ ​accepts​ ​that​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​necessarily 65
tied​ ​to​ ​a​ ​universal,​ ​public​ ​reason,​ ​then​ ​the​ ​impetus​ ​for​ ​secularism​ ​collapses.​ ​This​ ​does​ ​not 
mean​ ​all​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​crumble.​ ​Other​ ​possibilities​ ​will​ ​be​ ​explored​ ​later. 
2.2.​ ​Ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secular  
“Behind​ ​the​ ​​politics​​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​(liberal,​ ​secular)​ ​is...​ ​an​ ​​ontology​.” 
According​ ​to​ ​the​ ​axiom​ ​stated​ ​above,​ ​the​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​has​ ​an​ ​epistemology, 
and​ ​this​ ​is​ ​rooted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​understanding​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​reality.​ ​Whereas 
pre-Enlightenment​ ​ontology​ ​had​ ​remained​ ​“open”​ ​to​ ​transcendence,​ ​the​ ​ontology​ ​of 
modernity​ ​was​ ​immanentized.​ ​The​ ​world​ ​became​ ​closed​ ​off​ ​from​ ​the​ ​transcendent​ ​and 
became​ ​a​ ​flat,​ ​autonomous​ ​system.​ ​Modern,​ ​secular​ ​people​ ​now​ ​live​ ​in​ ​the​ ​“immanent 
frame.”   66
Common​ ​to​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​accounts​ ​which​ ​critique​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​the​ ​location​ ​of​ ​a​ ​key 
ontological​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​the​ ​philosopher-theologian​ ​John​ ​Duns​ ​Scotus​ ​(1266–1308).​ ​While​ ​Smith 
is​ ​tracing​ ​this​ ​story​ ​through​ ​his​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy,​ ​others​ ​dating​ ​back​ ​to​ ​the 
64 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives,”​ ​361. 
65 ​ ​​See​​ ​​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity.” 
66 ​ ​​Charles​ ​Taylor,​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​Harvard​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​Belknap​ ​Press,​ ​2007).​ ​Taylor’s 
tome​ ​and​ ​its​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​we​ ​now​ ​inhabit​ ​the​ ​“immanent​ ​frame”​ ​led​ ​to​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Social​ ​Science​ ​Research 
Council’s​ ​creation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​website​ ​called​ ​“The​ ​Immanent​ ​Frame”​ ​devoted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​Taylor’s​ ​tome​ ​and 
religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere.​ ​Smith​ ​and​ ​Taylor​ ​have​ ​both​ ​published​ ​there.​ ​Important​ ​to​ ​Taylor’s​ ​work​ ​is​ ​that 
attempt​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​what​ ​it​ ​“feels”​ ​like​ ​to​ ​inhabit​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​age​ ​and​ ​the​ ​“immanent​ ​frame,”​ ​rather​ ​than 
deconstruct​ ​the​ ​propositional​ ​claims​ ​underwriting​ ​it.​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy,​ ​by​ ​contrast,​ ​has​ ​a​ ​“genealogical” 
account​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​immanent​ ​frame​ ​and​ ​traces​ ​these​ ​shifts​ ​through​ ​their​ ​intellectual​ ​carriers.​ ​These​ ​are​ ​not 
necessarily​ ​at​ ​odds,​ ​but​ ​different​ ​ways​ ​of​ ​approaching​ ​the​ ​same​ ​phenomenon. 
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Nouvelle​ ​Théologie​ ​​movement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mid-twentieth​ ​century​ ​have​ ​offered​ ​similar 
Scotus-centered​ ​genealogical​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​modernity. ​ ​The​ ​thesis​ ​is​ ​roughly​ ​this:​ ​Whereas 67
Thomas​ ​Aquinas’s​ ​participatory​ ​metaphysics​ ​held​ ​that​ ​the​ ​world​ ​“is”​ ​only​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​it 
“participates”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​transcendent​ ​(in​ ​Aquinas’s​ ​case,​ ​God),​ ​Scotus​ ​elevated​ ​“being”​ ​above 
transcendence.​ ​The​ ​material​ ​world​ ​thus​ ​becomes​ ​unhooked​ ​from​ ​its​ ​dependence​ ​on​ ​the 
transcendent,​ ​and​ ​“because​ ​being​ ​is​ ​‘flattened,’​ ​the​ ​world​ ​is​ ​freed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​an​ ​autonomous 
realm.” ​ ​Human​ ​beings​ ​were​ ​granted​ ​ontological​ ​independence—their​ ​“own​ ​subsistence​ ​and 68
autonomy” —taken​ ​as​ ​autonomous​ ​units​ ​which​ ​could​ ​make​ ​observations​ ​about​ ​the​ ​world​ ​as 69
if​ ​they​ ​were​ ​outside​ ​it.​ ​Naturalism​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​natural​ ​consequence​ ​of​ ​this​ ​shift,​ ​“just​ ​the​ ​kind 
of​ ​world​ ​that​ ​emerged​ ​after​ ​Scotus’s​ ​bifurcation​ ​of​ ​an​ ​‘autonomous’​ ​world,​ ​culminating​ ​in 
Kant.”  70
The​ ​ontological​ ​shift​ ​goes​ ​hand​ ​in​ ​hand​ ​with​ ​the​ ​epistemological​ ​shift.​ ​The 
“autonomous​ ​(and​ ​secular)​ ​metaphysics”​ ​of​ ​Scotus​ ​“treats​ ​finite​ ​creatures​ ​as​ ​wholly​ ​available 
for​ ​comprehension.” ​ ​To​ ​put​ ​this​ ​in​ ​hermeneutical​ ​terms,​ ​humans​ ​now​ ​have​ ​full,​ ​immediate 71
access​ ​to​ ​finite​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​such​ ​that​ ​they​ ​can​ ​be​ ​certain​ ​of​ ​their​ ​knowledge​ ​about​ ​and 
interpretation​ ​of​ ​them.​ ​Smith’s​ ​writes​ ​that​ ​before​ ​the​ ​advent​ ​of​ ​modernity,​ ​humanity​ ​was 
“positioned​ ​within​ ​a​ ​hierarchy​ ​of​ ​forms​ ​(in​ ​which​ ​case​ ​we​ ​wouldn’t​ ​be​ ​surprised​ ​if​ ​‘higher 
levels’​ ​are​ ​mysterious​ ​and​ ​inscrutable),”​ ​but​ ​the​ ​shift​ ​to​ ​the​ ​immanent​ ​frame​ ​means​ ​“we​ ​now 
adopt​ ​a​ ​God-like,​ ​dispassionate​ ​‘gaze’​ ​that​ ​deigns​ ​to​ ​survey​ ​the​ ​whole.” ​ ​The​ ​secular 72
epistemic​ ​category​ ​is​ ​only​ ​possible​ ​within​ ​this​ ​flattened​ ​reality,​ ​unhooked​ ​and​ ​autonomous 
with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​the​ ​transcendent.​ ​In​ ​modernity,​ ​the​ ​assumption​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​world​ ​can​ ​be 
understood​ ​neutrally,​ ​with​ ​no​ ​need​ ​to​ ​relate​ ​to​ ​transcendence.​ ​Now,​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Duns 
Scotus​ ​was​ ​such​ ​a​ ​primary​ ​source​ ​for​ ​secular​ ​ontology​ ​and​ ​modernity​ ​in​ ​general​ ​as​ ​Smith​ ​and 
67 ​ ​​The​ ​“Scotus​ ​Story”​ ​(as​ ​Michael​ ​Horton​ ​has​ ​called​ ​it)​ ​is​ ​found​ ​in​ ​other​ ​accounts.​ ​See,​ ​Brad​ ​S. 
Gregory,​ ​​The​ ​Unintended​ ​Reformation:​ ​How​ ​a​ ​Religious​ ​Revolution​ ​Secularized​ ​Society​ ​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​The 
Belknap​ ​Press​ ​of​ ​Harvard​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2012),​ ​25-73;​ ​Louis​ ​Dupré,​ ​​Passage​ ​to​ ​Modernity​​ ​(New​ ​Haven:​ ​Yale 
University​ ​Press,​ ​1993). 
68 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​97.​ ​So​ ​“both​ ​the​ ​Creator​ ​and​ ​the​ ​creature​ ​exist​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same 
way​ ​or​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​sense,”​ ​or​ ​what​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​ ​calls​ ​the​ ​“univocity​ ​of​ ​being.” 
69 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​98. 
70 ​ ​​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​​Thinking​ ​in​ ​Tongues:​ ​Pentecostal​ ​Contributions​ ​to​ ​Christian​ ​Philosophy​ ​​(Grand 
Rapids:​ ​Eerdmans,​ ​2010),​ ​98. 
71 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​98.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​what​ ​Derrida​ ​critiques​ ​as​ ​“presentism.” 
72 ​ ​​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​​How​ ​(Not)​ ​To​ ​Be​ ​Secular​,​ ​52. 
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Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​ ​thinkers​ ​suggest​ ​is​ ​disputed. ​ ​Even​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor,​ ​who​ ​finds​ ​much​ ​in 73
agreement​ ​with​ ​this​ ​“Intellectual​ ​Deviation”​ ​story,​ ​finds​ ​it​ ​an​ ​incomplete​ ​explanation​ ​of 
modern​ ​secularity. ​ ​Yet​ ​the​ ​historicity​ ​of​ ​this​ ​account,​ ​while​ ​important,​ ​is​ ​less​ ​important​ ​than 74
whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​the​ ​intellectual​ ​shifts​ ​have​ ​indeed​ ​occurred.​ ​The​ ​latter​ ​is​ ​less​ ​in​ ​doubt.  
The​ ​ontology​ ​emphasizing​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​material​ ​world​ ​was​ ​particularly 
significant​ ​in​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​modern​ ​science.​ ​Science,​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​is​ ​“governed​ ​by 
commitment​ ​to​ ​the​ ​regularities​ ​of​ ​cause-and-effect”​ ​and​ ​its​ ​“successes…​ ​have​ ​been​ ​the​ ​fruit 
of​ ​the​ ​predictive​ ​power​ ​of​ ​just​ ​such​ ​a​ ​‘normal’​ ​causal​ ​structure).” ​ ​But​ ​Smith’s​ ​contention​ ​is 75
that​ ​this​ ​ontological​ ​shift​ ​toward​ ​a​ ​closed​ ​system​ ​was​ ​not​ ​simply​ ​a​ ​​finding​​ ​of​ ​science​ ​or​ ​of 
secular​ ​reason.​ ​The​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​a​ ​closed,​ ​immanent​ ​world​ ​is​ ​a​ ​metaphysical—i.e., 
not-scientific—claim,​ ​a​ ​philosophical​ ​presupposition.​ ​Smith​ ​affirms​ ​that​ ​“the​ ​regularity​ ​and 
(relative)​ ​constancy​ ​of​ ​natural​ ​processes,”​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​use​ ​the​ ​scientific​ ​method,​ ​does​ ​not 
require​ ​this​ ​particular​ ​ontology.​ ​So​ ​though​ ​naturalism​ ​“claims​ ​that​ ​this​ ​must​ ​entail​ ​an 
understanding​ ​of​ ​nature​ ​as​ ​a​ ​closed​ ​system​ ​of​ ​laws,​ ​[]​ ​this​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​properly​ ​scientific 
(empirical)​ ​claim.” ​ ​Philosophy​ ​actually​ ​serves​ ​as​ ​the​ ​ground​ ​upon​ ​which​ ​the​ ​science​ ​(which 76
Smith​ ​clearly​ ​endorses​ ​and​ ​celebrates)​ ​stands.​ ​But​ ​“science​ ​finds​ ​itself​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​prior 
beliefs​ ​which​ ​do​ ​not​ ​admit​ ​of​ ​legitimation,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​function​ ​as​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​further 
legitimation.” ​ ​If​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​is​ ​foundationalist,​ ​secular​ ​ontology​ ​​assumes​​ ​the 77
legitimacy​ ​of​ ​philosophical​ ​naturalism​ ​in​ ​which​ ​only​ ​“natural”​ ​forces​ ​are​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​operate​ ​in 
the​ ​world. 
According​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​naturalistic​ ​assumptions​ ​in​ ​the​ ​hard​ ​sciences​ ​(biology,​ ​chemistry, 
physics,​ ​etc.),​ ​while​ ​not​ ​necessary​ ​for​ ​scientific​ ​inquiry,​ ​have​ ​become​ ​dominant​ ​in​ ​the​ ​field. 
The​ ​“price​ ​of​ ​admission​ ​to​ ​science​ ​(and​ ​scientific​ ​respectability)”​ ​is​ ​“​ ​metaphysical 
naturalism,​ ​or​ ​at​ ​least​ ​ontological​ ​monism,​ ​coupled​ ​with​ ​rigid​ ​conceptions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​laws​ ​of 
73 ​ ​​See​ ​Richard​ ​Cross,​ ​“Duns​ ​Scotus​ ​and​ ​Suárez​ ​at​ ​the​ ​Origins​ ​of​ ​Modernity,”​ ​in​ ​​Deconstructing​ ​Radical 
Orthodoxy:​ ​Postmodern​ ​Theology,​ ​Rhetoric​ ​and​ ​Truth​,​ ​eds.​ ​Wayne​ ​J.​ ​Hankey​ ​and​ ​Douglas​ ​Hedley​ ​(Aldershort: 
Ashgate,​ ​2005),​ ​65-80. 
74 ​ ​​Taylor​ ​thinks​ ​the​ ​Reform​ ​Master​ ​Narrative​ ​was​ ​also​ ​necessary:​ ​“Reform​ ​demanded​ ​that​ ​everyone​ ​be 
a​ ​r​eal,​ ​100​ ​​percent​​ ​​Christian.​ ​Reform​ ​not​ ​only​ ​disenchants,​ ​but​ ​disciplines​ ​and​ ​re-orders​ ​life​ ​and​ ​society.”​ ​See 
Charles​ ​Taylor,​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​,​ ​773-74.  
75 ​ ​​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Thinking​ ​in​ ​Tongues​,​ ​94. 
76 ​ ​​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Is​ ​the​ ​Universe​ ​Open​ ​for​ ​Surprise?​ ​Pentecostal​ ​Ontology​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Spirit​ ​of 
Naturalism,”​ ​​Zygon:​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Religion​ ​&​ ​Science​​ ​43,​ ​no.​ ​4​ ​(2008),​ ​891.​ ​As​ ​the​ ​non-scientific​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​these 
ontological​ ​claims,​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​elsewhere​ ​as​ ​a​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​“legitimation”:​ ​“Whenever​ ​science​ ​attempts​ ​to 
legitimate​ ​itself,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​scientific​ ​but​ ​narrative,​ ​appealing​ ​to​ ​an​ ​orienting​ ​myth​ ​which​ ​is​ ​not​ ​susceptible​ ​to 
scientific​ ​legitimation.”​ ​See​ ​Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives,”​ ​359. 
77 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives,”​ ​361. 
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nature.” ​ ​Because​ ​nature​ ​is​ ​assumed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​autonomous,​ ​no​ ​outside​ ​(transcendent, 78
supernatural)​ ​causal​ ​explanations​ ​are​ ​possible,​ ​so​ ​scientific​ ​methodology​ ​then​ ​becomes​ ​the 
way​ ​truth​ ​claims​ ​are​ ​adjudicated.​ ​Within​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​framework,​ ​“‘science’​ ​is​ ​the​ ​primary 
authority​ ​and​ ​is​ ​the​ ​first​ ​to​ ​stipulate​ ​what​ ​could​ ​be​ ​theoretically​ ​acceptable”​ ​as​ ​it​ ​has​ ​made 
“first​ ​and​ ​preeminent​ ​claim​ ​to​ ​the​ ​territory.” ​ ​When​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​religious​ ​truth​ ​claims,​ ​the 79
“natural​ ​sciences,​ ​then,​ ​are​ ​taken​ ​to​ ​be​ ​‘objective’​ ​arbiters​ ​of​ ​‘the​ ​way​ ​things​ ​​really​​ ​are,’” 
such​ ​that​ ​religious​ ​communities​ ​are​ ​“expected​ ​to​ ​modify​ ​and​ ​conform​ ​(‘correlate’)​ ​[their] 
beliefs​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​to​ ​the​ ​dispensations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​scientific​ ​magisterium.” ​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​this 80
ontology​ ​has​ ​become​ ​so​ ​dominant​ ​that​ ​those​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​hard​ ​sciences—and,​ ​most​ ​relevant​ ​to 
this​ ​discussion,​ ​theologians​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​thinkers—have​ ​felt​ ​obliged​ ​to​ ​join​ ​a​ ​correlationist 
project​ ​which​ ​requires​ ​conform​ ​to​ ​naturalistic,​ ​secular​ ​standards.  81
But​ ​the​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​has​ ​not​ ​been​ ​confined​ ​to​ ​the​ ​hard​ ​sciences​ ​alone. 
Perhaps​ ​more​ ​importantly​ ​for​ ​an​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​secular​ism​ ​​was​ ​the​ ​shift​ ​that​ ​occurred​ ​in 
secular​ ​social​ ​theoretical​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​intersubjectivity.​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​social​ ​ontology​ ​in 
modernity​ ​has​ ​adopted​ ​Thomas​ ​Hobbes’​ ​state​ ​of​ ​nature​ ​as​ ​a​ ​“war​ ​of​ ​all​ ​against​ ​all,”​ ​or​ ​what 
Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​ ​calls​ ​the​ ​“ontology​ ​of​ ​violence.”​ ​The​ ​ontologically​ ​autonomous​ ​individual 
becomes​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​social​ ​unit,​ ​and​ ​social​ ​relations​ ​are​ ​assumed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​inherently​ ​violent​ ​and 
atomistic.​ ​This​ ​social​ ​ontology​ ​then​ ​becomes​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​social,​ ​political,​ ​and​ ​economic 
theory​ ​in​ ​modernity​ ​and​ ​its​ ​“fruits:”​ ​the​ ​liberal​ ​nation-state​ ​and​ ​capitalism.​ ​And​ ​here​ ​is 
another​ ​point​ ​where​ ​the​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​are​ ​interrelated.​ ​Smith 
writes​ ​that​ ​Hobbes​ ​believed​ ​the​ ​truth​ ​of​ ​his​ ​state​ ​of​ ​nature​ ​theory​ ​was​ ​“disclosed​ ​by​ ​mere 
reason,”​ ​but​ ​it​ ​“is​ ​unveiled​ ​as​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​interpretive​ ​decision​ ​or​ ​commitment,​ ​not​ ​the 
self-evident​ ​truth​ ​of​ ​a​ ​universal​ ​logic.” ​ ​This​ ​presupposition,​ ​taken​ ​as​ ​self-evident,​ ​cannot​ ​be 82
demonstrated.​ ​So​ ​just​ ​as​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​​presupposes​​ ​an​ ​autonomous​ ​sphere​ ​of​ ​reason, 
immanent​ ​ontology​ ​​presupposes​ ​​a​ ​closed​ ​system​ ​of​ ​reality,​ ​neither​ ​of​ ​which​ ​are 
demonstrable.​ ​Both​ ​become​ ​axiomatic​ ​to​ ​theoretical​ ​thinking,​ ​fundamentally​ ​shaping​ ​secular 
social​ ​sciences​ ​and​ ​the​ ​possible​ ​political​ ​and​ ​social​ ​arrangements​ ​from​ ​which​ ​they​ ​result.  
78 ​ ​​​ ​Smith,​ ​“Is​ ​the​ ​Universe​ ​Open​ ​for​ ​Surprise?,”​ ​892. 
79 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Thinking​ ​in​ ​Tongues​,​ ​94. 
80 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​94. 
81 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​94.​ ​Smith​ ​cites​ ​Rudolf​ ​Bultmann,​ ​known​ ​for​ ​his​ ​“demythologization”​ ​of​ ​the​ ​New​ ​Testament,​ ​as 
a​ ​“classic​ ​case”​ ​of​ ​this.​ ​For​ ​an​ ​account​ ​of​ ​correlationism,​ ​see​ ​Vainio,​ ​​Beyond​ ​Fideism​,​ ​Ch.​ ​3,​ ​77-127. 
82 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​145.  
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2.2.1.​ ​Disenchantment​ ​to​ ​Reenchantment 
A​ ​word​ ​commonly​ ​used​ ​to​ ​summarize​ ​the​ ​ontology​ ​undergirding​ ​secular​ ​modernity​ ​is 
“disenchantment.” ​ ​Disenchantment,​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​story​ ​about​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​reality,​ ​but​ ​it 83
refuses​ ​to​ ​acknowledge​ ​its​ ​contestability,​ ​just​ ​as​ ​the​ ​epistemology​ ​of​ ​autonomous​ ​reason​ ​does.  
Despite​ ​its​ ​over-reaching​ ​claims​ ​to​ ​be​ ​‘value-free’​ ​description​ ​of​ ​‘the​ ​way​ ​thing​ ​are,’​ ​the​ ​secularist 
disenchantment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​is​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​narration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​that​ ​is​ ​contestable.​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​the 
secular​ ​story​ ​about​ ​the​ ​world​ ​and​ ​human​ ​beings,​ ​and​ ​our​ ​relationships​ ​is​ ​just​ ​that:​ ​a​ ​story​.”   84
Smith​ ​doesn’t​ ​want​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​this​ ​secular​ ​story​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​​not​​ ​a​ ​narrative​ ​like​ ​other 
worldviews.​ ​Yet​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​constructive​ ​project​ ​here:​ ​“to​ ​counter​ ​the​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​epistemology 
of​ ​secular​ ​modernity,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​subject​ ​its​ ​​ontology​ ​​to​ ​critique​ ​(and​ ​unveil​ ​its​ ​status​ ​as 
a​ ​​mythos​),​ ​then​ ​articulate​ ​the​ ​only​ ​counter-ontology​ ​that​ ​is​ ​able​ ​to​ ​do​ ​justice​ ​to​ ​materiality​ ​and 
embodiment​ ​as​ ​such.” ​ ​Smith’s​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​disenchanted​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​does 85
not​ ​do​ ​justice​ ​to​ ​the​ ​observed​ ​data.​ ​The​ ​phenomena​ ​of​ ​the​ ​material​ ​and​ ​of​ ​humanity’s 
embodied​ ​experience,​ ​Smith​ ​believes,​ ​are​ ​better​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​their​ ​“participation”​ ​with 
transcendance.​ ​“The​ ​key​ ​here​ ​is​ ​that​ ​this​ ​dynamic,​ ​participatory​ ​ontology​ ​refuses​ ​the​ ​static 
ontologies​ ​that​ ​presume​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​nature.” ​ ​Smith​ ​rejects​ ​the​ ​dualism​ ​present​ ​in​ ​the 86
natural/supernatural​ ​divisions​ ​characteristic​ ​of​ ​modernity​ ​(present​ ​in​ ​both​ ​secular​ ​​and 
religious​ ​accounts).  
The​ ​project​ ​could​ ​be​ ​summarized​ ​as​ ​a​ ​“reenchantment,”​ ​which​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​“requires​ ​a 
kind​ ​of​ ​theorizing​ ​that​ ​is​ ​imaginative​ ​which​ ​is​ ​not​ ​constrained​ ​by​ ​the​ ​rules​ ​and​ ​regulations 
imposed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​‘plausibility​ ​structures’​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​modernity​ ​(which​ ​are​ ​themselves​ ​relative).”
​ ​It​ ​affirms​ ​transcendence​ ​and​ ​immanence,​ ​but​ ​rejects​ ​the​ ​latter’s​ ​autonomy​ ​and​ ​affirms​ ​a 87
subordination/dependency​ ​on​ ​the​ ​former.​ ​This​ ​counter-ontology,​ ​while​ ​self-consciously​ ​part 
of​ ​the​ ​Christian​ ​tradition,​ ​would​ ​also​ ​find​ ​allies​ ​other​ ​“religious”​ ​articulations​ ​that​ ​reject​ ​the 
secular.​ ​So​ ​while​ ​Smith​ ​describes​ ​this​ ​as​ ​a​ ​“creational​ ​ontology,”​ ​or​ ​“a​ ​philosophy​ ​of 
immanence​ ​that​ ​affirms​ ​the​ ​materiality​ ​of​ ​creation​ ​at​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time​ ​that​ ​it​ ​affirms​ ​the 
Creator,” ​ ​other​ ​traditions​ ​which​ ​eschew​ ​the​ ​dualism​ ​assumed​ ​by​ ​secular​ ​ontology​ ​and​ ​affirm 88
a​ ​dependence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​material​ ​on​ ​the​ ​transcendent​ ​may​ ​find​ ​much​ ​agreement​ ​here.  
83 ​ ​​Max​ ​Weber​ ​is​ ​provided​ ​early​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“disenchantment”​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​world.  
84 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“​Secularity,​ ​Globalization,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Re-enchantment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​World​,”​ ​11.  
85 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Thinking​ ​in​ ​Tongues​,​ ​101. 
86 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​101. 
87 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“​Secularity,​ ​Globalization,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Re-enchantment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​World​,”​ ​11.  
88 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​222. 
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Relating​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology,​ ​there​ ​does​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​correlation​ ​between​ ​the 
foundationalist​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​the​ ​immanentized​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​The 
extent​ ​to​ ​which​ ​these​ ​shifts​ ​are​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​Duns​ ​Scotus​ ​is​ ​debatable,​ ​but​ ​Smith’s​ ​interaction​ ​with 
Radical​ ​Orthodoxy's​ ​story​ ​of​ ​Scotus’​ ​role​ ​in​ ​modernity​ ​does​ ​shed​ ​light​ ​on​ ​how​ ​the​ ​roots​ ​may 
have​ ​developed.​ ​The​ ​emphasis​ ​found​ ​in​ ​modernity​ ​on​ ​individual​ ​autonomy​ ​has​ ​undoubtedly 
shaped​ ​political,​ ​social,​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​theory.​ ​Recognizing​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​to​ ​which​ ​those​ ​theories 
themselves​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​tradition,​ ​a​ ​view​ ​of​ ​social​ ​ontology​ ​which​ ​assumes 
autonomous​ ​units,​ ​would​ ​also​ ​requires​ ​questioning​ ​the​ ​epistemology​ ​of​ ​autonomous​ ​reason 
they​ ​entail. 
The​ ​result​ ​of​ ​reenchantment​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​that,​ ​for​ ​social​ ​theorizing,​ ​more​ ​weight​ ​would 
go​ ​to​ ​collectivities​ ​than​ ​to​ ​individuals​ ​in​ ​explaining​ ​subjectivity,​ ​hermeneutics,​ ​social 
rationality​ ​and​ ​the​ ​like.​ ​It​ ​seems​ ​this​ ​already​ ​exists​ ​to​ ​some​ ​degree​ ​among​ ​communitarian 
thinkers​ ​like​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor​ ​or​ ​Alasdair​ ​MacIntyre​ ​who​ ​are,​ ​like​ ​Smith,​ ​critical​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular. 
Perhaps​ ​when​ ​he​ ​suggests​ ​“imaginative”​ ​theorizing​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​thinking​ ​of​ ​something​ ​beyond 
this​ ​school​ ​of​ ​thought,​ ​but​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​clear​ ​indication​ ​of​ ​what​ ​that​ ​might​ ​entail. 
​ ​It​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​a​ ​closed,​ ​immanent​ ​system​ ​is​ ​not​ ​necessary​ ​for​ ​the​ ​predictive​ ​power​ ​of 
the​ ​scientific​ ​method​ ​to​ ​work—the​ ​presence​ ​and​ ​prominent​ ​of​ ​openly​ ​religious​ ​scientists 
certainly​ ​suggests​ ​as​ ​much.​ ​But​ ​reenchantment​ ​would​ ​imply​ ​to​ ​some​ ​degree​ ​a​ ​demotion​ ​from 
science’s​ ​status​ ​as​ ​the​ ​objective​ ​standard​ ​which​ ​arbitrates​ ​truth.​ ​As​ ​a​ ​methodology​ ​for​ ​finding 
and​ ​explaining​ ​“natural”​ ​causes​ ​and​ ​phenomena,​ ​it​ ​simply​ ​is​ ​not​ ​equipped​ ​to​ ​answer​ ​questions 
outside​ ​that​ ​framework,​ ​or​ ​to​ ​prove​ ​the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​the​ ​framework​ ​itself.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​evident, 
however,​ ​to​ ​what​ ​extent​ ​a​ ​reenchanted​ ​ontology​ ​would​ ​change​ ​the​ ​methodology​ ​of​ ​hard 
sciences,​ ​especially​ ​if​ ​some​ ​scientists​ ​already​ ​to​ ​some​ ​degree​ ​hold​ ​to​ ​it.​ ​What​ ​would​ ​a​ ​looser 
conception​ ​of​ ​the​ ​laws​ ​of​ ​nature​ ​entail?​ ​If​ ​the​ ​regularity​ ​of​ ​nature​ ​is​ ​assumed​ ​in​ ​both 
enchanted​ ​and​ ​disenchanted​ ​ontologies,​ ​how​ ​does​ ​reenchantment​ ​bring​ ​new​ ​elements​ ​into 
science?​ ​This​ ​part​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​account​ ​needs​ ​expansion​ ​and​ ​examples​ ​as​ ​its​ ​applicability​ ​is 
unclear.​ ​The​ ​political​ ​and​ ​social​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​moving​ ​beyond​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​and 
ontology,​ ​however,​ ​are​ ​more​ ​evident.​ ​They​ ​will​ ​be​ ​addressed​ ​in​ ​a​ ​later​ ​chapter. 
2.2.2.​ ​Sources​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment 
While​ ​Smith​ ​repeatedly​ ​points​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​as​ ​the​ ​source​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​and 
ontology,​ ​he​ ​acknowledges​ ​the​ ​debt​ ​owed​ ​to​ ​other​ ​traditions.​ ​As​ ​noted​ ​above,​ ​Duns​ ​Scotus, 
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the​ ​medieval​ ​philosopher-theologian,​ ​played​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​role​ ​in​ ​synthesizing​ ​and​ ​articulating 
a​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​autonomy​ ​accorded​ ​to​ ​the​ ​material​ ​world.​ ​He​ ​predated​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​by 
several​ ​centuries.​ ​Following​ ​Taylor,​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​“philosophical​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​modernity… 
tend​ ​to​ ​have​ ​an​ ​epistemological​ ​fixation​ ​that​ ​seizes​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​as​ ​the​ ​center​ ​of 
the​ ​story.”​ ​To​ ​add​ ​nuance​ ​to​ ​this​ ​picture,​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​new​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​art​ ​contributed 
to​ ​secular​ ​ontology.​ ​While​ ​it​ ​has​ ​once​ ​been​ ​“embroiled​ ​with​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​and​ ​the​ ​political,” 
the​ ​Renaissance​ ​and​ ​Romanticism​ ​“disembedded”​ ​art​ ​so​ ​that​ ​it​ ​“emerge[s]​ ​as​ ​an​ ​autonomous 
entity​ ​and​ ​institution.”​ ​In​ ​modernity,​ ​the​ ​“aesthetic​ ​aspect​ ​is​ ​distilled​ ​and​ ​disclosed​ ​for​ ​its​ ​own 
sake​ ​and​ ​as​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​interest”​ ​and​ ​art​ ​becomes​ ​“a​ ​cultural​ ​phenomenon​ ​and​ ​an 
autonomous​ ​reality.”​ ​Instead​ ​of​ ​pointing​ ​to​ ​a​ ​transcendent​ ​reality​ ​and​ ​being​ ​embedded​ ​in​ ​the 
institutions​ ​mediating​ ​transcendence,​ ​art​ ​ceases​ ​to​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​anything​ ​outside​ ​itself.​ ​“This​ ​was 
necessary​ ​precisely​ ​because​ ​the​ ​flattening​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​meant​ ​the​ ​loss​ ​of​ ​reference.” ​ ​The 89
picture​ ​painted​ ​here​ ​of​ ​the​ ​emergence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​thus​ ​more​ ​complicated​ ​than​ ​a​ ​mere 
intellectual​ ​shift.​ ​Broader​ ​cultural​ ​forces​ ​are​ ​acknowledged. 
Epistemological​ ​sources​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment​ ​are​ ​also​ ​noted. 
Interestingly,​ ​Smith​ ​identifies​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas’​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​“natural​ ​reason” ​ ​as​ ​an 90
epistemological​ ​forerunner​ ​to​ ​secular​ ​reason,​ ​a​ ​typical​ ​perspective​ ​among​ ​Reformed 
philosophers.​ ​Here,​ ​Smith​ ​differs​ ​with​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​ ​thinkers,​ ​who​ ​interpret​ ​Aquinas’ 
nature​ ​not​ ​as​ ​a​ ​neutral​ ​realm​ ​but​ ​as​ ​a​ ​“originally​ ​graced.” ​ ​Yet​ ​even​ ​Duns​ ​Scotus’​ ​thought 91
was​ ​within​ ​the​ ​Christian​ ​tradition,​ ​demonstrating​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular 
goes​ ​beyond​ ​critiques​ ​of​ ​modern​ ​sources.​ ​Enlightenment​ ​thought​ ​was​ ​simply​ ​an​ ​intensified 
and​ ​ultimately​ ​dominant​ ​perspective​ ​and​ ​project.​ ​If​ ​this​ ​account​ ​is​ ​correct,​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of 
implications​ ​are​ ​of​ ​interest.​ ​Firstly,​ ​the​ ​supposed​ ​tension​ ​between​ ​and​ ​challenges​ ​of​ ​relating 
the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​that​ ​emerged​ ​have​ ​taken​ ​place​ ​​within​​ ​Christendom;​ ​i.e.,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not 
necessarily​ ​a​ ​contest​ ​between​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​and​ ​the​ ​non-religious,​ ​or​ ​even​ ​between​ ​religions. 
One​ ​tradition​ ​has​ ​produced​ ​the​ ​tension.​ ​Secondly,​ ​if​ ​art​ ​has​ ​been​ ​a​ ​source​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​then 
seeking​ ​to​ ​negotiate​ ​secular/religious​ ​tensions​ ​predominantly​ ​through​ ​philosophical​ ​analysis 
may​ ​not​ ​be​ ​adequate.​ ​Intellectual​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​other​ ​cultural​ ​(re)sources​ ​may​ ​be 
necessary.  
89 ​ ​​This​ ​paragraph​ ​is​ ​from​ ​Smith,​ ​​How​ ​(Not)​ ​To​ ​Be​ ​Secular,​​ ​74-75. 
90 ​ ​​Highlighting​ ​the​ ​difference​ ​with​ ​Augustine,​ ​Smith​ ​points​ ​to​ ​Aquinas’​ ​commentary​ ​on​ ​Boethius’​ ​​De 
trinitate​,​ ​Q​.​​ ​1,​ ​art.​ ​1.​ ​See​ ​Smith,​ ​“A​ ​Little​ ​Story​ ​About​ ​Metanarratives,”​ ​368n63. 
91 ​ ​​See​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​120-122.  
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2.3.​ ​The​ ​(Religious)​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Secular 
As​ ​already​ ​noted,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​multiple​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​political​ ​doctrine​ ​of​ ​secularism.​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a 
critic​ ​of​ ​every​ ​stripe​ ​which​ ​falls​ ​under​ ​the​ ​name.​ ​Those​ ​which​ ​advocate​ ​institutional 
separation​ ​in​ ​society—political​ ​structures​ ​like​ ​the​ ​state​ ​acting​ ​independently​ ​of​ ​churches, 
mosques,​ ​and​ ​synagogues—fall​ ​into​ ​Smith’s​ ​taxonomy​ ​of​ ​secularism​1​,​ ​and​ ​this​ ​he​ ​supports.  92
Nor​ ​would​ ​every​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​engagement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​which​ ​challenges 
secularism​2​​ ​be​ ​appropriate​ ​or​ ​coherent.​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​openly​ ​critical​ ​of​ ​Constantinian​ ​approaches 
from​ ​religious​ ​groups​ ​(particularly​ ​the​ ​Religious​ ​Right​ ​of​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States),​ ​which​ ​have 
“sought​ ​to​ ​colonize​ ​the​ ​public​ ​and​ ​political​ ​spheres​ ​by​ ​Christian​ ​morality​ ​(or​ ​the​ ​morality 
disclosed​ ​supposedly​ ​disclosed​ ​by​ ​‘natural​ ​law’).” ​ ​In​ ​fact,​ ​these​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​triumphalistic 93
postures,​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​are​ ​operating​ ​out​ ​of​ ​essentially​ ​the​ ​same​ ​modern​ ​framework​ ​and 
epistemology​ ​as​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​Smith​ ​opposes.   94
The​ ​secularism​ ​which​ ​is​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique,​ ​and​ ​which​ ​assumes​ ​the 
epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​outlined​ ​above,​ ​is​ ​that​ ​which​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​“carve​ ​out​ ​‘the​ ​secular’—a 
zone​ ​decontaminated​ ​of​ ​the​ ​prejudices​ ​of​ ​determinate​ ​religious​ ​influences.”​ ​The​ ​project, 
which​ ​has​ ​progressed​ ​more​ ​in​ ​Europe​ ​but​ ​is​ ​present​ ​in​ ​North​ ​America,​ ​aims​ ​to​ ​“neutralize​ ​the 
public​ ​sphere,​ ​hoping​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​this​ ​pristine​ ​space​ ​unpolluted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​prejudices​ ​of​ ​concrete 
religious​ ​faith.” ​ ​There​ ​are​ ​different​ ​manifestations​ ​of​ ​this​ ​normative​ ​view:​ ​the​ ​academic 95
arguments​ ​in​ ​political​ ​philosophy,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​more​ ​popular​ ​versions​ ​articulated​ ​in​ ​the​ ​media​ ​and 
by​ ​politicians,​ ​pundits​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​commentators.​ ​But​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​Rawls​ ​or​ ​the 
French​ ​tradition​ ​of​ ​​laïcité​,​ ​the​ ​concern​ ​here​ ​is​ ​that​ ​a​ ​secular​ism​​ ​of​ ​the​ ​harsher​ ​stripes​ ​would 
hinder​ ​what​ ​Smith​ ​calls​ ​“confessional​ ​plurality,”​ ​which​ ​he​ ​sees​ ​as​ ​an​ ​aspiration​ ​in​ ​a 
religiously,​ ​politically,​ ​and​ ​ethnically​ ​diverse​ ​society. ​ ​Confessional​ ​plurality​ ​refers 96
92 ​ ​​This​ ​separation​ ​is​ ​central​ ​to​ ​the​ ​“sphere​ ​sovereignty”​ ​advocated​ ​by​ ​Abraham​ ​Kuyper​ ​and​ ​Smith’s 
Reformed​ ​tradition.​ ​See​ ​James​ ​K.A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Worldview,​ ​Sphere​ ​Sovereignty,​ ​and​ ​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom:​ ​A 
Guide​ ​for​ ​(Perplexed)​ ​Reformed​ ​Folk,”​​ ​Pro​ ​Rege​​ ​39,​ ​no.​ ​4​ ​(2011),​ ​15-24.​ ​Smith​ ​also​ ​appears​ ​to​ ​approvingly​ ​cite 
Graham​ ​Ward​ ​who​ ​“does​ ​not​ ​endorse​ ​‘outright​ ​condemnations​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​or​ ​modernity​ ​or​ ​liberalism.’​ ​Rather, 
he​ ​concedes​ ​that​ ​‘in​ ​certain​ ​countries​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world​ ​a​ ​good​ ​dose​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​would​ ​break​ ​the​ ​repressive​ ​holds 
certain​ ​state-ratified​ ​religions​ ​have​ ​over​ ​people’s​ ​lives.’”​ ​See​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of 
Ambiguity,”​ ​116n2​ ​citing​ ​Graham​ ​Ward,​ ​​True​ ​Religion​​ ​(Oxford:​ ​Blackwell,​ ​2003),​ ​ix,​ ​1. 
93 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​32. 
94 ​ ​​One​ ​might​ ​also​ ​add​ ​that​ ​Constantinian​ ​approaches​ ​perpetuate​ ​discourse​ ​(and​ ​policy)​ ​which​ ​contribute 
to​ ​religious​ ​conflict,​ ​particularly​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​Western​ ​policy​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Islamic​ ​world.  
95 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​31-32. 
96 ​ ​​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​9.​ ​In​ ​important​ ​question​ ​regarding​ ​a​ ​confessional​ ​plurality​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​is​ ​over​ ​what​ ​can 
be​ ​considered​ ​“public.”The​ ​most​ ​prominent​ ​twentieth-century​ ​theorizer​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​was​ ​Jurgen 
Habermas,​ ​but​ ​Smith​ ​points​ ​to​ ​a​ ​brief​ ​description​ ​by​ ​sociologist​ ​Christian​ ​Smith​ ​to​ ​summarize​ ​his​ ​own​ ​view: 
“those​ ​fields​ ​of​ ​social​ ​life​ ​in​ ​which​ ​culturally​ ​different​ ​groups​ ​of​ ​people​ ​must​ ​live​ ​together​ ​with​ ​common 
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specifically​ ​to​ ​the​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​groups​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​which​ ​contribute​ ​​from 
their​ ​own​ ​tradition,​ ​articulating​ ​the​ ​political​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​their​ ​faiths.   97
The​ ​liberal​ ​political​ ​tradition’s​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​(autonomous)​ ​subject​ ​is​ ​what 
closely​ ​ties​ ​it​ ​to​ ​the​ ​project​ ​of​ ​​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Connecting​ ​the​ ​two,​ ​Smith​ ​writes​ ​that​ ​secularism​ ​is 
“rooted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​deeply​ ​liberal​ ​suspicion​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​purported​ ​dangers​ ​of​ ​determinate​ ​religious 
confession,​ ​to​ ​which​ ​their​ ​response​ ​is​ ​the​ ​advocacy​ ​of​ ​an​ ​autonomous​ ​reason​ ​and​ ​an 
autonomous​ ​individual​ ​subject,​ ​endued​ ​with​ ​certain​ ​inalienable​ ​rights.” ​ ​The​ ​liberal​ ​account 98
of​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​aligns​ ​with​ ​that​ ​proposed​ ​by​ ​a​ ​secularist,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​why​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​that 
secularism​ ​will​ ​“almost​ ​always​ ​be​ ​in​ ​allegiance​ ​with​ ​classical​ ​liberal​ ​polity.” ​ ​Because​ ​of 99
liberalism’s​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​individual​ ​subjects’​ ​rights,​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​what​ ​to​ ​do​ ​with​ ​cultural 
and​ ​religious​ ​diversity​ ​gets​ ​solved​ ​mainly​ ​by​ ​pushing​ ​such​ ​particularities​ ​to​ ​the​ ​private 
sphere.​ ​José​ ​Casanova,​ ​a​ ​sociologist​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​summarizes​ ​this​ ​tension​ ​between​ ​liberalism 
and​ ​particular​ ​religious​ ​traditions​ ​in​ ​what​ ​he​ ​calls​ ​the​ ​“secularist​ ​paradox:”​ ​​ ​“[I]n​ ​the​ ​name​ ​of 
freedom,​ ​individual​ ​autonomy,​ ​tolerance,​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​pluralism,​ ​religious​ ​people—Christian, 
Jewish,​ ​and​ ​Muslim—are​ ​being​ ​asked​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​their​ ​religious​ ​beliefs,​ ​identities,​ ​and​ ​norms 
‘private’​ ​so​ ​that​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​disturb​ ​the​ ​project​ ​of​ ​a​ ​modern,​ ​secular,​ ​enlightened​ ​Europe.”  100
Nicholas​ ​Wolterstorff,​ ​a​ ​defender​ ​of​ ​liberal​ ​democracy,​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​distinguish​ ​liberal​ ​polities 
from​ ​liberal​ ​theory,​ ​proposing​ ​that​ ​the​ ​political​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​liberal​ ​societies​ ​​are​​ ​worthy​ ​of​ ​the 
support​ ​of​ ​people​ ​seeking​ ​a​ ​“religiously​ ​integrated​ ​existence.” ​ ​Yet​ ​Wolterstorff​ ​is​ ​also 101
critical​ ​of​ ​liberal​ ​​theory​’s​ ​(i.e.,​ ​liberalism)​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​articulated​ ​by​ ​Robert​ ​Audi 
and​ ​John​ ​Rawls. ​ ​Smith’s​ ​claim​ ​here​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​the​ ​​theory​​ ​of​ ​liberalism​ ​(and​ ​certain 102
normative​ ​and​ ​institutional​ ​arrangements​ ​that​ ​govern​ ​or​ ​influence​ ​important​ ​dimensions​ ​of​ ​their​ ​lives.​ ​These 
include​ ​the​ ​areas​ ​of​ ​law,​ ​education,​ ​science,​ ​medicine,​ ​the​ ​mass​ ​media,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​on.”​ ​See​ ​Christian​ ​Smith,​ ​ed.,​ ​​The 
Secular​ ​Revolution:​ ​Power,​ ​Interests,​ ​and​ ​Conflict​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Secularization​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Public​ ​Life​ ​​(Berkeley: 
University​ ​of​ ​California​ ​Press,​ ​2003),​ ​vii.​ ​Cited​ ​in​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​33. 
97 ​ ​​A​ ​prime​ ​example​ ​of​ ​shutting​ ​down​ ​confessional​ ​plurality​ ​is​ ​France.​ ​During​ ​the​ ​debates​ ​on​ ​the​ ​display 
of​ ​religious​ ​symbols​ ​in​ ​public​ ​schools,​ ​Prime​ ​Minister​ ​Jean-Pierre​ ​Raffarin​ ​said,​ ​“Religion​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​a​ ​political 
project,”​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​veil​ ​had​ ​taken​ ​on​ ​political​ ​meaning.​ ​See​ ​Elaine​ ​Sciolino,​ ​“Debate​ ​Begins​ ​In​ ​France​ ​On 
Religion​ ​In​ ​the​ ​Schools,”​ ​​The​ ​New​ ​York​ ​Times​,​ ​February​ ​4,​ ​2004. 
98 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​60. 
99 ​ ​​Ibid.,​ ​50. 
100 ​ ​​José​ ​Casanova,​ ​“Religion,​ ​European​ ​secular​ ​identities,​ ​and​ ​European​ ​integration,”​ ​in​ ​​Religion​ ​in​ ​an 
Expanding​ ​Europe​,​ ​eds.​ ​Timothy​ ​Byrnes​ ​and​ ​Peter​ ​J.​ ​Katzenstein​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​Cambridge​ ​University​ ​Press, 
2006),​ ​66-67. 
101 ​ ​​Nicholas​ ​Wolterstorff​ ​and​ ​Terence​ ​Cuneo,​ ​​Understanding​ ​Liberal​ ​Democracy:​ ​Essays​ ​in​ ​Political 
Philosophy​ ​​(Oxford:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2012),​ ​296.​ ​For​ ​more​ ​on​ ​Wolterstorff’s​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​religion 
in​ ​liberal​ ​democracy,​ ​see​ ​Ch.11,​ ​“Why​ ​Can’t​ ​We​ ​All​ ​Just​ ​Get​ ​Along​ ​With​ ​Each​ ​Other?”​ ​and​ ​Ch.​ ​13,​ ​“Do 
Christians​ ​Have​ ​Good​ ​Reasons​ ​for​ ​Supporting​ ​Liberal​ ​Democracy?” 
102 ​ ​​See​ ​Robert​ ​Audi​ ​and​ ​Nicholas​ ​Wolterstorff,​ ​​Religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Public​ ​Square:​ ​The​ ​Place​ ​of​ ​Religious 
Convictions​ ​in​ ​Political​ ​Debate​​ ​(Lanham:​ ​Rowman​ ​and​ ​Littlefield,​ ​1997). 
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manifestations​ ​in​ ​practice)​ ​which​ ​misunderstands​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​confessional​ ​and​ ​cultural 
plurality.  
Contra​ ​Rawls,​ ​Smith​ ​believes​ ​liberalism​ ​is​ ​not​ ​simply​ ​a​ ​political​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​justice 
without​ ​any​ ​metaphysical​ ​or​ ​epistemological​ ​assumptions.​ ​He​ ​writes​ ​that​ ​the​ ​principles​ ​of 
liberalism​ ​“are​ ​not​ ​simply​ ​self-evident​ ​or​ ​just​ ​there​ ​to​ ​be​ ​perceived​ ​by​ ​neutral,​ ​dispassionate 
observers;​ ​rather,​ ​they​ ​grow​ ​out​ ​of​ ​an​ ​orienting​ ​narrative,​ ​a​ ​distinct​ ​tradition​ ​of​ ​thought​ ​which 
fosters​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​set​ ​of​ ​practices.” ​ ​The​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​liberal​ ​democracy​ ​​is​​ ​a​ ​tradition,​ ​just​ ​like 103
the​ ​religious​ ​confessions​ ​whose​ ​public​ ​presence​ ​it​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​limit,​ ​is​ ​precisely​ ​what​ ​it​ ​advocates 
tend—indeed,​ ​must,​ ​by​ ​virtue​ ​of​ ​their​ ​argument—to​ ​deny. ​ ​Liberalism,​ ​Smith​ ​writes,​ ​is​ ​a 104
worldview​ ​that​ ​prioritizes​ ​individual​ ​freedom​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​values​ ​autonomy​ ​as​ ​a​ ​fundamental​ ​value. 
Beginning​ ​with​ ​this​ ​creedal​ ​commitment​ ​to​ ​individual​ ​freedom​ ​as​ ​‘the​ ​Good,’​ ​liberalism​ ​entails​ ​both 
political​ ​autonomy​ ​(rights​ ​and​ ​freedoms​ ​only​ ​constrained​ ​by​ ​the​ ​right​ ​and​ ​freedoms​ ​of​ ​others)​ ​and 
epistemological​ ​autonomy​ ​(neutral,​ ​secular​ ​reason​ ​unconstrained​ ​by​ ​nonrational​ ​commitments).  105
Smith​ ​continues:​ ​“if​ ​one​ ​can​ ​see​ ​that​ ​liberalism,​ ​as​ ​an​ ​orienting​ ​ideology,​ ​is​ ​grounded​ ​in 
myths​ ​which​ ​have​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​epistemic​ ​status,​ ​then​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​me​ ​that​ ​one​ ​could​ ​legitimately 
describe​ ​liberalism—and​ ​its​ ​attendant​ ​doctrines,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​secularism—as​ ​​religious​”​ ​(emphasis 
original). ​ ​The​ ​irony​ ​for​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​that​ ​secularism​ ​itself​ ​has​ ​turned​ ​into​ ​a​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​covert 106
religion​ ​which​ ​“passes​ ​itself​ ​off​ ​as​ ​‘rational’​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​ir-religious,​ ​making​ ​its​ ​religious 
colonization​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​submerged​ ​yet​ ​powerful.” ​ ​What​ ​governs​ ​the​ ​public 107
sphere,​ ​then,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​point​ ​of​ ​view​ ​which​ ​doesn’t​ ​consider​ ​itself​ ​religious.​ ​Smith​ ​says 
that​ ​“this​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​a​ ​theocracy​ ​without​ ​god.”  108
The​ ​argument​ ​for​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​liberalism​ ​(and​ ​thus​ ​secularism)​ ​is​ ​again 
based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​mythic​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​its​ ​grounding.​ ​Reference​ ​to​ ​liberalism’s​ ​commitments​ ​as 
“creedal”​ ​indicates​ ​this​ ​argument​ ​hinges​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​“epistemic​ ​status​ ​of​ ​liberal​ ​discourse​ ​and 
practice.” ​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​the​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​individual​ ​freedom​ ​as​ ​the​ ​good​ ​to​ ​be​ ​sought​ ​above​ ​all​ ​others 109
within​ ​a​ ​political​ ​community​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​rationally​ ​demonstrated.​ ​But​ ​Smith​ ​adds​ ​another 
indication​ ​of​ ​how​ ​liberalism​ ​could​ ​be​ ​conceived​ ​of​ ​as​ ​religious:​ ​“its​ ​articulation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​unique 
orienting​ ​​telos​.” ​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​the​ ​epistemic​ ​status​ ​of​ ​the​ ​doctrines​ ​of​ ​liberalism​ ​(and 110
103 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity,”​ ​120-121. 
104 ​ ​​This​ ​is​ ​the​ ​burden​ ​of​ ​Jeffrey​ ​Stout’s​ ​​Democracy​ ​and​ ​Tradition​​ ​(Princeton:​ ​Princeton​ ​University 
Press,​ ​2004). 
105 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​60n113.  
106 ​ ​​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity,”​ ​120. 
107 ​ ​​Ibid. 
108 ​ ​​Ibid. 
109 ​ ​​Ibid. 
110 ​ ​​Ibid. 
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secularism)—examined​ ​above—is​ ​coupled​ ​with​ ​an​ ​orientation​ ​towards​ ​some​ ​​telos​,​ ​an​ ​end​ ​or 
goal​ ​to​ ​which​ ​the​ ​discourse​ ​and​ ​practice​ ​is​ ​aimed.​ ​The​ ​​telos​ ​​of​ ​our​ ​political​ ​and​ ​cultural 
practices​ ​are​ ​precisely​ ​the​ ​thread​ ​Smith​ ​picks​ ​up​ ​in​ ​other​ ​works​ ​and​ ​orients​ ​his​ ​framework​ ​for 
thinking​ ​about​ ​religion.​ ​That​ ​is​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​of​ ​the​ ​next​ ​chapter. 
Conclusion 
This​ ​chapter​ ​was​ ​a​ ​systematic​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith’s​ ​deconstruction​ ​of​ ​the 
epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Through​ ​an​ ​interrogation​ ​of​ ​these​ ​concepts,​ ​it​ ​was 
found​ ​that​ ​the​ ​political​ ​doctrine​ ​and​ ​project​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​has​ ​roots​ ​in​ ​the​ ​foundationalist 
epistemology​ ​of​ ​universal,​ ​autonomous​ ​reason​ ​birthed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Enlightenment.​ ​Next,​ ​Smith’s 
account​ ​of​ ​postmodern​ ​epistemology​ ​was​ ​found​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​challenge​ ​to​ ​the​ ​status​ ​accorded 
secular​ ​knowledge,​ ​calling​ ​into​ ​question​ ​the​ ​coherence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​public​ ​sphere.​ ​Secular 
epistemology,​ ​in​ ​turn,​ ​was​ ​found​ ​also​ ​to​ ​be​ ​closely​ ​related​ ​to​ ​a​ ​changing​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the 
nature​ ​of​ ​reality​ ​as​ ​a​ ​closed,​ ​autonomous​ ​system​ ​which​ ​can​ ​be​ ​accessed​ ​without​ ​reference​ ​to 
transcendence.​ ​This​ ​ontology​ ​gives​ ​secular​ ​theorizing​ ​and​ ​science​ ​an​ ​unwarranted​ ​privileged 
epistemic​ ​status.​ ​The​ ​sources​ ​for​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​were​ ​also​ ​found​ ​to​ ​be​ ​more​ ​than​ ​simply​ ​the 
Enlightenment,​ ​suggesting​ ​a​ ​broader​ ​cultural​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular/religious​ ​divide​ ​is 
needed.​ ​Finally,​ ​an​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​showed​ ​he​ ​finds​ ​it 
intimately​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​liberalism’s​ ​faulty​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​and​ ​that​ ​its​ ​orienting 






















3.​ ​Philosophical​ ​Anthropology​ ​of​ ​Religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Secular 
Introduction 
This​ ​introductory​ ​section​ ​explains​ ​how​ ​Smith​ ​moves​ ​from​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​secular 
epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​to​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology​ ​in​ ​his​ ​interrogation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern 
understanding​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Section​ ​3.1​ ​looks​ ​at​ ​how​ ​Smith’s​ ​analysis​ ​of 
modern​ ​anthropology​ ​challenges​ ​contemporary​ ​methods​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​sociology 
and​ ​philosophy.​ ​Section​ ​3.2​ ​assesses​ ​the​ ​alternative​ ​model​ ​Smith​ ​proposes.​ ​Section​ ​3.3 
examines​ ​how​ ​this​ ​model​ ​challenges​ ​modern​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​secularity.​ ​Section​ ​3.4 
offers​ ​an​ ​overall​ ​assessment​ ​of​ ​Smith​ ​model​ ​as​ ​a​ ​framework​ ​for​ ​analyzing​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​offers 
points​ ​where​ ​his​ ​analysis​ ​could​ ​be​ ​strengthened. 
The​ ​previous​ ​chapter​ ​was​ ​a​ ​critical​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​account​ ​of​ ​the 
epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​which​ ​provide​ ​the​ ​foundation​ ​for​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​His​ ​account​ ​says 
that​ ​while​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​claims​ ​for​ ​itself​ ​an​ ​autonomous​ ​and​ ​universally​ ​accessible​ ​reason,​ ​it​ ​is 
actually​ ​itself​ ​a​ ​narrative​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​tradition​ ​and​ ​faith​ ​assumptions​ ​as​ ​much​ ​as​ ​any 
religion.​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​relies​ ​on​ ​an​ ​account​ ​of​ ​knowledge​ ​and​ ​reality​ ​which​ ​is 
not​ ​simply​ ​a​ ​neutral​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​the​ ​“way​ ​things​ ​are.”​ ​The​ ​account​ ​is​ ​ultimately​ ​a​ ​story 
which,​ ​like​ ​all​ ​stories,​ ​cannot​ ​claim​ ​any​ ​outside​ ​legitimation​ ​but​ ​must​ ​be​ ​taken​ ​on​ ​faith.​ ​At​ ​the 
level​ ​of​ ​worldview​ ​or​ ​comprehensive​ ​doctrine,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​division​ ​between​ ​faith-based​ ​or 
reason-based​ ​legitimation.​ ​Every​ ​view​ ​“operates​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​​faith​,”​ ​because​ ​“thought​ ​is 
not​ ​a​ ​neutral,​ ​objective​ ​activity​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​way​ ​of​ ​seeing​ ​the​ ​world​ ​that​ ​is​ ​itself 
based​ ​on​ ​prior​ ​faith​ ​or​ ​trust.” ​ ​In​ ​the​ ​final​ ​analysis,​ ​then,​ ​Smith​ ​would​ ​say​ ​that​ ​even 111
adherents​ ​to​ ​secularism​ ​have​ ​faith. 
The​ ​account​ ​of​ ​modern​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​is​ ​the​ ​first​ ​stage​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique 
of​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Whereas​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​assumes​ ​humans​ ​to​ ​be​ ​rational​ ​“thinkers,”​ ​the​ ​faith 
required​ ​of​ ​all​ ​worldviews​ ​would​ ​mean​ ​a​ ​more​ ​apt​ ​description​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​would​ ​be 
“believers”:  
Our​ ​primordial​ ​orientation​ ​or​ ​comportment​ ​to​ ​the​ ​world​ ​is​ ​not​ ​as​ ​thinkers​ ​but​ ​as​ ​believers.​ ​Beliefs,​ ​we 
might​ ​say,​ ​are​ ​more​ ​“basic”​ ​than​ ​ideas.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​alternative​ ​anthropology,​ ​human​ ​persons​ ​are​ ​understood 
not​ ​as​ ​fundamentally​ ​thinking​ ​machines​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​as​ ​believing​ ​animals,​ ​or​ ​essentially​ ​religious 
creatures,​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​a​ ​worldview​ ​that​ ​is​ ​pre-rational​ ​or​ ​supra-rational….​ ​This​ ​moves​ ​the​ ​essence​ ​of​ ​the 
111​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom:​ ​Worship,​ ​Worldview,​ ​and​ ​Cultural​ ​Formation​​ ​(Grand 
Rapids:​ ​Baker​ ​Academic,​ ​2009),​ ​43.  
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humans​ ​person​ ​from​ ​the​ ​more​ ​abstract,​ ​disembodied​ ​world​ ​of​ ​ideas​ ​to​ ​a​ ​prerational​ ​level​ ​of 
commitments​ ​that​ ​are​ ​more​ ​ingrained​ ​in​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person.  112
While​ ​Smith​ ​holds​ ​to​ ​the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​this​ ​analysis,​ ​his​ ​view​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​insufficient.​ ​The 
account​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​radicalized,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​go​ ​far​ ​enough.​ ​In​ ​Smith’s​ ​Cultural​ ​Liturgies 
project, ​ ​he​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​with​ ​this​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​“worldviews”​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​​still​​ ​fails​ ​to 113
grasp​ ​what​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​beings​ ​humans​ ​are—in​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​operating​ ​with​ ​a​ ​faulty 
philosophical​ ​anthropology. ​ ​The​ ​“believer”​ ​model​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person​ ​is​ ​still​ ​governed​ ​by 114
the​ ​modern​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​and​ ​“seems​ ​just​ ​to​ ​move​ ​the​ ​clash​ ​of​ ​ideas​ ​down​ ​a​ ​level 
to​ ​a​ ​clash​ ​of​ ​beliefs.” ​ ​Propositions​ ​are​ ​still​ ​the​ ​focus,​ ​and​ ​Smith​ ​wonders​ ​if​ ​this​ ​“(merely 115
semantic)​ ​shift​ ​really​ ​honor[s]​ ​the​ ​richness​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person.” ​ ​He​ ​claims​ ​the 116
person-as-believer​ ​anthropology​ ​is​ ​too​ ​disembodied​ ​and​ ​individualistic,​ ​creating​ ​a 
reductionistic​ ​account​ ​of​ ​humans.​ ​So​ ​while​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​focuses​ ​on 
the​ ​epistemology​ ​and​ ​ontology​ ​it​ ​assumes,​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​question​ ​the​ ​anthropological​ ​accounts 
that​ ​attended​ ​these​ ​shifts.  
3.1.​ ​The​ ​Religion​ ​of​ ​Philosophy​ ​and​ ​Sociology 
In​ ​his​ ​challenging​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​Smith​ ​applies​ ​his 
critique​ ​to​ ​two​ ​disciplines​ ​within​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion:​ ​philosophy​ ​and​ ​sociology.​ ​The 
academic​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​as​ ​many​ ​fields,​ ​faces​ ​the​ ​perennial​ ​challenge​ ​of​ ​defining​ ​its 
object​ ​of​ ​study.​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith​ ​(no​ ​relation),​ ​though​ ​already​ ​noted​ ​as​ ​a​ ​critic​ ​of 
essentialized​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​category​ ​of​ ​phenomena​ ​deemed​ ​“religion,”​ ​nevertheless 
recognizes​ ​that​ ​the​ ​difficulty​ ​of​ ​the​ ​challenge​ ​does​ ​not​ ​negate​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​attempts​ ​to 
meet​ ​it.​ ​He​ ​says​ ​that​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“second-order,​ ​generic​ ​concept​ ​that​ ​plays​ ​the​ ​same​ ​role​ ​in 
establishing​ ​a​ ​disciplinary​ ​horizon​ ​that​ ​a​ ​concept​ ​such​ ​as​ ​‘language’​ ​plays​ ​in​ ​linguistics​ ​or 
‘culture’​ ​plays​ ​in​ ​anthropology.​ ​There​ ​can​ ​be​ ​no​ ​disciplined​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​without​ ​such​ ​a 
112​ ​Ibid​. 
113​ ​Smith’s​ ​Cultural​ ​Liturgies​ ​trilogy​ ​includes​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​​Imagining​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​and 
Awaiting​ ​the​ ​King:​ ​Reforming​ ​Public​ ​Theology​​ ​(Grand​ ​Rapids:​ ​Baker​ ​Academic,​ ​2017).​​ ​​The​ ​final​ ​volume​ ​was 
unpublished​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​unavailable​ ​during​ ​the​ ​writing​ ​this​ ​thesis.  
114​ ​A​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology​ ​is​ ​an​ ​“attempt​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​unified​ ​account​ ​of​ ​the​ ​meaning​ ​of​ ​the 
human​ ​being.”​ ​See​ ​​ ​Zachary​ ​Davis​ ​and​ ​Anthony​ ​Steinbock,​ ​“Max​ ​Scheler,”​ ​​The​ ​Stanford​ ​Encyclopedia​ ​of 
Philosophy​​ ​(Fall​ ​2016​ ​Edition),​ ​Edward​ ​N.​ ​Zalta​ ​(ed.),​ ​URL​ ​= 
<​https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/scheler​>.​ ​Any​ ​mention​ ​of​ ​“anthropology”​ ​in​ ​this​ ​paper 
refers​ ​to​ ​it​ ​this​ ​“philosophical”​ ​sense. 




horizon.” ​ ​(James​ ​K.​ ​A.)​ ​Smith​ ​would​ ​certainly​ ​agree,​ ​and​ ​this​ ​section​ ​will​ ​examine​ ​his 117
attempt​ ​to​ ​improve​ ​that​ ​disciplinary​ ​horizon. 
The​ ​philosophy​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​experienced​ ​somewhat​ ​of​ ​a​ ​renaissance​ ​in​ ​twentieth 
century​ ​which​ ​increasingly​ ​saw​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​a​ ​legitimate​ ​object​ ​and​ ​starting​ ​place​ ​for 
philosophy.​ ​Arguments​ ​for​ ​and​ ​against​ ​the​ ​rationality​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​belief,​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​good 
and​ ​evil,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​of​ ​science​ ​and​ ​religion​ ​are​ ​sample​ ​of​ ​the​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​topics​ ​explored 
in​ ​the​ ​field.​ ​Smith’s​ ​primary​ ​concern​ ​with​ ​the​ ​discipline​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​religion​ ​which 
philosophers​ ​examine​ ​is​ ​primarily​ ​the​ ​propositional​ ​content,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​field​ ​“tends​ ​to 
reflect​ ​a​ ​working​ ​(or​ ​at​ ​least​ ​functional)​ ​assumption​ ​that​ ​doctrine​ ​is​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​liturgy,​ ​and​ ​thus 
ideas​ ​and​ ​propositions​ ​trump​ ​practices.” ​ ​Questions​ ​about​ ​the​ ​epistemic​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​religious 118
beliefs​ ​or​ ​of​ ​particular​ ​doctrines​ ​are​ ​not​ ​off​ ​limits,​ ​Smith​ ​would​ ​say,​ ​but​ ​these​ ​are​ ​not​ ​the​ ​core 
of​ ​religion.  
A​ ​formative​ ​and​ ​usually​ ​central​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​that​ ​form​ ​of​ ​life—across​ ​religious​ ​traditions—is​ ​participation 
in​ ​corporate​ ​worship,​ ​liturgical​ ​practices,​ ​and​ ​other​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​shared​ ​spiritual​ ​disciplines.​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words, 
believers​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​faith​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​life​ ​('what​ ​we​ ​do')​ ​whereas​ ​contemporary​ ​philosophy​ ​of 
religion​ ​tends​ ​to​ ​treat​ ​faith​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​thinking​ ​('what​ ​we​ ​believe').  119
Already​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​has​ ​qualms​ ​with​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​primarily​ ​about 
holding​ ​certain​ ​beliefs,​ ​as​ ​such​ ​a​ ​starting​ ​point​ ​affects​ ​the​ ​method​ ​and​ ​practice​ ​of​ ​the 
discipline.​ ​For​ ​philosophers​ ​to​ ​do​ ​justice​ ​the​ ​subject​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​then,​ ​the​ ​lived​ ​experiences 
and​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​“believers”​ ​themselves​ ​must​ ​somehow​ ​be​ ​explored​ ​with​ ​greater​ ​priority.   120
In​ ​the​ ​field​ ​of​ ​sociology,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​two​ ​general​ ​approaches​ ​that​ ​have​ ​come​ ​down​ ​from 
two​ ​founding​ ​fathers​ ​of​ ​the​ ​field​ ​Max​ ​Weber​ ​and​ ​Émile​ ​Durkheim.​ ​Broadly​ ​speaking,​ ​the 
substantivist​ ​approach,​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​Weber,​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​say​ ​what​ ​religion​ ​​is​.​ ​It​ ​views 
religion​ ​primarily​ ​through​ ​its​ ​content—beliefs​ ​about​ ​God​ ​or​ ​the​ ​supernatural.​ ​The 
functionalist​ ​approach,​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​Durkheim,​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​say​ ​what​ ​religion​ ​​does​.​ ​It 
studies​ ​the​ ​social​ ​function​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​without​ ​reference​ ​to​ ​the​ ​supernatural.  
Substantivist​ ​and​ ​functionalist​ ​approaches​ ​each​ ​have​ ​problems,​ ​as​ ​sociologists​ ​of 
religion​ ​are​ ​well​ ​aware.​ ​For​ ​a​ ​substantivist,​ ​the​ ​difficulty​ ​lies​ ​in​ ​the​ ​ambiguity​ ​of​ ​defining​ ​the 
117​ ​Jonathan​ ​Z.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Religion,​ ​Religions,​ ​Religious,”​ ​in​ ​​Critical​ ​Terms​ ​for​ ​Religious​ ​Studies​,​ ​ed. 
Mark​ ​C.​ ​Taylor​ ​(Chicago:​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Chicago​ ​Press,​ ​1998),​ ​281-282. 
118​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion​ ​Takes​ ​Practice:​ ​Liturgy​ ​as​ ​Source​ ​and​ ​Method​ ​in 
Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion,”​ ​in​ ​​Contemporary​ ​Method​ ​and​ ​Practice​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion​,​ ​eds.​ ​David 
Cheetham​ ​and​ ​Rolfe​ ​King​ ​(London:​ ​Continuum,​ ​2008),​ ​136. 
119​ ​Ibid. 
120​ ​While​ ​philosophy​ ​may​ ​be​ ​more​ ​guilty​ ​of​ ​this​ ​than​ ​other​ ​disciplines,​ ​sociologists​ ​have​ ​attempted​ ​to 
understand​ ​religion​ ​through​ ​practices,​ ​particularly​ ​in​ ​the​ ​school​ ​known​ ​as​ ​“lived​ ​religion.”​ ​While​ ​there​ ​are 
important​ ​overlaps​ ​with​ ​that​ ​school​ ​and​ ​Smith’s​ ​project,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​differences​ ​which​ ​will​ ​be​ ​addressed​ ​below.  
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supernatural​ ​or​ ​transcendent,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​non-Western​ ​religions.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​if 
reference​ ​to​ ​the​ ​supernatural​ ​is​ ​the​ ​standard,​ ​Confucianism​ ​and​ ​other​ ​traditions​ ​commonly 
considered​ ​religions​ ​could​ ​be​ ​excluded.​ ​This​ ​indicates​ ​a​ ​lacuna​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Western​ ​approach​ ​that 
could​ ​be​ ​evidence​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​ethno-centrism​ ​to​ ​this​ ​way​ ​of​ ​approaching​ ​phenomena​ ​associated 
religion. ​ ​For​ ​a​ ​functionalist,​ ​nearly​ ​every​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​social​ ​set​ ​of​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​systems​ ​could 121
count​ ​as​ ​religion,​ ​making​ ​the​ ​approach​ ​too​ ​inclusivist​ ​to​ ​give​ ​the​ ​designation​ ​of​ ​“religious” 
significant​ ​analytical​ ​value.​ ​The​ ​inclusivity​ ​of​ ​this​ ​approach​ ​would​ ​prove​ ​problematic​ ​for 
measuring​ ​the​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​religiosity​ ​of​ ​a​ ​given​ ​society.​ ​The​ ​sociology​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​West 
has​ ​by-and-large​ ​favored,​ ​despite​ ​its​ ​problems,​ ​the​ ​substantivist​ ​definition,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​a​ ​lack 
of​ ​any​ ​clear​ ​alternatives.​ ​As​ ​prominent​ ​sociologist​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​Grace​ ​Davie​ ​has​ ​written,​ ​“Once 
the​ ​gold​ ​standard,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​form​ ​of​ ​the​ ​supernatural,​ ​has​ ​been​ ​abandoned,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​very​ ​difficult​ ​to 
draw​ ​any​ ​precise​ ​or​ ​undisputed​ ​boundary​ ​about​ ​what​ ​should​ ​or​ ​should​ ​not​ ​be​ ​included​ ​in​ ​the 
sociological​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion.” ​ ​Both​ ​philosophy​ ​and​ ​sociology,​ ​then,​ ​operate​ ​with​ ​similar 122
working​ ​definitions​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​beliefs​ ​and/about​ ​the​ ​supernatural.  123
All​ ​of​ ​these​ ​modern​ ​approaches​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​Smith​ ​argues,​ ​view​ ​the​ ​human 
subject​ ​through​ ​an​ ​overly​ ​“intellectualist”​ ​lens.​ ​To​ ​view​ ​religiosity​ ​this​ ​way​ ​is​ ​to​ ​“impose​ ​on 
religion​ ​a​ ​picture​ ​of​ ​human​ ​persons​ ​that​ ​reflects​ ​a​ ​distinctly​ ​modern​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​the 
cognitive—a​ ​top-heavy​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​beliefs,​ ​ideas,​ ​and​ ​doctrines.” ​ ​Smith​ ​finds​ ​an​ ​emblem 124
of​ ​this​ ​shift​ ​to​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​in​ ​René​ ​Descartes’​ ​maxim​ ​in​ ​​Meditations​:​ ​“I​ ​think,​ ​therefore​ ​I 
am.” ​ ​This,​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​is​ ​indicative​ ​of​ ​the​ ​quintessentially​ ​modern​ ​philosopher’s​ ​belief​ ​that 125
not​ ​only​ ​could​ ​he​ ​be​ ​certain​ ​of​ ​his​ ​existence—“I​ ​am”—but​ ​that​ ​he​ ​could​ ​say​ ​​what​​ ​he 
fundamentally​ ​was:​ ​a​ ​“thinking​ ​thing.” ​ ​Elements​ ​of​ ​this​ ​account​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​can​ ​be​ ​traced 126
back​ ​even​ ​further​ ​to​ ​Greek​ ​philosophy,​ ​and​ ​would​ ​be​ ​carried​ ​through​ ​the 
Enlightenment—especially​ ​Kant—into​ ​the​ ​present.​ ​But​ ​the​ ​contention​ ​is​ ​that​ ​this​ ​“Cartesian 
121​ ​Or,​ ​more​ ​radically​ ​and​ ​as​ ​noted​ ​in​ ​my​ ​introduction,​ ​modern​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​“religion”​ ​could​ ​itself​ ​be 
evidence​ ​of​ ​ethnocentrism.  
122​ ​Grace​ ​Davie,​ ​​The​ ​Sociology​ ​of​ ​Religion:​ ​A​ ​Critical​ ​Agenda​ ​​(2nd​ ​ed.,​ ​London:​ ​SAGE,​ ​2013),​ ​20. 
123​ ​For​ ​a​ ​lucid​ ​discussion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​issues​ ​with​ ​substantivist​ ​and​ ​functionalist​ ​(“culturalist”),​ ​see​ ​William 
Arnal​ ​and​ ​Russell​ ​McCutcheon,​ ​​The​ ​Sacred​ ​Is​ ​the​ ​Profane:​ ​The​ ​Political​ ​Nature​ ​of​ ​"Religion"​​ ​(New​ ​York: 
Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2013),​ ​23-27. 
124​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​Liturgies​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Prospects​ ​for​ ​a​ ​‘Post-Secular’​ ​Sociology​ ​of​ ​Religion,”​ ​in​ ​​The 
Post-Secular​ ​in​ ​Question​,​ ​eds.​ ​Philip​ ​Gorski​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​(New​ ​York:​ ​NYU​ ​Press,​ ​2012),​ ​161. 
125​ ​Whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​Descartes’​ ​maxim​ ​was​ ​the​ ​fundamental​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​modern​ ​accounts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​is​ ​not 
the​ ​primary​ ​issue​ ​here.​ ​Like​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor​ ​in​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​,​ ​Smith’s​ ​interest​ ​is​ ​more​ ​engaging​ ​implicit 
assumptions​ ​in​ ​shifting​ ​cultural​ ​narratives​ ​that​ ​are​ ​only​ ​occasionally​ ​articulated—such​ ​as​ ​in​ ​​Meditations​. 
126​ ​René​ ​Descartes,​ ​​Meditations​ ​on​ ​First​ ​Philosophy​​ ​(Oxford:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press),​ ​74. 
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model​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person,”​ ​which​ ​assumes​ ​that​ ​the​ ​“heady​ ​realm​ ​of​ ​ideas​ ​and​ ​beliefs​ ​is​ ​the 
core​ ​of​ ​our​ ​being,”​ ​became​ ​dominant​ ​in​ ​modernity​ ​and​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion.   127
If​ ​a​ ​modern,​ ​cognitivist​ ​anthropology​ ​is​ ​assumed​ ​in​ ​philosophy​ ​and​ ​sociology’s 
approach​ ​to​ ​religion,​ ​how​ ​would​ ​this​ ​affect​ ​their​ ​methods​ ​and​ ​objects​ ​of​ ​inquiry?​ ​Smith 
argues​ ​that​ ​these​ ​approaches​ ​would​ ​begin​ ​with​ ​a​ ​“stunted”​ ​picture​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​being.​ ​He 
offers​ ​a​ ​few​ ​thought​ ​experiments​ ​to​ ​explain: 
Imagine​ ​a​ ​world​ ​of​ ​unspeakable​ ​cruelty​ ​and​ ​the​ ​degradation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​race​ ​to​ ​a​ ​cannibalistic​ ​war​ ​of 
all​ ​with​ ​all.​ ​Would​ ​that​ ​be​ ​a​ ​“secular”​ ​world?​ ​When​ ​humanity​ ​is​ ​reduced​ ​to​ ​“bare​ ​life”​ ​(Agamben), 
exposed​ ​and​ ​vulnerable​ ​and​ ​just​ ​fixated​ ​on​ ​the​ ​quotidian​ ​task​ ​of​ ​surviving—reduced​ ​to​ ​animality—is 
humanity​ ​then​ ​reduced​ ​to​ ​something​ ​less​ ​than​ ​religious?   128
Another​ ​runs​ ​as​ ​follows:  
Imagine​ ​the​ ​whole​ ​world​ ​looked​ ​like​ ​the​ ​Upper​ ​West​ ​Side...​ ​like​ ​the​ ​enclaves​ ​of​ ​what​ ​Peter​ ​Berger​ ​calls 
a​ ​“globalized​ ​elite​ ​culture.”​ ​...​ ​Would​ ​“religion”​ ​survive​ ​that​ ​annihilation/transformation?​ ​Would​ ​the 
global​ ​triumph​ ​of​ ​secularism—in​ ​which​ ​everyone​ ​reflected​ ​the​ ​ideal,​ ​cultivated,​ ​“secular” 
citizen—signal​ ​the​ ​obliteration​ ​of​ ​religion?  129
Based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​categories​ ​of​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​that​ ​these 
questions​ ​would​ ​“yield​ ​predictable​ ​answers.” ​ ​Religion​ ​​would​​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​disappear​ ​in​ ​a​ ​world 130
where​ ​the​ ​daily​ ​tasks​ ​which​ ​ensure​ ​survival—procuring​ ​food/water,​ ​self-defense, 
sleep—occupy​ ​all​ ​of​ ​humanity’s​ ​time,​ ​or​ ​where​ ​all​ ​people​ ​adopt​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​cosmopolitan 
culture.​ ​Why​ ​would​ ​this​ ​be?​ ​Operating​ ​with​ ​a​ ​cognitivist​ ​anthropology,​ ​the​ ​first​ ​thought 
experiment​ ​points​ ​to​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​loss​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​because​ ​the​ ​“animality”​ ​of​ ​merely​ ​surviving​ ​is 
something​ ​done​ ​by​ ​all​ ​sentient​ ​beings,​ ​and​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​allegedly​ ​a​ ​specifically​ ​human 
phenomenon.​ ​Similarly,​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​citizen’s​ ​beliefs​ ​(or​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​them)​ ​are​ ​primarily​ ​what 
determines​ ​their​ ​secularity.​ ​The​ ​religion​ ​examined​ ​by​ ​sociology,​ ​philosophy,​ ​and​ ​often 
theology,​ ​Smith​ ​claims,​ ​“is​ ​a​ ​religion​ ​for​ ​disembodied​ ​minds.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​religion​ ​of​ ​‘beliefs’​ ​and 
‘values,’​ ​of​ ​representations,​ ​the​ ​stuff​ ​of​ ​minds​ ​and​ ​souls.”   131
An​ ​important​ ​distinction​ ​must​ ​be​ ​made​ ​here.​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​​not​​ ​simply​ ​saying​ ​that​ ​the​ ​study 
of​ ​religion​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​shift​ ​its​ ​focus​ ​from​ ​the​ ​beliefs​ ​to​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​lived​ ​experiences​ ​of 
127​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​76.​ ​Smith​ ​actually​ ​notes​ ​(43-46)​ ​two​ ​related​ ​models:​ ​The​ ​Human 
Person​ ​as​ ​Thinker​ ​and​ ​as​ ​Believer.​ ​The​ ​latter​ ​model​ ​contests​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​epistemology​ ​assumed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​former, 
and​ ​this​ ​will​ ​be​ ​taken​ ​up​ ​in​ ​a​ ​later​ ​chapter. 
128​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​Liturgies,”​ ​160. 
129​ ​Ibid.,​ ​160. 
130​ ​Ibid.,​ ​160. 
131​ ​Ibid.,​ ​160.​ ​Compare​ ​with​ ​Saba​ ​Mahmood’s​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​the​ ​U.S.​ ​State​ ​Department​ ​and​ ​Muslim 
reformers​ ​assume​ ​a​ ​“secularized​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​which​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​understood​ ​to​ ​be​ ​an​ ​abstracted 
category​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​doctrines​ ​from​ ​which​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​believer​ ​stands​ ​apart​ ​to​ ​examine,​ ​compare,​ ​and 
evaluate​ ​its​ ​various​ ​manifestations.”​ ​See​ ​Saba​ ​Mahmood,​ ​“Secularism,​ ​Hermeneutics,​ ​and​ ​Empire:​ ​The​ ​Politics 
of​ ​Islamic​ ​Reformation,”​ ​​Public​ ​Culture​ ​​18​ ​(2006):​ ​341. 
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religious​ ​people—though,​ ​particularly​ ​with​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​philosophy,​ ​he​ ​certainly​ ​encourages 
this.​ ​Anthropologists​ ​have​ ​long​ ​considered​ ​lived​ ​and​ ​visible​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​their​ ​work, 
and​ ​sociologists​ ​have​ ​as​ ​well.​ ​Rather,​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​goes​ ​down​ ​one​ ​level.​ ​His​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​both 
philosophy​ ​and​ ​sociology​ ​must​ ​reconsider​ ​​which​​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​lived​ ​experiences​ ​should​ ​be 
considered​ ​religious.​ ​His​ ​target​ ​is​ ​the​ ​theoretical​ ​toolbox.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​chapter,​ ​it​ ​was 
shown​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​epistemology​ ​is​ ​such​ ​that​ ​beliefs​ ​are​ ​ultimately 
grounded​ ​in​ ​faith​ ​(myths,​ ​stories​ ​whose​ ​grounding​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​rationally​ ​demonstrated), 
making​ ​all​ ​worldviews​ ​ultimately​ ​religious.​ ​But​ ​in​ ​addition,​ ​Smith​ ​suggests​ ​scholars​ ​must 
give​ ​more​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​religious​ ​practice,​ ​and​ ​specifically​ ​​how​​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​not​ ​a 
practice​ ​is​ ​religious.​ ​Association​ ​with​ ​one’s​ ​belief​ ​and​ ​worship​ ​of​ ​a​ ​supernatural​ ​being​ ​is 
insufficient​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​view.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​significant​ ​overlap​ ​between​ ​Smith​ ​approach​ ​and​ ​the 
functionalists,​ ​but​ ​with​ ​added​ ​nuance​ ​that​ ​will​ ​be​ ​explored​ ​in​ ​this​ ​chapter. 
The​ ​central​ ​question​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​asking​ ​is​ ​this:​ ​Are​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​ideas​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​manner 
in​ ​which​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​something​ ​or​ ​someone​ ​as​ ​religious​ ​or​ ​secular?​ ​If​ ​so,​ ​why?​ ​If​ ​not,​ ​what 
should​​ ​be​ ​the​ ​criteria?​ ​In​ ​his​ ​work,​ ​Smith​ ​maintains​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​strong​ ​connection​ ​between 
how​ ​one​ ​studies​ ​religion​ ​with​ ​one’s​ ​“theory”​ ​of​ ​human​ ​beings.​ ​Theories​ ​are​ ​meant​ ​to​ ​account 
for​ ​observable​ ​phenomena.​ ​A​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​what​ ​human​ ​beings 
are,​ ​thus​ ​must​ ​help​ ​explain​ ​phenomena​ ​observed​ ​in​ ​human​ ​activity.​ ​Looking​ ​at​ ​the 
phenomena​ ​of​ ​“human​ ​social​ ​behavior,”​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​the​ ​cognitivist​ ​model​ ​which 
allegedly​ ​underpins​ ​modern​ ​understandings​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​“inadequate​ ​not​ ​just​ ​because​ ​it​ ​is 
secular​ ​but​ ​because​ ​it​ ​can’t​ ​do​ ​justice​ ​to​ ​the​ ​data.” ​ ​Why​ ​do​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​act​ ​the​ ​way​ ​they 132
do?​ ​What​ ​motivates​ ​their​ ​behaviour?​ ​Are​ ​people​ ​driven​ ​by​ ​the​ ​beliefs​ ​of​ ​their​ ​religion​ ​and 
ideology​ ​to​ ​act​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​way?​ ​Do​ ​people​ ​with​ ​religious​ ​beliefs​ ​act​ ​differently​ ​than​ ​those​ ​with 
secular​ ​beliefs?​ ​Do​ ​different​ ​religious​ ​beliefs​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​different​ ​behaviours?​ ​These​ ​are​ ​the​ ​kinds 
of​ ​question​ ​which​ ​flow​ ​from​ ​Smith’s​ ​challenging​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cognitivist​ ​anthropology. 
The​ ​problem​ ​which​ ​Smith​ ​sets​ ​up​ ​and​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​solve—the​ ​difficulty​ ​of​ ​explaining 
human​ ​behavior​ ​with​ ​current​ ​understandings​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology—is 
undoubtedly​ ​present.​ ​The​ ​scientific​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​has​ ​suffered​ ​from​ ​what​ ​sociologist​ ​Mark 
Chaves​ ​calls​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​congruence​ ​fallacy. ​ ​In​ ​brief,​ ​while​ ​much​ ​of​ ​scholarly​ ​and​ ​popular 133
discussions​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​assume​ ​a​ ​consistency​ ​between​ ​religious​ ​ideas​ ​and​ ​behavior,​ ​decades​ ​of 
132​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​Liturgies,”​ ​181-182n28. 
133​ ​Mark​ ​Chaves,​ ​“SSSR​ ​Presidential​ ​Address​ ​Rain​ ​Dances​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Dry​ ​Season:​ ​Overcoming​ ​the 
Religious​ ​Congruence​ ​Fallacy,”​ ​​Journal​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Scientific​ ​Study​ ​of​ ​Religion​​ ​49,​ ​no.​ ​1​ ​(2010):​ ​1–14. 
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research​ ​across​ ​multiple​ ​disciplines​ ​indicate​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​the​ ​exception,​ ​not​ ​the​ ​rule.​ ​A 
simple​ ​example​ ​Chaves​ ​cites​ ​is​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​gathering​ ​in​ ​which​ ​people​ ​emphasize​ ​loving​ ​one 
another,​ ​only​ ​to​ ​act​ ​harshly​ ​towards​ ​one​ ​another​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​the​ ​gathering. ​ ​Because​ ​it​ ​is​ ​rare 134
to​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​predict​ ​behaviour​ ​based​ ​on​ ​religious​ ​beliefs,​ ​there​ ​must​ ​be​ ​other​ ​more​ ​significant 
factors​ ​driving​ ​actions.​ ​This​ ​fact​ ​alone​ ​indicates​ ​the​ ​need​ ​for​ ​better​ ​theory.  
But​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​congruence​ ​raises​ ​another​ ​question:​ ​if​ ​religious​ ​congruence​ ​is​ ​rare,​ ​is 
there​ ​any​ ​reason​ ​to​ ​think​ ​that​ ​secular​ ​congruence​ ​is​ ​common?​ ​The​ ​ubiquity​ ​of​ ​religious 
incongruence​ ​points​ ​to​ ​a​ ​more​ ​fundamental​ ​discontinuity​ ​between​ ​belief​ ​and​ ​behavior; 
namely,​ ​that​ ​all​ ​cultures​ ​and​ ​worldviews—religious​ ​or​ ​not—are​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​the​ ​same​ ​problem. 
As​ ​Chaves​ ​notes,​ ​“ideas​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​exist​ ​as​ ​bits​ ​and​ ​pieces​ ​that​ ​come​ ​and​ ​go​ ​as​ ​situations 
change,​ ​producing​ ​many​ ​inconsistencies​ ​and​ ​discrepancies.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​true​ ​of​ ​culture​ ​in​ ​general, 
and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​true​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​culture​ ​in​ ​particular.” ​ ​If​ ​this​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​incongruence​ ​applies​ ​to 135
religious​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​cultures​ ​alike,​ ​then​ ​studies​ ​of​ ​either​ ​which​ ​​assume​​ ​congruence​ ​and 
maintain​ ​a​ ​conceptual​ ​separation​ ​by​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​beliefs​ ​may​ ​be​ ​misleading.​ ​One​ ​could 
maintain​ ​the​ ​“gold​ ​standard”​ ​of​ ​supernatural​ ​in​ ​a​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​for​ ​lack​ ​of​ ​alternatives, 
but​ ​if​ ​it​ ​fails​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​religious​ ​or​ ​secular​ ​behavior,​ ​perhaps​ ​more​ ​efforts​ ​at​ ​seeking​ ​such​ ​an 
alternative​ ​are​ ​to​ ​be​ ​sought.​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​starting​ ​from​ ​this​ ​understanding:​ ​that​ ​religious​ ​beliefs 
and​ ​practices​ ​often​ ​don’t​ ​match.​ ​And​ ​he​ ​thinks​ ​the​ ​cognitivist​ ​anthropology​ ​assumed​ ​the 
study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​fails​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​that​ ​is​ ​the​ ​case.  
To​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​he​ ​believes​ ​modern​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​cannot​ ​adequately​ ​explain​ ​the 
human​ ​behavior,​ ​Smith​ ​alleges​ ​two​ ​reductionistic​ ​assumptions:​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​model​ ​is​ ​too 
narrow​ ​and​ ​too​ ​static.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​narrow​ ​in​ ​that​ ​it​ ​considers​ ​one​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​human 
beings—beliefs—to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​most​ ​significant​ ​factor​ ​in​ ​determining​ ​religiosity.​ ​And​ ​other 
aspects​ ​are​ ​left​ ​under-explored​ ​and​ ​their​ ​significance​ ​under-appreciated:​ ​“[N]oncognitive 
ways​ ​of​ ​being-in-the-world​ ​that​ ​are​ ​more​ ​closely​ ​tethered​ ​to​ ​our​ ​embodiment​ ​or​ ​animality… 
tend​ ​to​ ​drop​ ​of​ ​the​ ​radar​ ​or​ ​are​ ​treated​ ​as​ ​nonessential.”​ ​The​ ​model​ ​is​ ​static​ ​in​ ​that​ ​is​ ​suppose 
that​ ​humans​ ​can​ ​be​ ​“captured​ ​in​ ​a​ ​snapshot.”​ ​Human​ ​temporality​ ​loses​ ​its​ ​importance,​ ​and​ ​we 
are​ ​viewed​ ​“as​ ​creatures​ ​without​ ​histories,​ ​without​ ​any​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​unfolding​ ​and​ ​development 
over​ ​time.”   136
134​ ​Ibid.,​ ​4.​ ​Others,​ ​perhaps​ ​more​ ​illuminating,​ ​are​ ​found​ ​in​ ​his​ ​article. 
135​ ​Ibid.,​ ​2.  
136​ ​This​ ​paragraph​ ​follows​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​46-47.​ ​Compare​ ​again​ ​with​ ​Mahmood,​ ​who 
claims​ ​that​ ​in​ ​secularist​ ​approaches,​ ​“religion’s​ ​phenomenal​ ​forms—its​ ​liturgies,​ ​rituals,​ ​and​ ​scriptures—are 
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To​ ​review,​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​the​ ​methodologies​ ​of​ ​philosophy​ ​and​ ​sociology​ ​of 
religion​ ​have​ ​are​ ​faulty​ ​due​ ​to​ ​their​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology​ ​which​ ​focuses​ ​on​ ​the 
cognitive.​ ​Philosophy​ ​fails​ ​to​ ​adequately​ ​consider​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​a​ ​lived​ ​experience,​ ​and 
sociology’s​ ​substantivism​ ​relies​ ​on​ ​the​ ​ambiguous​ ​category​ ​of​ ​the​ ​supernatural. ​ ​A​ ​major 137
part​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​Cultural​ ​Liturgies​ ​project​ ​is​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​new​ ​framework​ ​through​ ​which​ ​to 
look​ ​at​ ​religion​ ​by​ ​offering​ ​an​ ​alternative​ ​anthropology​ ​which​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​displace​ ​intellectual 
beliefs​ ​as​ ​the​ ​core​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person.​ ​His​ ​approach​ ​is​ ​heavily​ ​influenced​ ​by​ ​the 
phenomenological​ ​tradition:​ ​Martin​ ​Heidegger,​ ​Maurice​ ​Merleau-Ponty,​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor​ ​and 
others​ ​who​ ​prioritize​ ​embodied​ ​experiences​ ​to​ ​understand,​ ​as​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​“human 
being-in-the-world.”​ ​As​ ​with​ ​any​ ​theory,​ ​for​ ​it​ ​displace​ ​current​ ​theories,​ ​it​ ​should​ ​have​ ​more 
explanatory​ ​power​ ​than​ ​other​ ​models.​ ​What​ ​follows​ ​is​ ​an​ ​exposition​ ​and​ ​assessment​ ​of​ ​this 
theory.  
3.2.​ ​​Homo​ ​liturgicus,​​ ​or​ ​the​ ​Human​ ​as​ ​Lover 
At​ ​the​ ​heart​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​anthropological​ ​account​ ​is​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​the​ ​core​ ​of​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​is 
not​ ​the​ ​propositional​ ​content​ ​contained​ ​in​ ​their​ ​heads,​ ​but​ ​their​ ​embodied​ ​​desire​.​ ​That​ ​is, 
while​ ​modern​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​accounts​ ​place​ ​more​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​what​ ​humans​ ​​think​,​ ​Smith​ ​claims 
that​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​better​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​what​ ​they​ ​​love​. ​ ​What​ ​he​ ​articulates​ ​throughout​ ​his​ ​book 138
Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“more​ ​holistic,​ ​affective,​ ​embodied​ ​anthropology.”   139
This​ ​Augustinian ​ ​model​ ​that​ ​resists​ ​the​ ​rationalism​ ​and​ ​quasi-rationalism​ ​of​ ​the​ ​earlier​ ​models​ ​by 140
shifting​ ​the​ ​center​ ​of​ ​gravity​ ​of​ ​human​ ​identity,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​were,​ ​down​ ​from​ ​the​ ​heady​ ​regions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mind 
closer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​central​ ​regions​ ​of​ ​our​ ​bodies,​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​our​ ​​kardia​—our​ ​gut​ ​or​ ​heart.​ ​The​ ​point​ ​is​ ​to 
emphasize​ ​that​ ​the​ ​way​ ​we​ ​inhabit​ ​the​ ​world​ ​is​ ​not​ ​primarily​ ​as​ ​thinkers,​ ​or​ ​even​ ​as​ ​believers,​ ​but​ ​as 
more​ ​affective,​ ​embodied​ ​creatures​ ​who​ ​make​ ​our​ ​way​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world​ ​more​ ​by​ ​feeling​ ​our​ ​way​ ​around​ ​it... 
One​ ​might​ ​say​ ​that​ ​in​ ​our​ ​everyday,​ ​mundane​ ​being-in-the​ ​world,​ ​we​ ​don’t​ ​lead​ ​with​ ​our​ ​head,​ ​so​ ​to 
speak;​ ​we​ ​lead​ ​with​ ​our​ ​heart​ ​and​ ​hands.   141
understood​ ​to​ ​be​ ​inessential​ ​to​ ​it​ ​and​ ​are​ ​not​ ​to​ ​be​ ​confused​ ​with​ ​the​ ​universal​ ​truth​ ​for​ ​which​ ​they​ ​are​ ​made​ ​to 
stand​ ​in.”​ ​See​ ​Saba​ ​Mahmood,​ ​“Secularism,​ ​Hermeneutics,​ ​and​ ​Empire,”​ ​341. 
137​ ​Functionalism​ ​tends​ ​to​ ​dissolve​ ​the​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​religious​ ​practices,​ ​ideas,​ ​and​ ​ideologies​ ​and 
secular​ ​counterparts.​ ​Smith’s​ ​approach​ ​seems​ ​closer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​functionalists,​ ​but​ ​with​ ​added​ ​nuance​ ​that​ ​merits​ ​the 
attention​ ​given​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sections​ ​which​ ​follow. 
138​ ​Smith​ ​makes​ ​no​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​love​ ​and​ ​desire.​ ​See​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​51n20. 
139​ ​Ibid.,​ ​26. 
140 ​ ​​Augustinian​ ​in​ ​that​ ​it​ ​grants​ ​a​ ​primacy​ ​to​ ​our​ ​love,​ ​not​ ​rational​ ​ideas.​ ​Smith​ ​cites​ ​Augustine’s​ ​​City​ ​of 
God​ ​​19.24​ ​(London:​ ​Penguin,​ ​2003);​ ​idem.,​ ​​Teaching​ ​Christianity​,​ ​trans.​ ​Edmund​ ​Hill​ ​(New​ ​York:​ ​New​ ​York 
City,​ ​1996);​ ​idem.,​ ​​Homilies​ ​on​ ​I​ ​John​ ​​4.6​ ​in​ ​​Augustine:​ ​Later​ ​Works​,​ ​ed.​ ​John​ ​Burnaby​ ​(Philadelphia: 
Westminster,​ ​1955).​ ​​ ​Smith’s​ ​epistemology,​ ​as​ ​mentioned​ ​in​ ​chapter​ ​2,​ ​​ ​is​ ​Augustinian​ ​in​ ​that​ ​it​ ​assumes​ ​that 
faith​ ​must​ ​precede​ ​understanding. 
141​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​47. 
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Because​ ​Smith​ ​believes​ ​gives​ ​much​ ​weight​ ​the​ ​affective​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person, 
embodied​ ​rituals​ ​and​ ​material​ ​practices​ ​gain​ ​primacy​ ​over​ ​cognitive​ ​activity​ ​in​ ​forming 
human​ ​desire​ ​and​ ​identity.​ ​To​ ​apply​ ​this​ ​anthropology​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​would​ ​mean 
scholars​ ​would​ ​have​ ​to​ ​look​ ​beyond​ ​doctrine​ ​and​ ​propositionalized​ ​content​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to 
“discover”​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​embodied​ ​in​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​institutions​ ​which​ ​form​ ​desire.  
What​ ​does​ ​this​ ​anthropological​ ​account​ ​tell​ ​us​ ​about​ ​the​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​and 
how​ ​does​ ​Smith’s​ ​view​ ​compare​ ​with​ ​current​ ​approaches?​ ​A​ ​simplified​ ​version​ ​of​ ​a 
substantivist​ ​approach,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​would​ ​view​ ​religion​ ​as​​ ​humans​ ​​believing​​ ​in​ ​supernatural 
X​.​ ​Similarly,​ ​a​ ​functionalist​ ​would​ ​see​ ​it​ ​as​ ​​humans​ ​​doing​​ ​practice​ ​X​.​ ​Smith​ ​does​ ​not​ ​reject 
these​ ​elements,​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​fair​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​is​ ​much​ ​closer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​functionalist 
emphasis​ ​on​ ​practices.​ ​But​ ​the​ ​verb​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​proposal​ ​is​ ​​desire​:​ ​​humans​ ​​desiring 
ultimately​ ​X​.​ ​More​ ​than​ ​believing​ ​or​ ​doing,​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​saying,​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​desiring​ ​animals, 
and​ ​those​ ​desires​ ​are​ ​more​ ​fundamentally​ ​driven​ ​not​ ​by​ ​beliefs​ ​by​ ​by​ ​formative​ ​practices,​ ​or 
“liturgies.”​ ​He​ ​puts​ ​it​ ​this​ ​way:​ ​“religion​ ​is​ ​an​ ​embodied,​ ​material,​ ​liturgical​ ​phenomenon​ ​that 
shapes​ ​our​ ​desire​ ​and​ ​imagination​ ​before​ ​it​ ​yields​ ​doctrines​ ​and​ ​beliefs.”  142
​ ​According​ ​to​ ​Smith’s​ ​model,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​possible​ ​for​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​to​ ​avoid​ ​desire.​ ​He 
equates​ ​a​ ​human’s​ ​ultimate​ ​desire​ ​with​ ​their​ ​identity.​ ​Because​ ​desire​ ​is​ ​constitutive​ ​of 
humans,​ ​being​ ​religious​ ​is​ ​as​ ​well,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​“cannot​ ​help​ ​but​ ​be​ ​religious.”​ ​This, 
Smith​ ​claims,​ ​is​ ​part​ ​of​ ​human​ ​beings’​ ​inherent​ ​structure,​ ​akin​ ​to​ ​what​ ​he​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​as 
Augustine’s​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​“structural​ ​religion.” ​ ​Desire​ ​is​ ​always​ ​operating,​ ​so​ ​all​ ​humans​ ​are, 143
whether​ ​conscious​ ​of​ ​it​ ​or​ ​not,​ ​religious.​ ​Obviously,​ ​this​ ​claim​ ​goes​ ​against​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​an 
individual​ ​or​ ​society​ ​being​ ​“secular”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​having​ ​no​ ​religion.​ ​And​ ​that​ ​is​ ​precisely 
what​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​to​ ​show​ ​with​ ​his​ ​model.  
What​ ​this​ ​anthropology​ ​offers​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​maintaining​ ​the​ ​key 
elements​ ​of​ ​substantivist​ ​and​ ​functionalist​ ​approaches​ ​(i.e.,​ ​belief​ ​and​ ​practice)​ ​while 
introducing​ ​new​ ​tools​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​religion.​ ​The​ ​key​ ​features​ ​of​ ​the​ ​anthropology​ ​of​ ​desire 
Smith​ ​is​ ​articulating​ ​are​ ​​intentionality​​ ​and​ ​​teleology​,​ ​which​ ​are​ ​shaped​ ​and​ ​inscribed​ ​through 
habits​ ​​(Love’s​ ​Fulcrum)​​ ​​and​ ​​practices​ ​​(Love’s​ ​Formation). ​ ​Let’s​ ​consider​ ​each​ ​in​ ​turn. 144
 
142​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​liturgies,”​ ​161. 
143​ ​This​ ​paragraph​ ​from​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy,​ ​​113. 




Intentionality​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​Smith’s​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​human​ ​persons’​ ​“being-in-the-world​ ​is​ ​always 
characterized​ ​by​ ​a​ ​dynamic,​ ​‘ek-static’​ ​orientation​ ​that​ ​‘intends’​ ​the​ ​world​ ​or​ ​‘aims​ ​at’​ ​the 
world​ ​as​ ​an​ ​object​ ​of​ ​conscious.” ​ ​This​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​his​ ​anthropology​ ​Smith​ ​articulates​ ​by 145
retracing​ ​bit​ ​of​ ​the​ ​history​ ​of​ ​twentieth-century​ ​phenomenology,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​undoubtedly​ ​an 
important​ ​thread​ ​through​ ​his​ ​work.​ ​Contra​ ​Descartes,​ ​humans​ ​do​ ​not​ ​​simply​ ​think​​ ​(Smith 
encourages​ ​us​ ​to​ ​try)​ ​but​ ​always​ ​think​ ​​of​​ ​or​ ​​about​​ ​something.​ ​Pointing​ ​to​ ​Edmund​ ​Husserl’s 
phenomenological​ ​maxim​ ​which​ ​states​ ​that​ ​“consciousness​ ​is​ ​always​ ​consciousness​ ​​of​…” 
something,​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​can​ ​never​ ​simply​ ​exist​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world​ ​without 
intending​ ​the​ ​worlding,​ ​without​ ​aiming​ ​at​ ​some​ ​object. ​ ​Human​ ​consciousness​ ​is​ ​intentional, 146
and​ ​there​ ​are​ ​different​ ​ways,​ ​or​ ​modes,​ ​of​ ​intending.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​when​ ​thinking​ ​of​ ​a​ ​friend, 
we​ ​may​ ​perceive​ ​her,​ ​remember​ ​her,​ ​be​ ​angry​ ​with​ ​her,​ ​remember​ ​her,​ ​love​ ​her,​ ​etc.​ ​A​ ​key 
issue​ ​for​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​determining​ ​which​ ​mode​ ​is​ ​primary.​ ​Martin​ ​Heidegger,​ ​a​ ​student​ ​of 
Edmund​ ​Husserl​ ​and​ ​fellow​ ​phenomenologist,​ ​disagreed​ ​with​ ​his​ ​teacher​ ​that​ ​“perception” 
was​ ​most​ ​the​ ​fundamental​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​intentionality.​ ​Rather​ ​than​ ​perceiving​ ​a​ ​world​ ​of​ ​objects, 
Heidegger​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​first​ ​“we​ ​are​ ​​involved​ ​​with​ ​the​ ​world​ ​as​ ​traditioned​ ​actors.​ ​The​ ​world​ ​is 
an​ ​environment​ ​in​ ​which​ ​we​ ​swim,​ ​not​ ​a​ ​picture​ ​that​ ​we​ ​look​ ​at​ ​as​ ​distanced​ ​observers.”  147
And​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​way​ ​we​ ​“intend,”​ ​Heidegger​ ​claimed,​ ​is​ ​through​ ​​care​.​ ​This​ ​move​ ​was​ ​a 
critical​ ​in​ ​that​ ​it​ ​shifted​ ​the​ ​weight​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​person​ ​down​ ​to​ ​the​ ​noncognitive,​ ​“from​ ​the 
cerebral​ ​regions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mind​ ​to​ ​the​ ​more​ ​affective​ ​regions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​body.” ​ ​Smith​ ​sees​ ​this​ ​as​ ​a 148
sign​ ​of​ ​Augustinian​ ​influence​ ​on​ ​Heidegger’s​ ​thought.​ ​But​ ​Smith​ ​will​ ​be​ ​siding​ ​with​ ​this 
ancient​ ​source,​ ​he​ ​claims,​ ​by​ ​specifying​ ​that​ ​our​ ​most​ ​fundamental​ ​​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​intending​ ​is​ ​not 
care​,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​​love​.  149
To​ ​say​ ​that​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​intend​ ​the​ ​world​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​love​ ​is​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that 
“(ultimate)​ ​love​ ​is​ ​constitutive​ ​of​ ​our​ ​identity.” ​ ​Neither​ ​what​ ​we​ ​say​ ​is​ ​most​ ​ultimate​ ​(or 150
most​ ​important,​ ​most​ ​animating)​ ​nor​ ​is​ ​what​ ​we​ ​may​ ​even​ ​​believe​​ ​is​ ​most​ ​ultimate​ ​to​ ​us 
145​ ​Ibid.,​ ​48. 
146 ​ ​​Ibid​. 
147​ ​Ibid.,​ ​49,​ ​emphasis​ ​original.​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​that​ ​in​ ​​Being​ ​and​ ​Time​,​ ​trans.​ ​John​ ​Macquarrie​ ​and​ ​Edward 
Robinson​ ​(New​ ​York:​ ​Harper​ ​&​ ​Row,​ ​1966),​ ​Heidegger​ ​suggests​ ​a​ ​“fundamental​ ​continuity​ ​between​ ​Descartes’ 
rationalism​ ​and​ ​Husserl’s​ ​particular,​ ​overly​ ​cognitivist​ ​version​ ​of​ ​phenomenology.”​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the 
Kingdom​,​ ​49n15. 
148​ ​Ibid.,​ ​50. 
149​ ​Smith​ ​writes​ ​that​ ​“what​ ​distinguishes​ ​Augustine’s​ ​two​ ​cities​ ​(the​ ​earthly​ ​city​ ​and​ ​the​ ​city​ ​of​ ​God)​ ​is 
not​ ​ideas​ ​or​ ​beliefs​ ​but​ ​​love​,”​ ​citing​ ​​City​ ​of​ ​God​ ​​19.24.​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​46n12. 
150​ ​Ibid.,​ ​51. 
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actually​ ​defines​ ​who​ ​we​ ​are.​ ​Rather,​ ​as​ ​noted​ ​above,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​what​ ​we​ ​​desire​—consciously​ ​or 
unconsciously.​ ​These​ ​are​ ​“​ultimate​​ ​loves—that​ ​to​ ​which​ ​we​ ​are​ ​fundamentally​ ​oriented,​ ​what 
ultimately​ ​governs​ ​our​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​good​ ​life,​ ​what​ ​shapes​ ​and​ ​molds​ ​our 
being-in-the-world—in​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​what​ ​we​ ​desire​ ​above​ ​all​ ​else,​ ​the​ ​ultimate​ ​desire​ ​that 
shapes​ ​and​ ​positions​ ​and​ ​makes​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​all​ ​our​ ​penultimate​ ​desires​ ​and​ ​actions.” ​ ​Another 151
way​ ​Smith​ ​describes​ ​this​ ​is​ ​​worship​,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​what​ ​humans​ ​ultimately​ ​love​ ​is​ ​what​ ​they 
worship.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​some​ ​ambiguity​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​use​ ​of​ ​the​ ​word​ ​​worship​​ ​here.​ ​Is​ ​it​ ​the​ ​practices, 
or​ ​the​ ​intentionality​ ​of​ ​itself?​ ​In​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​Smith​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​both.​ ​He 
equates​ ​​worship​​ ​and​ ​​liturgy​,​ ​noting​ ​the​ ​latter​ ​as​ ​a​ ​“shorthand​ ​for​ ​naming​ ​worship​ ​practices​ ​of 
all​ ​kinds.” ​ ​Yet​ ​later​ ​he​ ​suggests​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​intentionality​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​love,​ ​writing​ ​that 152
it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“formal,​ ​ineradicable​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​human​ ​being-in-the-world.” ​ ​In​ ​short,​ ​is​ ​​worship​​ ​a 153
liturgy​ ​or​ ​love​ ​(point​ ​1​ ​or​ ​3​ ​of​ ​the​ ​​homo​ ​liturgicus​ ​​model)?​ ​While​ ​it​ ​is​ ​true​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​model 
is​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​show​ ​how​ ​liturgies​ ​and​ ​loves​ ​are​ ​intimately​ ​connected—indeed, 
inseparable—Smith​ ​nonetheless​ ​distinguishes​ ​between​ ​them.​ ​Use​ ​of​ ​​worship​ ​​is​ ​not​ ​frequent 
in​ ​his​ ​book,​ ​but​ ​consistent​ ​usage​ ​would​ ​add​ ​clarity. 
While​ ​​worship​​ ​has​ ​religious​ ​connotations​ ​(indeed,​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is​ ​often​ ​associated​ ​with 
worship​ ​of​ ​a​ ​deity),​ ​Smith​ ​holds​ ​that​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​accurately​ ​indicates​ ​how​ ​all​ ​humans​ ​love/desire 
something​ ​as​ ​ultimate,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​they​ ​are​ ​unable​ ​to​ ​articulate​ ​this. ​ ​It​ ​is​ ​the​ ​human​ ​mode​ ​of 154
intending​ ​the​ ​world.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​constitutive​ ​of​ ​a​ ​human,​ ​not​ ​merely​ ​for​ ​“passionate”​ ​or​ ​“romantic” 
types​ ​or​ ​“even​ ​specifically​ ​religious​ ​people.” ​ ​These​ ​assertions​ ​by​ ​Smith​ ​point​ ​to​ ​why​ ​his 155
alternative​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology​ ​challenges​ ​modern​ ​categories​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​religious.  
The​ ​importance​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​places​ ​on​ ​the​ ​role​ ​of​ ​desire​ ​raises​ ​an​ ​important​ ​question: 
What​ ​is​ ​desire?​ ​As​ ​desire​ ​is​ ​central​ ​to​ ​the​ ​book—indeed,​ ​even​ ​part​ ​of​ ​its​ ​title—establishing 
how​ ​the​ ​term​ ​it​ ​used​ ​is​ ​important.​ ​Unfortunately,​ ​Smith​ ​does​ ​not​ ​offer​ ​an​ ​explicit​ ​definition​ ​of 
the​ ​term.​ ​Most​ ​of​ ​his​ ​writing​ ​on​ ​desire​ ​is​ ​concerned​ ​with​ ​describing​ ​​how​​ ​it​ ​works,​ ​but​ ​it 
would​ ​have​ ​been​ ​beneficial​ ​to​ ​the​ ​reader—practitioner​ ​and​ ​scholar​ ​alike—to​ ​have​ ​offered​ ​a 
151​ ​Ibid​. 
152​ ​Ibid.,​ ​25n8.​ ​Later,​ ​in​ ​dialogue​ ​with​ ​Orthodox​ ​theologian​ ​Alexander​ ​Schmemann,​ ​Smith​ ​will 
characterize​ ​Christian​ ​worship​ ​as​ ​“the​ ​ordering​ ​and​ ​reordering​ ​of​ ​our​ ​material​ ​being​ ​to​ ​the​ ​end​ ​for​ ​which​ ​it​ ​was 
meant.”​ ​Ibid.,​ ​143.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​again​ ​more​ ​in​ ​line​ ​with​ ​worship​ ​as​ ​liturgy​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​mode​ ​of​ ​intentionality.  
153​ ​Ibid.,​ ​90n1.. 
154​ ​This​ ​resonates​ ​with​ ​an​ ​observation​ ​made​ ​in​ ​a​ ​famous​ ​speech​ ​by​ ​the​ ​(quintessentially?)​ ​postmodern 
writer​ ​David​ ​Foster​ ​Wallace​ ​at​ ​Kenyon​ ​College​ ​in​ ​2005:​ ​“There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​such​ ​thing​ ​as​ ​not​ ​worshipping.​ ​Everybody 
worships.​ ​The​ ​only​ ​choice​ ​we​ ​get​ ​is​ ​what​ ​to​ ​worship.”​ ​David​ ​Foster​ ​Wallace,​ ​“Plain​ ​old​ ​untrendy​ ​troubles​ ​and 
emotions,”​ ​​The​ ​Guardian​,​ ​September​ ​20,​ ​2008,​ ​https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/sep/20/fiction 
155​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​51. 
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clear​ ​description​ ​of​ ​the​ ​term.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​true​ ​as​ ​a​ ​matter​ ​of​ ​clarity​ ​for​ ​the​ ​argument,​ ​but 
particularly​ ​as​ ​​love​ ​​and​ ​​desire​​ ​are​ ​common​ ​words​ ​in​ ​colloquial​ ​English​ ​vocabulary​ ​(which 
perhaps​ ​is​ ​his​ ​point​ ​in​ ​using​ ​them​ ​as​ ​the​ ​core​ ​terms​ ​over​ ​more​ ​academic​ ​versions​ ​like 
“affects”),​ ​it​ ​would​ ​have​ ​been​ ​helpful​ ​to​ ​state​ ​how​ ​he​ ​uses​ ​them,​ ​as​ ​he​ ​does​ ​with​ ​​liturgy​​ ​and 
religion​. 
​ ​Nonetheless,​ ​one​ ​can​ ​ascertain​ ​from​ ​various​ ​passages​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​holds​ ​​desire​​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a 
mode​ ​of​ ​“intending”​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​a​ ​description​ ​of​ ​the​ ​way​ ​humans​ ​“be”​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​in 
contrast​ ​to​ ​the​ ​already​ ​mentioned​ ​intentionalities​ ​of​ ​perception​ ​or​ ​care,​ ​among​ ​other 
possibilities.​ ​Because​ ​he​ ​is​ ​keen​ ​to​ ​use​ ​it​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​explaining​ ​human​ ​behavior,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear 
that​ ​​desire​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​describing​ ​a​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​subconscious​ ​motivation:​ ​“There​ ​is​ ​a​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​drive 
(or​ ​pull,​ ​depending​ ​on​ ​the​ ​metaphor)​ ​that​ ​pushes​ ​(or​ ​pulls)​ ​us​ ​to​ ​act​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​ways,​ ​develop 
certain​ ​relationships,​ ​pursue​ ​certain​ ​goods,​ ​make​ ​certain​ ​sacrifices,​ ​enjoy​ ​certain​ ​things.”  156
The​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​generally​ ​unconscious​ ​of​ ​​desire​​ ​and​ ​how​ ​it​ ​affects​ ​their 
behavior.​ ​It​ ​operates​ ​often​ ​in​ ​ways​ ​that​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​perceived,​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​that 
actions​ ​and​ ​preferences​ ​provoked​ ​by​ ​​desire​ ​​may​ ​even​ ​be​ ​contrary​ ​to​ ​conscious​ ​registers. 
Donovan​ ​Shaefer,​ ​who​ ​has​ ​written​ ​on​ ​how​ ​affect​ ​theory​ ​could​ ​aid​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion, 
suggests​ ​it​ ​works​ ​like​ ​this:​ ​“At​ ​the​ ​personal​ ​level,​ ​we​ ​may​ ​find​ ​something​ ​‘sad,’​ ​but​ ​that 
response​ ​in​ ​the​ ​register​ ​of​ ​awareness​ ​does​ ​not​ ​dictate​ ​our​ ​preference—​whether​ ​our​ ​bodies 
move​ ​toward​ ​or​ ​away​ ​from​ ​that​ ​object​”​ ​(emphasis​ ​added). ​ ​​Desire​,​ ​then,​ ​can​ ​be​ ​understood 157
in​ ​Smith’s​ ​anthropology​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​humans​ ​are​ ​pre-cognitively​ ​pushed/pulled​ ​in​ ​certain 
directions,​ ​to​ ​particular​ ​ends—which​ ​brings​ ​us​ ​to​ ​​telos​. 
Aiming 
The​ ​Greek​ ​word​ ​​telos​ ​​means​ ​“end”​ ​or​ ​“goal.” ​ ​Intentional​ ​creatures,​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​are​ ​also 158
teleological​​ ​creatures.​ ​Humans​ ​are​ ​desiring​ ​creatures​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​some​ ​goal.​ ​Though​ ​we​ ​may​ ​not 
be​ ​conscious​ ​of​ ​it,​ ​“what​ ​we​ ​love​ ​is​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​good​ ​life,​ ​an​ ​implicit​ ​picture​ ​of 
156​ ​Ibid.,​ ​51-52. 
157 ​ ​​Donovan​ ​O.​ ​Schaefer,​ ​​Religious​ ​Affects:​ ​Animality,​ ​Evolution,​ ​and​ ​Power​​ ​(Durham:​ ​Duke 
University​ ​Press,​ ​2015),​ ​26.​ ​Smith’s​ ​theory​ ​could​ ​benefit​ ​from​ ​interaction​ ​with​ ​a​ ​growing​ ​body​ ​of​ ​research 
which​ ​explicitly​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​religion​ ​using​ ​affect​ ​theory.​ ​See​ ​Kathleen​ ​Stewart,​ ​​Ordinary​ ​Affects 
(Durham:​ ​Duke​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2007);​ ​Manuel​ ​Vásquez,​ ​​More​ ​Than​ ​Belief:​ ​A​ ​Materialist​ ​Theory​ ​of​ ​Religion 
(New​ ​York:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2011).​ ​(Admittedly,​ ​some​ ​of​ ​this​ ​research​ ​was​ ​published​ ​after​ ​Smith’s 
book!) 
158​ ​​Henry​ ​George​ ​Liddell​ ​and​ ​Robert​ ​Scott.​ ​​An​ ​Intermediate​ ​Greek-English​ ​Lexicon​ ​​(7th​ ​ed.;​ ​Oxford: 
Clarendon​ ​Press,​ ​1961),​ ​799. 
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what​ ​we​ ​think​ ​human​ ​flourishing​ ​looks​ ​like.” ​ ​It​ ​is​ ​an​ ​aesthetic​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​social,​ ​economic, 159
personal,​ ​familial,​ ​personal,​ ​environmental​ ​relations.​ ​Here​ ​Smith​ ​echoes​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor,​ ​who 
describes​ ​these​ ​visions​ ​in​ ​the​ ​following​ ​way:​ ​“Every​ ​person,​ ​and​ ​every​ ​society,​ ​lives​ ​with​ ​or 
by​ ​some​ ​conception(s)​ ​of​ ​what​ ​human​ ​flourishing​ ​is:​ ​What​ ​constitutes​ ​a​ ​fulfilled​ ​life?​ ​What 
makes​ ​life​ ​really​ ​worth​ ​living?​ ​What​ ​would​ ​we​ ​most​ ​admire​ ​people​ ​for?” ​ ​The​ ​aim​ ​is​ ​not 160
simply​ ​ideas​ ​or​ ​doctrines.​ ​Smith’s​ ​contention​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​​telos​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​vision​ ​that​ ​has​ ​captured​ ​our 
imagination​​ ​through​ ​affective​ ​means,​ ​grabbing​ ​our​ ​“gut.”​ ​That​ ​means,​ ​more​ ​than​ ​a​ ​mere​ ​list 
of​ ​ideas​ ​and​ ​propositions,​ ​the​ ​narratives​ ​found​ ​in​ ​stories,​ ​films,​ ​and​ ​other​ ​art​ ​forms​ ​are​ ​what 
really​ ​pull​ ​humans:​ ​“Our​ ​ultimate​ ​love​ ​moves​ ​and​ ​motivates​ ​us​ ​because​ ​we​ ​are​ ​lured​ ​by​ ​this 
picture​ ​of​ ​human​ ​flourishing.​ ​Rather​ ​than​ ​being​ ​pushed​ ​by​ ​beliefs,​ ​we​ ​are​ ​pulled​ ​by​ ​a​ ​​telos​​ ​we 
desire.”  161
None​ ​of​ ​this​ ​is​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​we​ ​do​ ​not​ ​also​ ​​have​ ​​a​ ​cognitive​ ​register​ ​that​ ​influences 
human​ ​behaviour​ ​and​ ​love.​ ​Smith​ ​acknowledges​ ​that​ ​if​ ​humans​ ​were​ ​​only​​ ​affective​ ​creatures, 
his​ ​entire​ ​project​ ​would​ ​be​ ​moot.​ ​To​ ​offset​ ​the​ ​(very)​ ​cognitive​ ​communication​ ​of​ ​his​ ​project, 
Smith​ ​therefore​ ​includes​ ​snippets​ ​of​ ​commentary​ ​on​ ​films,​ ​novels,​ ​and​ ​other​ ​cultural​ ​items​ ​to 
support​ ​his​ ​thesis​ ​more​ ​​a​ffectively​ ​than​ ​a​ ​typical​ ​philosophical​ ​treatise.​ ​But​ ​even​ ​when 
engaged​ ​in​ ​more​ ​cognitive​ ​pursuits,​ ​he​ ​claims,​ ​the​ ​affective​ ​register​ ​is​ ​always​ ​still​ ​at​ ​work.  
In​ ​this​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​model,​ ​one​ ​can​ ​see​ ​that​ ​different​ ​religions​ ​are​ ​distinguished​ ​by 
the​ ​different​ ​ends​ ​they​ ​seek.​ ​These​ ​ends​ ​could​ ​be​ ​transcendent,​ ​involving​ ​some​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​the 
supernatural,​ ​however​ ​defined.​ ​Or​ ​the​ ​ends​ ​could​ ​utterly​ ​immanent:​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​type​ ​of​ ​society, 
a​ ​certain​ ​lifestyle,​ ​etc.​ ​Thus,​ ​no​ ​​telos​​ ​could​ ​be​ ​secular​ ​in-and-of​ ​itself,​ ​since​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​nature 
of​ ​the​ ​​telos​ ​​which​ ​makes​ ​a​ ​person’s​ ​love​ ​of​ ​it​ ​religious,​ ​but​ ​that​ ​the​ ​way​ ​a​ ​person​ ​intends​ ​it: 
whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​a​ ​person​ ​loves​ ​it​ ​ultimately. 
Habits 
What​ ​mechanism​ ​determines​ ​the​ ​object​ ​of​ ​human​ ​desire?​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​have 
“precognitive​ ​tendencies​ ​to​ ​act​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​ways​ ​and​ ​toward​ ​certain​ ​ends,”​ ​which​ ​he​ ​calls 
dispositions​​ ​or​ ​​habits​. ​ ​These​ ​are​ ​default​ ​virtues​ ​and​ ​vices​ ​which​ ​have​ ​become​ ​second​ ​nature 162
159​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​52. 
160​ ​Taylor,​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​,​ ​16. 
161​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​54. 
162​ ​Ibid.,​ ​55.​ ​He​ ​notes​ ​“habits”​ ​is​ ​used​ ​by​ ​philosophers​ ​like​ ​Aristotle,​ ​Thomas​ ​Aquinas,​ ​and​ ​Alasdair 
MacIntyre.​ ​In​ ​​Imagining​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​more​ ​explicit​ ​in​ ​his​ ​debt​ ​to​ ​Pierre​ ​Bordieu’s​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​​habitus​​ ​a 
“system​ ​of​ ​structered,​ ​structuring​ ​dispositions”​ ​to​ ​“​construct​​ ​(constitute)​ ​our​ ​world​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​ways”​ ​(81). 
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to​ ​us​ ​(not​ ​first​ ​nature,​ ​as​ ​these​ ​are​ ​the​ ​biologically​ ​“hard-wired”)​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​are​ ​not​ ​part​ ​of 
conscious​ ​reflection.​ ​They​ ​are​ ​learned​ ​“attitudinal​ ​reflexes” ​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​“quasi-automatic”: 163
“[T]he​ ​virtuous​ ​person​ ​is​ ​someone​ ​who​ ​has​ ​an​ ​almost​ ​automatic​ ​disposition​ ​to​ ​do​ ​the​ ​right 
thing​ ​‘without​ ​thinking​ ​about​ ​it.’” ​ ​This​ ​is​ ​why​ ​they​ ​are​ ​the​ ​“fulcrum”​ ​of​ ​our​ ​desire:​ ​“they 164
are​ ​the​ ​hinge​ ​that​ ​‘turns’​ ​our​ ​heart,​ ​our​ ​love,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​predisposed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​certain 
directions.” ​ ​Habits,​ ​more​ ​so​ ​than​ ​our​ ​reflections,​ ​aim​ ​human​ ​desire.​ ​But,​ ​as​ ​Smith​ ​notes, 165
this​ ​merely​ ​pushes​ ​the​ ​question​ ​up​ ​another​ ​level:​ ​how​ ​do​ ​habits​ ​and​ ​dispositions​ ​get​ ​inscribed 
in​ ​humans?  
Formation 
According​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​habits​ ​are​ ​inscribed​ ​by​ ​​formation​​ ​which​ ​happens​ ​in​ ​in​ ​two​ ​ways:​ ​through 
the​ ​imagination,​ ​and​ ​through​ ​repeated,​ ​embodied,​ ​material​ ​practices.​ ​First,​ ​a​ ​​telos​ ​​becomes 
inscribed​ ​by​ ​“being​ ​​pictured​​ ​in​ ​concrete,​ ​alluring​ ​ways​ ​that​ ​attract​ ​us​ ​at​ ​the​ ​noncognitive 
level.”​ ​These​ ​pictures​ ​come​ ​through​ ​the​ ​aesthetic​ ​means​ ​of​ ​stories​ ​and​ ​images​ ​found​ ​in​ ​art 
and​ ​in​ ​marketing​ ​and​ ​entertainment.​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​these​ ​pictures​ ​work​ ​affectively​ ​through​ ​the 
senses,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​that​ ​“seep​ ​into​ ​us”​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​factual​ ​reporting​ ​does​ ​not. ​ ​While​ ​a​ ​cognitivist 166
anthropology​ ​would​ ​emphasize​ ​that​ ​people​ ​are​ ​intellectually​ ​drawn​ ​to​ ​one​ ​(world)view​ ​or 
another​ ​based​ ​on​ ​propositional​ ​content,​ ​the​ ​desiring​ ​model​ ​emphasizes​ ​that​ ​humans’ 
imaginations​ ​are​ ​captured​ ​(passive​ ​voice​ ​here​ ​intentional)​ ​by​ ​images​ ​absorbed​ ​by​ ​affective 
means. 
On​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​of​ ​practices​ ​it​ ​becomes​ ​especially​ ​apparent​ ​why​ ​so​ ​much​ ​weight​ ​is​ ​given 
to​ ​humans’​ ​embodiment.​ ​Having​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​the​ ​core​ ​of​ ​humans​ ​is​ ​not​ ​in​ ​the​ ​head​ ​but​ ​in​ ​the 
body,​ ​Smith​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​embodied​ ​practices​ ​“infuse​ ​noncognitive​ ​dispositions​ ​and​ ​skills​ ​in​ ​us 
through​ ​ritual​ ​and​ ​repetition​ ​precisely​ ​because​ ​our​ ​hearts​ ​(site​ ​of​ ​habits)​ ​are​ ​so​ ​closely 
tethered​ ​to​ ​our​ ​bodies.” ​ ​And​ ​these​ ​material​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​rituals​ ​often​ ​happen​ ​alongside​ ​the 167
various​ ​aesthetic​ ​experiences​ ​of​ ​imagination​ ​which​ ​“mold​ ​and​ ​shape​ ​our​ ​precognitive 
Contrary​ ​to​ ​some​ ​popular​ ​usage,​ ​here​ ​“habit”​ ​does​ ​not​ ​generally​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​behaviors​ ​themselves​ ​but​ ​the 
attitude/dispositions​ ​from​ ​which​ ​they​ ​flow. 
163​ ​Ibid.,​ ​59. 
164​ ​Ibid.,​ ​56.​ ​Smith​ ​holds​ ​that​ ​reflection​ ​is​ ​possible​ ​and​ ​important.​ ​But​ ​he​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​“prereflective” 
dispositions​ ​come​ ​first​ ​and​ ​conscious​ ​reflection​ ​is,​ ​at​ ​best,​ ​sporadic.​ ​See​ ​ibid.,​ ​57​ ​n34. 
165​ ​Ibid.​ ​56. 
166​ ​This​ ​paragraph​ ​is​ ​from​ ​ibid.,​ ​58.​ ​Note​ ​that​ ​the​ ​second​ ​volume​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​Cultural​ ​Liturgies​ ​trilogy, 
Imagining​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​book-length​ ​treatment​ ​of​ ​how​ ​the​ ​“imagination”​ ​element​ ​of​ ​formation​ ​works.​ ​Due 
to​ ​space​ ​limitations,​ ​this​ ​second​ ​volume,​ ​despite​ ​its​ ​importance​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​how​ ​cultural 




disposition​ ​to​ ​the​ ​world​ ​by​ ​training​ ​our​ ​desires.” ​ ​Because​ ​desires​ ​are​ ​not​ ​abstract​ ​ideas 168
grasped​ ​by​ ​the​ ​mind,​ ​they​ ​are​ ​shaped​ ​primarily​ ​by​ ​these​ ​embodied​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​the​ ​images 
absorbed​ ​through​ ​multiple​ ​bodily​ ​senses. 
At​ ​this​ ​point,​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​that​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​these​ ​claims​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​embodied 
formation​ ​of​ ​human​ ​dispositions​ ​are​ ​not​ ​particularly​ ​new​ ​in​ ​the​ ​history​ ​of​ ​thought.​ ​But​ ​many 
of​ ​the​ ​claims​ ​in​ ​this​ ​model​ ​and​ ​others​ ​like​ ​them,​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​are​ ​made​ ​by 
philosophers​ ​and​ ​theologians,​ ​are​ ​empirical,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​should​ ​be​ ​testable​ ​by​ ​social​ ​sciences. 
Smith​ ​recognizes​ ​this​ ​need,​ ​and​ ​while​ ​he​ ​does​ ​not​ ​give​ ​a​ ​full​ ​treatment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​social​ ​scientific 
literature,​ ​he​ ​notes​ ​developments​ ​in​ ​cognitive​ ​psychology​ ​and​ ​neuroscience​ ​which​ ​may 
ground​ ​empirically​ ​this​ ​decidedly​ ​philosophical​ ​approach.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​research​ ​has 
suggested​ ​that,​ ​contra​ ​Freud,​ ​much​ ​of​ ​our​ ​unconscious​ ​activity​ ​is​ ​not​ ​explained​ ​by​ ​repression 
but​ ​efficiency.​ ​This​ ​means​ ​that​ ​the​ ​unconscious​ ​is​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​a​ ​defense​ ​mechanisms,​ ​but 
rather​ ​it​ ​increases​ ​adaptive​ ​capacities​ ​(i.e.,​ ​for​ ​survival).​ ​​ ​Smith​ ​cites​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​psychologist 
Timothy​ ​Wilson​ ​who​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​the​ ​“adaptive​ ​unconscious”​ ​sets​ ​goals,​ ​initiates​ ​action, 
evaluates—all​ ​tasks​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​are​ ​the​ ​tasks​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​desire. ​ ​While​ ​Smith 169
spends​ ​just​ ​a​ ​couple​ ​paragraphs​ ​engaging​ ​the​ ​social​ ​scientific​ ​literature,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​clearly​ ​much 
more​ ​to​ ​be​ ​explored,​ ​researched,​ ​and​ ​said​ ​about​ ​how​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​and​ ​sociological​ ​study 
of​ ​religion​ ​could​ ​engage​ ​with​ ​these​ ​empirical​ ​disciplines. 
3.3.​ ​Religious​ ​and​ ​Secular​ ​Liturgies 
To​ ​understand​ ​how​ ​Smith’s​ ​anthropology​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​challenge​ ​modern​ ​categories​ ​of​​ ​religious 
and​ ​​secular​,​ ​two​ ​other​ ​important​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​formative​ ​practices​ ​described​ ​above​ ​are 
important.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​is​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​always​ ​communal/social,​ ​and​ ​are​ ​thus 
intimately​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​institutions:  
There​ ​are​ ​no​ ​“private”​ ​practices;​ ​rather,​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​social​ ​products​ ​that​ ​come​ ​to​ ​have​ ​an​ ​institutional 
expression.​ ​Practices​ ​don’t​ ​float​ ​in​ ​society;​ ​rather​ ​they​ ​find​ ​expression​ ​and​ ​articulation​ ​in​ ​concrete​ ​sites 
and​ ​institutions—which​ ​is​ ​also​ ​how​ ​and​ ​why​ ​they​ ​actually​ ​shape​ ​embodied​ ​persons.​ ​There​ ​are​ ​no 
practices​ ​without​ ​institutions.   170
Second,​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​that​ ​every​ ​practice,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​institution​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​is​ ​expressed,​ ​is 
always​​ ​teleological.​ ​Practices​ ​are​ ​always​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​some​ ​end,​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​good​ ​life, 
168​ ​Ibid.,​ ​59 
169​ ​Timothy​ ​Wilson,​ ​​Strangers​ ​to​ ​Ourselves:​ ​Discovering​ ​the​ ​Adaptive​ ​Unconscious​ ​​(Cambridge: 
Harvard​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2002).  
170​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​62.  
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though​ ​it​ ​may​ ​only​ ​be​ ​implicit,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​themselves​ ​“carry”​ ​the​ ​​telos​. ​ ​This 171
means​ ​that​ ​human​ ​practices,​ ​being​ ​(publically)​ ​institutional​ ​and​ ​teleological,​ ​are​ ​always 
religious. 
What​ ​makes​ ​Smith’s​ ​analysis​ ​interesting​ ​and​ ​provocative​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​all 
institutions—even​ ​those​ ​normally​ ​considered​ ​secular—are​ ​in​ ​some​ ​sense​ ​​religious 
institutions.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​impossible​ ​for​ ​any​ ​institution​ ​or​ ​practice​ ​to​ ​ultimately​ ​be​ ​religiously​ ​neutral 
because​ ​its​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​always​ ​​assuming​​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​a 
“charged,​ ​​religious​​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​cultural​ ​institutions​ ​that​ ​we​ ​all​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​inhabit​ ​as​ ​if​ ​they​ ​were 
neutral​ ​sites.” ​ ​This​ ​means​ ​that​ ​spheres​ ​and​ ​institutions​ ​normally​ ​considered​ ​secular​ ​(the 172
state,​ ​schools,​ ​universities,​ ​cultural​ ​organizations,​ ​and​ ​others)​ ​are,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​their​ ​power​ ​to 
form​ ​human​ ​desire,​ ​religious.​ ​Of​ ​course,​ ​an​ ​anthropology​ ​assumed​ ​would​ ​rarely​ ​be​ ​articulated 
by​ ​most​ ​institutions,​ ​but​ ​Smith​ ​argues​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​themselves​ ​contain​ ​the​ ​pre-rational 
“understanding,”​ ​that​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​always​ ​aiming​ ​human​ ​desire​ ​at​ ​some​ ​​telos​.  
On​ ​the​ ​surface,​ ​this​ ​analysis​ ​may​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​align​ ​with​ ​functionalist​ ​approaches​ ​to 
religion.​ ​As​ ​already​ ​mentioned,​ ​functionalist​ ​approaches​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​what​ ​people​ ​​do​,​ ​on​ ​how 
social​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​practices​ ​function.​ ​This​ ​tends​ ​to​ ​dissolve​ ​religious​ ​and​ ​secular 
distinctions,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​Marxism​ ​and​ ​Islam​ ​both​ ​can​ ​serve​ ​similar​ ​functions​ ​in​ ​society.​ ​Because 
the​ ​desiring​ ​model​ ​of​ ​the​ ​human​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​all​ ​people​ ​desire​ ​some​ ​​telos​​ ​ultimately,​ ​and​ ​all 
practices​ ​implicitly​ ​carry​ ​a​ ​​telos​,​ ​it​ ​appears​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​escaping​ ​religion.​ ​But​ ​another​ ​piece​ ​of 
the​ ​model​ ​examined​ ​below​ ​adds​ ​a​ ​nuanced​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​practices​ ​that​ ​indicates​ ​that​ ​there 
are​​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​human​ ​life​ ​which​ ​do​ ​not​ ​carry​ ​the​ ​same​ ​religious​ ​weight​ ​as​ ​others.​ ​While 
significantly​ ​blurring​ ​modern​ ​lines​ ​between​ ​what​ ​is​ ​commonly​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​constitute​ ​the 
religious​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​indicates​ ​that​ ​not​ ​everything​ ​people​ ​do​ ​is​ ​religious.  173
The​ ​widest​ ​category​ ​of​ ​human​ ​activities​ ​Smith​ ​considers​ ​in​ ​his​ ​model​ ​is​ ​​ritual​:​ ​thin 
routines​ ​which​ ​are​ ​​not​​ ​directed​ ​at​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​​telos​,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​brushing​ ​teeth,​ ​the​ ​order​ ​in​ ​which 
someone​ ​gets​ ​dressed,​ ​or​ ​the​ ​order​ ​in​ ​which​ ​you​ ​eat​ ​the​ ​different​ ​foods​ ​on​ ​a​ ​dinner​ ​plate. 
These​ ​are​ ​repeated​ ​activities​ ​done​ ​with​ ​our​ ​bodies,​ ​but​ ​they​ ​do​ ​not​ ​have​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​form 
171​ ​Smith​ ​acknowledges​ ​debt​ ​to​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor​ ​in​ ​his​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​how​ ​practices​ ​can​ ​“carry”​ ​an 
understanding​ ​which​ ​a​ ​subject​ ​does​ ​not​ ​know​ ​how​ ​to​ ​articulate.​ ​“This​ ​‘understanding’​ ​is​ ​more​ ​on​ ​the​ ​order​ ​of 
know-how​ ​than​ ​propositional​ ​knowledge,​ ​more​ ​on​ ​the​ ​order​ ​of​ ​the​ ​​imagination​​ ​than​ ​intellect”​ ​See​ ​Smith, 
Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​66.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​why​ ​Smith​ ​will​ ​adopt​ ​the​ ​terminology​ ​of​ ​“social​ ​imaginary”​ ​over 
“worldview.” 
172​ ​Ibid.,​ ​23. 
173​ ​And​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​so​ ​explicitly​ ​in​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​Liturgies,”​ ​182n29. 
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humans’​ ​ultimate​ ​loves.​ ​They​ ​are​ ​“not​ ​usually​ ​pursued​ ​for​ ​their​ ​own​ ​sake;​ ​rather,​ ​they​ ​are 
instrumental​ ​to​ ​some​ ​other​ ​end.”​ ​The​ ​“goods”​ ​sought​ ​are​ ​external​ ​to​ ​the​ ​practice,​ ​and​ ​thus 
they​ ​tend​ ​are​ ​not​ ​identity-forming. ​ ​Thin​ ​practices​ ​can​ ​also​ ​be​ ​thicker​ ​based​ ​on​ ​what​ ​is 174
driving​ ​them;​ ​i.e.,​ ​the​ ​need​ ​to​ ​exercise​ ​to​ ​​be​​ ​a​ ​fit​ ​person​ ​(thicker)​ ​vs.​ ​for​ ​health​ ​to​ ​enjoy​ ​other 
things​ ​(thinner). 
Practices​​ ​are​ ​a​ ​thicker​ ​category​ ​within​ ​the​ ​species​ ​of​ ​ritual​ ​(Smith​ ​cites​ ​masonry,​ ​i.e., 
bricklaying,​ ​or​ ​riding​ ​public​ ​transit​ ​as​ ​examples).​ ​Unlike​ ​rituals,​ ​however,​ ​practices​​ ​​are 
indeed​ ​directed​ ​toward​ ​some​ ​end,​ ​yet​ ​they​ ​are​ ​not​ ​thick​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​direct​ ​a​ ​person’s​ ​ultimate 
desire.​ ​It​ ​seems​ ​for​ ​Smith,​ ​then,​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​enough​ ​for​ ​practices​ ​to​ ​merely​ ​have​ ​some​ ​kind​ ​of 
telos​​ ​in​ ​order​ ​for​ ​those​ ​practices​ ​to​ ​shape​ ​desire​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​religious. ​ ​He​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​“not 175
all​ ​thick​ ​habits​ ​are​ ​specifically​ ​religious,​ ​but​ ​all​ ​thick​ ​habits​ ​are​ ​meaningful​ ​and 
identity-significant.” ​ ​A​ ​frustrating​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nomenclature​ ​here​ ​is​ ​that​ ​​practices​ ​​is​ ​used 176
more​ ​broadly​ ​in​ ​the​ ​opening​ ​chapters​ ​than​ ​later​ ​chapters​ ​when​ ​the​ ​categorization​ ​is​ ​explained. 
Smith​ ​is​ ​most​ ​often​ ​commenting​ ​about​ ​specifically​ ​identity-​ ​and​ ​love-shaping​ ​practices,​ ​but 
these​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​are​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​type​ ​of​ ​practice​ ​which​ ​fall​ ​in​ ​the​ ​final​ ​and​ ​most​ ​important​ ​category 
discussed​ ​below.  
The​ ​thickest​ ​practice​ ​on​ ​the​ ​spectrum​ ​of​ ​human​ ​rituals​ ​is​ ​what​ ​Smith​ ​deems​ ​as​ ​​liturgy​. 
Smith​ ​defines​ ​liturgies​ ​as​ ​“​rituals​ ​of​ ​ultimate​ ​concern​:​ ​rituals​ ​that​ ​are​ ​formative​ ​for​ ​identity, 
that​ ​inculcate​ ​particular​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​good​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​do​ ​so​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​means​ ​to​ ​trump​ ​other 
ritual​ ​formations.” ​ ​In​ ​this​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​of​ ​desire,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​spectrum​ ​of​ ​practices 177
which​ ​can​ ​be​ ​categorized​ ​according​ ​to​ ​their​ ​thickness.​ ​Not​ ​all​ ​of​ ​them​ ​are​ ​religious.​ ​Only​ ​the 
thick​ ​are​ ​considered​ ​liturgical,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​religious,​ ​because​ ​they​ ​are​ ​“identity-forming, 
telos​-laden,​ ​and​ ​get​ ​hold​ ​of​ ​our​ ​core​ ​desire—our​ ​ultimate​ ​love​ ​that​ ​define​ ​us​ ​in​ ​some 
fundamental​ ​way.” 
Our​ ​thickest​ ​practices—which​ ​are​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​linked​ ​to​ ​institutional​ ​religion—have​ ​a​ ​​liturgical 
function​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​they​ ​are​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​species​ ​of​ ​ritual​ ​practice​ ​that​ ​aim​ ​to​ ​do​ ​nothing​ ​less​ ​than​ ​shape​ ​our 
identity​ ​by​ ​shaping​ ​our​ ​desire​ ​for​ ​what​ ​we​ ​envision​ ​as​ ​the​ ​kingdom—the​ ​ideal​ ​of​ ​human​ ​flourishing. 
Liturgies​ ​are​ ​the​ ​most​ ​loaded​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​ritual​ ​practice​ ​because​ ​they​ ​are​ ​nothing​ ​less​ ​than​ ​our​ ​hearts.​ ​They 
want​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​what​ ​we​ ​love​ ​ultimately.​ ​By​ ​​ultimately​,​ ​I​ ​mean​ ​what​ ​we​ ​love​ ​‘above​ ​all,’​ ​that​ ​to 
which​ ​we​ ​pledge​ ​allegiance,​ ​that​ ​to​ ​which​ ​we​ ​are​ ​devoted​ ​in​ ​a​ ​way​ ​that​ ​overrules​ ​other​ ​concerns​ ​and 
174​ ​Thin​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​ritual​ ​descriptions​ ​are​ ​from​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​82,​ ​86. 
175​ ​Ibid.,​ ​86:​ ​“[N]ot​ ​all​ ​rituals​ ​would​ ​be​ ​practices​ ​because​ ​not​ ​all​ ​rituals​ ​are​ ​directed​ ​toward​ ​an​ ​end.” 
176​ ​Ibid.,​ ​83. 
177​ ​Ibid.,​ ​87. 
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interests.​ ​Our​ ​ultimate​ ​love​ ​is​ ​what​ ​defines​ ​us,​ ​what​ ​makes​ ​us​ ​the​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​people​ ​we​ ​are.​ ​In​ ​short,​ ​it​ ​is 
what​ ​we​ ​worship.   178
A​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​certain​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​repeated,​ ​embodied 
behaviours​ ​which​ ​so​ ​affect​ ​human​ ​desires​ ​to​ ​create​ ​​ultimate​ ​​desires​ ​which​ ​trump​ ​others. 
When​ ​competing​ ​desires​ ​confront​ ​one​ ​another,​ ​the​ ​dominant​ ​desire​ ​which​ ​overrules​ ​all​ ​others 
is​ ​what​ ​determines​ ​one’s​ ​religion. 
Notice​ ​that,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​liturgies​ ​are​ ​​not​ ​​limited​ ​to​ ​those​ ​practices​ ​that​ ​are 
often​ ​considered​ ​“religious.”​ ​But​ ​he​ ​says​ ​that​ ​“expanding​ ​our​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​what​ ​counts​ ​as 
‘worship’​ ​is​ ​precisely​ ​the​ ​point.” ​ ​It​ ​is​ ​those​ ​practices​ ​which​ ​form​ ​ultimate​ ​desires,​ ​the​ ​core 179
identity​ ​of​ ​a​ ​human,​ ​which​ ​enter​ ​the​ ​realm​ ​of​ ​liturgy,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​religion.​ ​While​ ​this​ ​focus​ ​on 
“ultimacy”​ ​appears​ ​to​ ​have​ ​affinities​ ​with​ ​theologian​ ​Paul​ ​Tillich’s​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​as 
“ultimate​ ​concern,” ​ ​Smith​ ​differentiates​ ​between​ ​his​ ​own​ ​project​ ​and​ ​Tillich’s.​ ​The​ ​latter 180
locates​ ​“an​ ​existential​ ​kernel​ ​that​ ​religions​ ​share​ ​in​ ​common,”​ ​whereas​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​is 
“pluralist​ ​about​ ​what​ ​people​ ​and​ ​communities​ ​worship​ ​​as​​ ​ultimate.” ​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​there​ ​is 181
not​ ​one​ ​ultimate​ ​love​ ​toward​ ​which​ ​every​ ​human​ ​desire​ ​is​ ​oriented,​ ​though​ ​named​ ​differently 
and​ ​perhaps​ ​only​ ​loved​ ​unconsciously.​ ​Smith​ ​pluralist​ ​view,​ ​in​ ​this​ ​context,​ ​is​ ​that​ ​liturgies 
mold​ ​human​ ​desire​ ​into​ ​many​ ​incommensurate​ ​directions.  
This​ ​pluralism​ ​goes​ ​beyond​ ​merely​ ​religious​ ​liturgies,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​different​ ​pictures​ ​of 
human​ ​flourishing​ ​offered​ ​by​ ​Buddhism,​ ​Islam,​ ​or​ ​Christianity.​ ​Smith​ ​attempts​ ​to 
demonstrate​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​practices​ ​which​ ​constitute​ ​secular​ ​liturgies:​ ​those​ ​practices​ ​and 
institutions​ ​not​ ​typically​ ​considered​ ​religious​ ​but​ ​which​ ​nonetheless​ ​form​ ​ultimate​ ​human 
desires.​ ​The​ ​cultural​ ​institutions​ ​of​ ​which​ ​Smith​ ​gives​ ​an​ ​“exegesis”​ ​are​ ​the​ ​liturgies​ ​of​ ​the 
178​ ​Ibid.​ ​Cf.​ ​sociologist​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​Christian​ ​Smith’s​ ​definition:​ ​“Liturgy​ ​ritually​ ​reenacts​ ​a​ ​tradition,​ ​an 
experience,​ ​a​ ​history,​ ​a​ ​worldview.​ ​It​ ​expresses​ ​in​ ​dramatic​ ​and​ ​corporeal​ ​form​ ​a​ ​sacred​ ​belief​ ​system​ ​in​ ​words, 
music,​ ​imagery,​ ​aromas,​ ​tastes,​ ​and​ ​bodily​ ​movement.​ ​In​ ​liturgy,​ ​worshipers​ ​both​ ​perform​ ​and​ ​observe,​ ​act​ ​out 
truth​ ​and​ ​have​ ​the​ ​truth​ ​act​ ​on​ ​them,​ ​remember​ ​the​ ​past​ ​and​ ​carry​ ​it​ ​into​ ​the​ ​future.​ ​Liturgy​ ​expresses,​ ​professes, 
performs,​ ​and​ ​informs.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​what​ ​religious​ ​liturgies​ ​do.​ ​​It​ ​is​ ​also​ ​exactly​ ​what​ ​human​ ​social​ ​life​ ​more 
generally​ ​does​ ​with​ ​cultural​ ​moral​ ​order.​​ ​All​ ​of​ ​the​ ​social​ ​practices,​ ​relations,​ ​and​ ​institutions​ ​that​ ​comprise 
human​ ​social​ ​life​ ​generally​ ​themselves​ ​together​ ​dramatize,​ ​ritualize,​ ​proclaim,​ ​and​ ​reaffirm​ ​the​ ​moral​ ​order​ ​that 
constitutes​ ​social​ ​life.​ ​​Moral​ ​order​ ​embodies​ ​the​ ​sacred​ ​story​ ​of​ ​the​ ​society,​ ​however​ ​profane​ ​it​ ​appears,​ ​and​ ​the 
social​ ​actors​ ​are​ ​believers​ ​in​ ​social​ ​congregation​.​ ​Together​ ​they​ ​remember,​ ​recite,​ ​represent,​ ​and​ ​reaffirm​ ​the 
normative​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​their​ ​moral​ ​order.​ ​All​ ​of​ ​the​ ​routines,​ ​habits,​ ​and​ ​conventions​ ​of​ ​micro​ ​interaction​ ​ritualize 
what​ ​they​ ​know​ ​about​ ​the​ ​good,​ ​the​ ​right,​ ​the​ ​true,​ ​the​ ​just.​ ​All​ ​of​ ​the​ ​systems​ ​and​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​macro 
institutional​ ​life​ ​do​ ​likewise.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​simply​ ​the​ ​way​ ​of​ ​moral,​ ​believing​ ​animals”​ ​(emphasis​ ​mine).​ ​Christian 
Smith​,​ ​Moral,​ ​Believing​ ​Animals:​ ​Human​ ​Personhood​ ​and​ ​Culture​ ​​(New​ ​York:​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2003), 
16. 
179​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​86-87. 
180​ ​Paul​ ​Tillich,​ ​​Dynamics​ ​of​ ​Faith​,​ ​(New​ ​York.:​ ​Harper​ ​&​ ​Row,​ ​1957). 
181​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​87.  
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mall​ ​(consumerism),​ ​the​ ​stadium​ ​(nationalism/patriotism),​ ​and​ ​universities.​ ​The​ ​following​ ​is 
an​ ​excerpt​ ​from​ ​his​ ​description​ ​of​ ​consumerism’s​ ​liturgies: 
[M]arketing​ ​is​ ​the​ ​mall’s​ ​evangelism;​ ​television​ ​commercials,​ ​billboards,​ ​Internet​ ​pop-ups,​ ​and 
magazine​ ​advertisements​ ​are​ ​the​ ​mall’s​ ​outreach.​ ​The​ ​rituals​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mall​ ​and​ ​the​ ​market 
are​ ​tactile​ ​and​ ​visceral—they​ ​capture​ ​our​ ​imaginations​ ​through​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​sight​ ​and​ ​sound,​ ​touch​ ​and 
taste,​ ​even​ ​smell.​ ​The​ ​hip,​ ​happy​ ​people​ ​that​ ​populate​ ​television​ ​commercials​ ​are​ ​the​ ​moving​ ​icons​ ​of 
the​ ​consumer​ ​gospel,​ ​illustrations​ ​of​ ​what​ ​the​ ​good​ ​life​ ​look​ ​like:​ ​carefree​ ​and​ ​independent,​ ​clean​ ​and 
sexy,​ ​perky​ ​and​ ​perfect.​ ​We​ ​see​ ​the​ ​embodiments​ ​of​ ​this​ ​ideal​ ​again​ ​in​ ​the​ ​icon-like​ ​mannequins​ ​in​ ​the 
windows​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mall.​ ​The​ ​mall…​ ​communicates​ ​its​ ​story​ ​not​ ​through​ ​tracts​ ​and​ ​didactic​ ​lectures​ ​but 
through​ ​visual​ ​embodiments​ ​of​ ​the​ ​happy​ ​life,​ ​3-D​ ​icons​ ​that​ ​we​ ​come​ ​to​ ​revere​ ​as​ ​ideals​ ​worthy​ ​of 
imitation.​ ​And​ ​because​ ​these​ ​visual​ ​and​ ​visceral​ ​media​ ​operate​ ​on​ ​our​ ​imaginary​ ​more​ ​than​ ​our 
intellect—because​ ​they​ ​seep​ ​into​ ​our​ ​imagination—they​ ​are​ ​slowly​ ​and​ ​often​ ​surreptitiously​ ​absorbed 
into​ ​our​ ​​kardia​,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​very​ ​nerve​ ​center​ ​of​ ​how​ ​we​ ​orient​ ​ourselves​ ​to​ ​the​ ​world.   182
In​ ​this​ ​description,​ ​the​ ​desire​ ​for​ ​material​ ​goods​ ​arises​ ​from​ ​the​ ​material,​ ​sensual​ ​liturgies 
which​ ​capture​ ​consumers’​ ​imagination.​ ​The​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​consumption,​ ​the​ ​embodied​ ​shopping 
that​ ​takes​ ​place​ ​in​ ​sensory​ ​rich​ ​malls,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​audio-visual​ ​narratives​ ​sold​ ​in​ ​marketing​ ​across 
media​ ​platforms,​ ​carry​ ​the​ ​​telos​​ ​that​ ​acquiring​ ​commodities​ ​will​ ​bring​ ​happiness,​ ​fulfillment, 
and​ ​flourishing.  
Similar​ ​descriptions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​stadium​ ​and​ ​the​ ​university​ ​follow.​ ​The​ ​bodily​ ​motions 
which​ ​accompany​ ​national​ ​anthems​ ​(or​ ​the​ ​Pledge​ ​of​ ​Allegiance​ ​in​ ​American​ ​schools),​ ​the 
narratives​ ​embedded​ ​in​ ​the​ ​songs,​ ​the​ ​flags​ ​and​ ​fighter​ ​jets​ ​are​ ​examples​ ​of​ ​embodied 
practices​ ​which​ ​Smith​ ​considers​ ​nationalism’s​ ​liturgies. ​ ​For​ ​the​ ​university,​ ​Smith​ ​examines 183
the​ ​Cathedral​ ​of​ ​Learning​ ​in​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​American​ ​university​ ​and​ ​its​ ​aspirations​ ​for​ ​human 
reason,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​embodied​ ​and​ ​narratival​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​initiation,​ ​formation,​ ​and​ ​commissioning 
that​ ​take​ ​place​ ​over​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of​ ​a​ ​university​ ​education.​ ​Smith​ ​thinks​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​the​ ​latter 
have​ ​a​ ​“frenetic​ ​and​ ​frantic​ ​pace,​ ​rhythms​ ​of​ ​expenditure​ ​and​ ​exhaustion”​ ​which​ ​launch 
young​ ​adults​ ​into​ ​“careerism.”  184
Analysis​ ​of​ ​these​ ​secular​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​institutions​ ​through​ ​the​ ​liturgical​ ​lens​ ​shows 
why​ ​Smith​ ​views​ ​them​ ​as​ ​deeply​ ​formative​ ​of​ ​human​ ​desire.​ ​Having​ ​relegated​ ​consciously 
held​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​the​ ​supernatural​ ​to​ ​secondary​ ​importance,​ ​he​ ​posits​ ​that​ ​the​ ​religiosity​ ​of​ ​these 
embodied​ ​practices​ ​depends​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​to​ ​which​ ​they​ ​shape​ ​ultimate​ ​loves.​ ​Thus,​ ​a 
methodology​ ​for​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​which​ ​assumed​ ​a​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​would​ ​find 
religion​ ​in​ ​all​ ​sorts​ ​of​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​institutions​ ​commonly​ ​considered​ ​secular.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​because 
182​ ​Ibid.,​ ​95-96. 
183​ ​Cf.​ ​​William​ ​Cavanaugh’s​ ​similar​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​nationalism​ ​in​ ​​Migrations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Holy:​ ​God,​ ​State,​ ​and 
the​ ​Political​ ​Meaning​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Church​​ ​(Grand​ ​Rapids:​ ​Eerdmans,​ ​2011). 
184​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​117.​ ​Unfortunately,​ ​the​ ​third​ ​and​ ​final​ ​volume​ ​which​ ​examines​ ​the 
state​ ​as​ ​a​ ​religious,​ ​liturgical​ ​institution​ ​will​ ​not​ ​be​ ​available​ ​until​ ​after​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​is​ ​completed. 
51 
 
Smith​ ​believes​ ​“the​ ​‘religious’​ ​is​ ​essentially​ ​tied​ ​not​ ​to​ ​the​ ​transcendent​ ​or​ ​the​ ​otherworldly 
but​ ​to​ ​the​ ​​modes​​ ​of​ ​identity​ ​formation​ ​and​ ​the​ ​​status​​ ​of​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​that​ ​engender​ ​such.”​ ​The 
implication​ ​of​ ​this​ ​analysis​ ​is​ ​that​ ​“secular​ ​practices,​ ​​because​​ ​they​ ​are​ ​identity-forming, 
amount​ ​to​ ​​religious​​ ​practices.”  185
3.4.​ ​Assessing​ ​Smith’s​ ​Model 
In​ ​addition​ ​to​ ​the​ ​issues​ ​pointed​ ​out​ ​above,​ ​a​ ​few​ ​points​ ​of​ ​ambiguity​ ​that​ ​occur​ ​in​ ​Smith’s 
work​ ​should​ ​be​ ​mentioned.​ ​In​ ​his​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​displace​ ​the​ ​primacy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​in​ ​his 
writing​ ​on​ ​religion,​ ​some​ ​of​ ​his​ ​publications​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​be​ ​in​ ​tension​ ​with​ ​others​ ​when​ ​it​ ​comes 
to​ ​defining​ ​​religion​.​ ​While​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​​ ​emphasizes​ ​that​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​are​ ​religious 
because​ ​of​ ​their​ ​desiring​ ​ultimately,​ ​Smith​ ​also​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​indicate​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​practices 
themselves​ ​which​ ​constitute​ ​religion.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​he​ ​writes​ ​of​ ​“the​ ​heart​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​as 
practice”or​ ​as​ ​“primarily​ ​a​ ​'form​ ​of​ ​life'​ ​and​ ​lived​ ​experience.” ​ ​This​ ​is​ ​virtually​ ​the​ ​same​ ​as 186
the​ ​tension​ ​already​ ​seen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​use​ ​of​ ​​worship​​ ​in​ ​his​ ​work:​ ​is​ ​it​ ​a​ ​liturgy,​ ​or​ ​a​ ​mode 
intentionality?​ ​Is​ ​religion​ ​primarily​ ​a​ ​liturgy​ ​(either​ ​as​ ​practice​ ​or​ ​“form​ ​of​ ​life”),​ ​or​ ​is​ ​it​ ​the 
ultimate​ ​desire?​ ​There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​question​ ​that,​ ​for​ ​Smith,​ ​liturgy​ ​and​ ​desire​ ​are​ ​inseparably 
connected​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​central​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​he​ ​is​ ​comfortable​ ​using​ ​them 
essentially​ ​interchangeably.​ ​That​ ​they​ ​are​ ​tightly​ ​bound​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​from​ ​the​ ​four​ ​pieces​ ​of​ ​his 
liturgical​ ​anthropology:​ ​intending​ ​(desire),​ ​aiming​ ​(teleology),​ ​habits,​ ​and​ ​formation​ ​(liturgy). 
The​ ​emphasis​ ​on​ ​practice​ ​also​ ​appears​ ​in​ ​a​ ​publication​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​philosophers,​ ​which​ ​may 
explain​ ​his​ ​wish​ ​to​ ​hone​ ​in​ ​on​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​deficiency​ ​in​ ​that​ ​discipline​ ​which​ ​he​ ​sees. 
Nonetheless,​ ​if​ ​part​ ​of​ ​his​ ​goal​ ​is​ ​to​ ​rework​ ​the​ ​disciplines​ ​which​ ​study​ ​religion​ ​with​ ​new 
conceptual​ ​tools,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​crucial​ ​to​ ​maintain​ ​a​ ​consistent​ ​usage​ ​of​ ​terminology.​ ​Scholars​ ​need​ ​to 
know​ ​if,​ ​when​ ​discussing​ ​religion,​ ​Smith​ ​means​ ​to​ ​talk​ ​about​ ​desire,​ ​liturgy,​ ​or​ ​how​ ​these 
elements​ ​together​ ​form​ ​religion. 
Smith’s​ ​categorization​ ​of​ ​human​ ​behavior​ ​into​ ​​ritual​,​ ​​practice​,​ ​and​ ​​liturgy​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​useful 
heuristic​ ​device.​ ​It​ ​helpfully​ ​explains​ ​how​ ​human​ ​embodiment​ ​matters​ ​and​ ​how​ ​and​ ​why 
different​ ​repeated​ ​behaviors​ ​can​ ​affect​ ​people’s​ ​identities.​ ​Smith​ ​acknowledges,​ ​however,​ ​that 
“the​ ​line​ ​between​ ​thin​ ​and​ ​thick​ ​practices​ ​will​ ​be​ ​fuzzy​ ​and​ ​hard​ ​to​ ​draw.” ​ ​The​ ​model 187
seems​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​the​ ​religiosity​ ​or​ ​non-religiosity​ ​of​ ​human​ ​social​ ​conduct​ ​depends​ ​upon 
185​ ​Both​ ​quotations​ ​are​ ​from​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​Liturgies,”​ ​178n4. 
186​ ​Smith,​ ​“Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion​ ​Takes​ ​Practice,”​ ​136. 
187​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​83. 
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where​ ​any​ ​given​ ​repeated​ ​action​ ​falls​ ​on​ ​the​ ​spectrum​ ​of​ ​thickness.​ ​So​ ​while​ ​the 
categorization​ ​is​ ​intuitively​ ​satisfying,​ ​there​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​ambiguity​ ​in​ ​determining​ ​exactly 
when​ ​a​ ​behavior​ ​is​ ​formative​ ​​enough​​ ​to​ ​move​ ​up​ ​a​ ​category.​ ​This​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​the​ ​model 
may​ ​be​ ​better​ ​explained​ ​as​ ​a​ ​continuum,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​more​ ​or​ ​less​ ​religious.​ ​Clear 
lines​ ​are​ ​often​ ​difficult​ ​to​ ​draw,​ ​even​ ​when​ ​categories​ ​are​ ​given​ ​extremely​ ​clear​ ​definitions 
(which,​ ​as​ ​argued​ ​above,​ ​is​ ​not​ ​the​ ​case​ ​with​ ​Smith’s​ ​use​ ​​practice​).​ ​The​ ​following​ ​visual 
conceptualization​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​is​ ​offered​ ​as​ ​a​ ​slight​ ​modification​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​its 




Smith​ ​says​ ​this​ ​his​ ​analysis​ ​implies​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​secular.​ ​But​ ​it​ ​​does​​ ​make​ ​a​ ​distinction 
between​ ​“religious”​ ​practices​ ​found​ ​in​ ​liturgies​ ​and​ ​the​ ​“non-religious”​ ​rituals​ ​of​ ​brushing 
teeth​ ​and​ ​other​ ​mundane​ ​activities. ​ ​What,​ ​then​ ​shall​ ​we​ ​call​ ​these​ ​mundane​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​life? 188
188​ ​Though​ ​again,​ ​a​ ​distinction​ ​is​ ​made​ ​by​ ​Smith:​ ​some​ ​mundane​ ​habits​ ​can​ ​relate​ ​in​ ​such​ ​a​ ​way​ ​to 
ultimate​ ​desires​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are,​ ​in​ ​some​ ​sense,​ ​religious.​ ​Exercise,​ ​if​ ​“hooked​ ​up”​ ​to​ ​one’s​ ​identity,​ ​can​ ​be​ ​more 
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In​ ​the​ ​first​ ​chapter,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​why​ ​Smith​ ​doubts​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​an 
epistemological​ ​category.​ ​On​ ​that​ ​account,​ ​no​ ​secular​ ​worldviews​ ​would​ ​be​ ​free​ ​of​ ​religious 
belief​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​relying​ ​upon​ ​faith/narrative​ ​to​ ​ground​ ​knowledge.​ ​And​ ​his 
anthropological​ ​account​ ​also​ ​shows​ ​why​ ​he​ ​believes​ ​ultimate​ ​desire-shaping​ ​institutions​ ​and 
their​ ​practices​ ​should​ ​not​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​secular.​ ​But​ ​there​ ​are​ ​still​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​human 
experience,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​brushing​ ​teeth​ ​and​ ​thicker​ ​activities​ ​which​ ​do​ ​​not​ ​​shape​ ​ultimate​ ​loves. 
What​ ​are​ ​these​ ​activities​ ​to​ ​be​ ​called?​ ​It​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​he​ ​would​ ​wish​ ​to​ ​drop​ ​the​ ​term​ ​​secular​ ​​as​ ​a 
descriptor​ ​here​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​baggage​ ​that​ ​comes​ ​with​ ​the​ ​word.​ ​Insofar​ ​as​ ​the​ ​rituals​ ​are​ ​not 
religious,​ ​another​ ​word​ ​such​ ​as​ ​​mundane​​ ​may​ ​be​ ​needed​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​the​ ​post-secular​ ​model 
with​ ​adequate​ ​vocabulary. 
An​ ​important​ ​thing​ ​missing​ ​from​ ​Smith’s​ ​project​ ​is​ ​a​ ​more​ ​detailed​ ​account​ ​of​ ​how 
one​ ​determines​ ​the​ ​thickness​ ​of​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​practice.​ ​He​ ​gives​ ​several​ ​examples​ ​which 
helpfully​ ​show​ ​how​ ​practices​ ​not​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​as​ ​“religious”​ ​can​ ​form​ ​us​ ​(the​ ​mall,​ ​the​ ​stadium, 
etc.),​ ​but​ ​nonetheless​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​for​ ​determining​ ​the​ ​“thickness”​ ​of​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​practice​ ​are 
difficult​ ​to​ ​discern.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​when​ ​Smith​ ​considers​ ​a​ ​person​ ​who​ ​stays​ ​at​ ​home​ ​on 
Sunday​ ​to​ ​read​ ​the​ ​latest​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​​New​ ​York​ ​Times​ ​Magazine​,​ ​what​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​this​ ​make​ ​it 
formative?​ ​Is​ ​it​ ​the​ ​reading​ ​itself​ ​which​ ​is​ ​formative?​ ​Is​ ​it​ ​the​ ​stories​ ​they​ ​are​ ​imbibing​ ​within 
the​ ​articles?​ ​Is​ ​a​ ​daily​ ​walk​ ​through​ ​the​ ​park​ ​filled​ ​with​ ​enough​ ​stimuli​ ​to​ ​shape​ ​our​ ​embodied 
imaginations?​ ​If​ ​Smith​ ​has​ ​given​ ​us​ ​a​ ​new​ ​radar,​ ​the​ ​instructions​ ​by​ ​which​ ​we​ ​would​ ​be​ ​able 
to​ ​operate​ ​it​ ​are​ ​as​ ​yet​ ​too​ ​vague.  
One​ ​exceedingly​ ​complex​ ​issue​ ​in​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​appears​ ​that​ ​humans​ ​can 
formed​ ​by​ ​multiple​ ​liturgies—certainly​ ​across​ ​their​ ​lifetime,​ ​and​ ​probably​ ​within​ ​a​ ​single​ ​day. 
This​ ​is​ ​a​ ​challenge​ ​of​ ​which​ ​Smith​ ​himself​ ​is​ ​aware.​ ​He​ ​acknowledges​ ​that​ ​human​ ​are​ ​“often 
fragmented,​ ​‘split’​ ​selves​ ​who​ ​might​ ​be​ ​simultaneously​ ​captivated​ ​by​ ​​competing​ ​​visions​ ​of 
the​ ​good.​ ​Few​ ​of​ ​us​ ​inhabit​ ​enclaves​ ​where​ ​only​ ​one​ ​story​ ​is​ ​dominant.” ​ ​This​ ​notion​ ​of 189
competing​ ​visions​ ​propelled​ ​by​ ​different​ ​liturgies​ ​may​ ​help​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​mentioned 
about​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​(in)congruence:​ ​if​ ​people’s​ ​conscious​ ​religious—and​ ​secular—beliefs​ ​and 
identities​ ​are​ ​not​ ​generally​ ​consistent​ ​with​ ​their​ ​behavior,​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​would​ ​indicate​ ​this 
could​ ​be​ ​due​ ​to​ ​inhabiting​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​narratives​ ​and​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​which​ ​shape​ ​desire 
religious​ ​than​ ​if​ ​it​ ​is​ ​done​ ​more​ ​instrumentally​ ​for​ ​other,​ ​more​ ​ultimate​ ​goods.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​another​ ​distinction​ ​which 
in​ ​some​ ​ways​ ​complicates​ ​the​ ​model​ ​but​ ​also​ ​rightly​ ​highlights​ ​the​ ​complexity​ ​of​ ​human​ ​behavior​ ​and 
motivations,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​the​ ​need​ ​of​ ​a​ ​spectrum​ ​of​ ​religiosity​ ​as​ ​shown​ ​above.​ ​See​ ​Ibid.,​ ​83. 
189​ ​Ibid.,​ ​55n30. 
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in​ ​unconscious​ ​ways.​ ​Though​ ​one​ ​possible​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​incongruence​ ​is​ ​increased 
atomization​ ​and​ ​fragmentation​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​technology,​ ​individualism,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​loss​ ​of 
traditional,​ ​tight-knit,​ ​and​ ​monolithic​ ​culture​ ​in​ ​a​ ​globalized​ ​world,​ ​incongruence​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a 
trend​ ​merely​ ​in​ ​the​ ​West​ ​or​ ​merely​ ​since​ ​the​ ​industrial​ ​revolution.​ ​As​ ​Chaves​ ​says,​ ​religious 
incongruence​ ​is​ ​seen​ ​“across​ ​religions,​ ​cultures,​ ​historical​ ​periods,​ ​and​ ​social​ ​contexts.” ​ ​A 190
liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​surprised​ ​by​ ​this​ ​incongruence,​ ​but​ ​would​ ​rather​ ​look​ ​to 
the​ ​liturgical​ ​formation​ ​taking​ ​place​ ​communities​ ​and​ ​individuals​ ​in​ ​a​ ​given​ ​place​ ​to​ ​explain 
behavior.  
But​ ​Chaves’​ ​analysis​ ​also​ ​indicates​ ​that​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​congruence​ ​may​ ​be​ ​deeper 
than​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​can​ ​explain.​ ​Recall​ ​that,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​scholar​ ​seeking​ ​also​ ​to​ ​influence​ ​church 
practice,​ ​Smith​ ​indeed​ ​​seeks​​ ​congruence​ ​within​ ​his​ ​religious​ ​tradition:​ ​he​ ​wants​ ​the​ ​beliefs, 
values,​ ​and​ ​narratives​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Christian​ ​tradition​ ​to​ ​directly​ ​influence​ ​and​ ​form​ ​the​ ​practices, 
desires,​ ​and​ ​behavior​ ​of​ ​churches​ ​and​ ​their​ ​members.​ ​This​ ​means​ ​moving​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​focus​ ​on 
cognitive​ ​content​ ​and​ ​teaching​ ​to​ ​emphasizing​ ​the​ ​embodied​ ​ritual​ ​formation,​ ​which​ ​leads 
Smith​ ​to​ ​an​ ​exposition​ ​of​ ​historic​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​Christian​ ​church​ ​services.​ ​Yet​ ​both 
Smith​ ​and​ ​Chaves​ ​realize​ ​these​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​enough​ ​to​ ​create 
congruence,​ ​to​ ​create​ ​behavior​ ​congruent​ ​with​ ​stated​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​content.​ ​Chaves​ ​writes​ ​that 
“a​ ​lifetime​ ​of​ ​weekly​ ​churchgoing​ ​surely​ ​establishes​ ​internalized​ ​responses​ ​to​ ​certain​ ​hymns 
or​ ​stories​ ​or​ ​rituals​ ​or​ ​practices,​ ​but​ ​these​ ​internalized​ ​responses​ ​do​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​extend 
beyond​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​setting.” ​ ​Smith​ ​comments​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​church​ ​members​ ​who,​ ​as​ ​he 191
advocates​ ​in​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​are​ ​already​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​the​ ​week​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​Christian 
liturgies​ ​which​ ​he​ ​says​ ​​should​​ ​shape​ ​the​ ​desire​ ​for​ ​​shalom​—a​ ​biblical​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​human 
flourishing​ ​and​ ​justice.​ ​But​ ​Smith​ ​notes​ ​that,​ ​despite​ ​involvement​ ​in​ ​this​ ​liturgy,​ ​there​ ​is 
incongruence:​ ​members​ ​of​ ​this​ ​community​ ​are​ ​nonetheless​ ​openly​ ​participating​ ​in​ ​systemic 
injustices​ ​which​ ​he​ ​says​ ​goes​ ​against​ ​​shalom​. Chaves​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​this​ ​kind​ ​of 192
incongruence​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be​ ​expected​ ​unless​ ​“substantial​ ​cognitive​ ​effort,​ ​[and]​ ​intense​ ​and 
190​ ​Chaves,​ ​“SSSR​ ​Presidential​ ​Address,”​ ​4. 
191​ ​Ibid.,​ ​8. 
192​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​208n115.​ ​Another​ ​way​ ​to​ ​view​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​is​ ​this:​ ​How​ ​could​ ​people​ ​in 
the​ ​same​ ​religious​ ​tradition,​ ​even​ ​the​ ​same​ ​religious​ ​community,​ ​have​ ​such​ ​radically​ ​different​ ​values​ ​in​ ​political 




consistent​ ​social​ ​reinforcement”​ ​happen​ ​so​ ​as​ ​to​ ​“activate”​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​schema​ ​that​ ​are 
important​ ​in​ ​religious​ ​communities​ ​and​ ​gatherings.   193
With​ ​the​ ​realities​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​incongruence,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​human​ ​behavior​ ​is​ ​driven 
by​ ​much​ ​more​ ​than​ ​simply​ ​conscious​ ​beliefs.​ ​Smith’s​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​account 
for​ ​this​ ​gap,​ ​and​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​better​ ​align​ ​with​ ​the​ ​empirical​ ​data​ ​summarized​ ​by​ ​Chaves​ ​which 
emphasizes​ ​practices.​ ​Yet​ ​there​ ​several​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​must​ ​be​ ​explored​ ​to​ ​improve 
its​ ​explanatory​ ​and​ ​predictive​ ​power​ ​as​ ​a​ ​theory.​ ​A​ ​more​ ​thorough​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​how​ ​people 
can​ ​inhabit​ ​multiple​ ​liturgies,​ ​how​ ​these​ ​liturgies​ ​compete,​ ​and​ ​how​ ​a​ ​liturgy​ ​can​ ​“trump” 
another​ ​are​ ​areas​ ​that​ ​should​ ​be​ ​investigated.​ ​Smith​ ​points​ ​to​ ​this​ ​need​ ​as​ ​well,​ ​noting​ ​that​ ​this 
kind​ ​of​ ​research​ ​would​ ​require​ ​a​ ​multidisciplinary​ ​approach​ ​and​ ​would​ ​have​ ​to​ ​engage​ ​the 
“empirical​ ​realities.” ​ ​Thus,​ ​several​ ​important​ ​questions​ ​remain​ ​to​ ​be​ ​explored​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study 194
of​ ​how​ ​liturgies​ ​affect​ ​human​ ​bodies​ ​and​ ​desire—and,​ ​ultimately,​ ​human​ ​behavior. 
Conclusion 
The​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​outlined​ ​by​ ​Smith​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​offer​ ​new,​ ​useful​ ​tools​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of 
religion​ ​and​ ​its​ ​relationship​ ​to​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Influenced​ ​by​ ​the​ ​intellectualism​ ​of​ ​modernity, 
Smith​ ​makes​ ​the​ ​case​ ​that​ ​scholars​ ​are​ ​often​ ​overly-focused​ ​on​ ​the​ ​cognitive​ ​content​ ​of 
religion​ ​(particularly​ ​philosophy)​ ​and,​ ​even​ ​when​ ​examining​ ​practices,​ ​use​ ​a​ ​faulty 
methodology​ ​for​ ​determining​ ​​which​​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​considered​ ​religious​ ​(sociology).​ ​For​ ​Smith, 
religion​ ​is​ ​more​ ​a​ ​matter​ ​of​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​the​ ​body​ ​than​ ​it​ ​is​ ​of​ ​the​ ​beliefs​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mind. 
Rather​ ​than​ ​asking​ ​what​ ​people​ ​think​ ​or​ ​believe,​ ​he​ ​thinks​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​about​ ​understanding 
what​ ​people​ ​desire​ ​above​ ​all.​ ​In​ ​his​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology,​ ​he​ ​outlines​ ​a​ ​model​ ​in​ ​which 
liturgies​ ​form​ ​people’s​ ​dispositions,​ ​which​ ​aim​ ​their​ ​ultimate​ ​loves​ ​at​ ​certain​ ​​teloi​.​ ​This 
model,​ ​he​ ​says,​ ​better​ ​explains​ ​the​ ​data​ ​of​ ​human​ ​behavior.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​also​ ​challenges​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of 
the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​institutions​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​religiously​ ​neutral.  
While​ ​Smith’s​ ​analysis​ ​addresses​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​shortcomings​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion 
(e.g.,​ ​acknowledging​ ​and​ ​explaining​ ​religious​ ​incongruence),​ ​it​ ​leaves​ ​much​ ​to​ ​be​ ​explained 
in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​understanding​ ​human​ ​behavior.​ ​Conceptual​ ​frameworks​ ​which​ ​prioritize​ ​the 
cognitive​ ​over​ ​embodied​ ​practices​ ​are​ ​rightly​ ​challenged​ ​by​ ​Smith,​ ​but​ ​understanding​ ​how 
various​ ​liturgies​ ​affect​ ​desire​ ​and​ ​ultimately​ ​behaviour​ ​still​ ​must​ ​be​ ​explored.  
 
193​ ​Chaves,​ ​“SSSR​ ​Presidential​ ​Address,”​ ​8. 
194​ ​Smith,​ ​​Desiring​ ​the​ ​Kingdom​,​ ​208n115. 
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4.​ ​Post-secular​ ​Implications 
Introduction 
Having​ ​examined​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​epistemology,​ ​ontology,​ ​and​ ​anthropology​ ​of 
modern​ ​approaches​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​now​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​assess​ ​the​ ​implications.​ ​In 
several​ ​texts,​ ​Smith​ ​advocates​ ​for​ ​a​ ​normative​ ​post-secularism.​ ​First,​ ​a​ ​definition​ ​of 
“post-secular”​ ​will​ ​be​ ​given.​ ​The​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​this​ ​chapter​ ​will​ ​assess​ ​the​ ​possibilities​ ​for​ ​a 
post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​to​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​and​ ​to​ ​understand 
religious​ ​conflict.  
4.1.​ ​Defining​ ​Post-secularism 
As​ ​with​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​“secular”​ ​and​ ​“religious,”​ ​it​ ​is​ ​first​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​define​ ​post-secular. 
It​ ​is,​ ​to​ ​large​ ​degree,​ ​dependent​ ​up​ ​which​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​is​ ​modified​ ​by​ ​the​ ​preposition 
“post.”​ ​The​ ​term​ ​is​ ​used​ ​in​ ​a​ ​variety​ ​of​ ​ways,​ ​though​ ​not​ ​all​ ​of​ ​them​ ​will​ ​be​ ​explored​ ​here.  195
As​ ​with​ ​all​ ​of​ ​the​ ​instances​ ​in​ ​which​ ​“post”​ ​is​ ​attached​ ​to​ ​some​ ​academic​ ​term,​ ​caution​ ​is 
warranted​ ​here.​ ​As​ ​scholars​ ​who​ ​edited​ ​a​ ​volume​ ​on​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​(which​ ​included​ ​a​ ​chapter​ ​by 
Smith)​ ​warn,​ ​“it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​the​ ​post-secular​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​an 
actual​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​the​ ​social​ ​world,​ ​or​ ​whether​ ​its​ ​growing​ ​deployment​ ​results,​ ​instead​ ​from​ ​a 
zealous​ ​need​ ​to​ ​detect​ ​epochal​ ​turning​ ​points​ ​in​ ​every​ ​minor​ ​twist​ ​of​ ​the​ ​historical​ ​road.”  196
The​ ​most​ ​important​ ​distinction​ ​to​ ​make​ ​for​ ​the​ ​purposes​ ​of​ ​this​ ​study​ ​is​ ​between​ ​post-secular 
as​ ​a​ ​descriptive​ ​term​ ​and​ ​as​ ​a​ ​normative​ ​term.​ ​Is​ ​the​ ​term​ ​meant​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​some 
phenomenon​ ​observed​ ​in​ ​society,​ ​or​ ​is​ ​it​ ​prescribing​ ​an​ ​attitude​ ​or​ ​institutional​ ​arrangements?  
Descriptively,​ ​the​ ​post-secular​ ​can​ ​refer​ ​to​ ​an​ ​alleged​ ​reinvigoration​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​the 
world,​ ​either​ ​generally​ ​or​ ​more​ ​specifically​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​connoting​ ​often​ ​an​ ​(at​ ​least) 
implicit​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​classical​ ​formulation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secularization​ ​thesis.​ ​This​ ​usage​ ​is 
primarily​ ​sociological,​ ​an​ ​epochal​ ​demarcation​ ​which​ ​describes​ ​the​ ​current​ ​era​ ​as​ ​one​ ​in 
which​ ​religion​ ​has​ ​returned​ ​as​ ​a​ ​(public)​ ​presence.​ ​While​ ​Smith​ ​agrees​ ​with​ ​scholars​ ​who, 
based​ ​empirical​ ​evidence,​ ​have​ ​rejected​ ​the​ ​thesis​ ​that​ ​modernization​ ​​necessarily​​ ​brings 
195​ ​James​ ​Beckford​ ​identifies​ ​six​ ​which​ ​are​ ​overlapping​ ​and​ ​sometimes​ ​incompatible​ ​in​ ​“SSSR 
Presidential​ ​Address:​ ​Public​ ​Religions​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Postsecular:​ ​Critical​ ​Reflections,”​ ​​Journal​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Scientific​ ​Study 
of​ ​Religion​,​ ​2012,​ ​51:​ ​1–19. 
196​ ​Philip​ ​Gorski​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​“The​ ​Post-Secular​ ​in​ ​Question,”​ ​in​​ ​​The​ ​Post-secular​ ​in​ ​Question:​ ​Religion​ ​in 
Contemporary​ ​Society​,​ ​eds.​ ​​Philip​ ​Gorski​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​(​New​ ​York:​ ​New​ ​York​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2012),​ ​1. 
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secularization—he​ ​cites​ ​Peter​ ​Berger​ ​in​ ​particular—Smith’s​ ​usage​ ​of​ ​“post-secular”​ ​is 
generally​ ​not​ ​descriptive.   197
Another​ ​use​ ​of​ ​“post-secular”​ ​refers​ ​not​ ​to​ ​sociological​ ​phenomena​ ​but​ ​to​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​in 
consciousness​ ​or​ ​attitude​ ​toward​ ​religion.​ ​This​ ​usage​ ​could​ ​be​ ​merely​ ​descriptive​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of 
describing​ ​shifting​ ​attitudes​ ​(though​ ​not​ ​religiosity),​ ​or​ ​normative​ ​as​ ​an​ ​attitude​ ​being 
advocated.​ ​While​ ​maintaining​ ​that​ ​Western​ ​society​ ​has​ ​remained​ ​secularized,​ ​sociologist​ ​José 
Casanova​ ​says​ ​this​ ​other​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​post-secular​ ​implies​ ​“reflexively​ ​abandoning​ ​or​ ​at​ ​least 
questioning​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​secularist​ ​stadial​ ​consciousness​ ​which​ ​relegates​ ​‘religion’​ ​to​ ​a​ ​more 
primitive,​ ​more​ ​traditional,​ ​now​ ​surpassed​ ​stage​ ​of​ ​human​ ​and​ ​societal​ ​development.” ​ ​This 198
aligns​ ​with​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas’​ ​usage​ ​of​ ​​ ​“post-secular”​ ​in​ ​his​ ​work​ ​on​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public 
sphere​ ​in​ ​this​ ​century. ​ ​Casanova​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​to​ ​be​ ​post-secular​ ​in​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​is​ ​not​ ​to​ ​reject 199
secularism​ ​​per​ ​se​ ​​but​ ​to​ ​resist​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​Zeitgeist​ ​which​ ​assumed​ ​European​ ​secularization​ ​to 
be​ ​the​ ​norm​ ​such​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​assumed​ ​to​ ​not​ ​need​ ​any​ ​elaboration.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​Smith​ ​welcomes 
such​ ​reflexivity,​ ​yet​ ​his​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​“post-secular”​ ​goes​ ​beyond​ ​this.  
The​ ​primary​ ​sense​ ​in​ ​which​ ​Smith​ ​promotes​ ​a​ ​post-secularism​ ​is​ ​normative​ ​and,​ ​more 
than​ ​attitudinal​ ​shifts,​ ​seeks​ ​to​ ​challenge​ ​methodology,​ ​practice,​ ​and​ ​policy.​ ​Moving​ ​from​ ​his 
critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​underpinnings​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​a-religious,​ ​un-traditioned​ ​and​ ​neutral,​ ​Smith’s 
constructive​ ​project​ ​advocates​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​pluralism​ ​in​ ​which​ ​secular​ ​perspectives, 
assumptions,​ ​arguments,​ ​institutions,​ ​and​ ​other​ ​manifestations​ ​are​ ​accorded​ ​the​ ​same​ ​status​ ​as 
those​ ​produced​ ​and​ ​held​ ​by​ ​religions.​ ​To​ ​return​ ​to​ ​the​ ​taxonomy​ ​introduced​ ​at​ ​the​ ​beginning 
of​ ​this​ ​thesis,​ ​Smith’s​ ​advocacy​ ​of​ ​a​ ​post-secularism​ ​is​ ​driven​ ​by​ ​1)​ ​principled​ ​concerns​ ​about 
the​ ​coherence​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​2​​ ​and​ ​2)​ ​pragmatic​ ​concerns​ ​to​ ​grapple​ ​with​ ​the​ ​diversity​ ​of 
religions,​ ​identities,​ ​and​ ​ideologies​ ​in​ ​society,​ ​or​ ​what​ ​Charles​ ​Taylor​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​as​ ​a​ ​secular​3 
age. ​ ​In​ ​his​ ​analysis,​ ​advocates​ ​of​ ​a​ ​secularism​2​​ ​have​ ​failed​ ​to​ ​realize​ ​that​ ​the​ ​secular​2​ ​​is 200
itself​ ​a​ ​“take”​ ​or​ ​“construal,”​ ​and​ ​instead​ ​adopted​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​as​ ​“a​ ​standpoint​ ​that​ ​just​ ​takes 
197​ ​The​ ​“secular”​ ​in​ ​this​ ​“post-secular”​ ​more​ ​or​ ​less​ ​corresponds​ ​to​ ​secular​1​​ ​(referring​ ​to​ ​the​ ​mundane, 
non-sacred)​ ​as​ ​outlined​ ​in​ ​the​ ​introduction.  
198​ ​José​ ​Casanova,​ ​“Exploring​ ​the​ ​Postsecular:​ ​Three​ ​Meanings​ ​of​ ​the​ ​‘Secular’​ ​and​ ​Their​ ​Possible 
Transcendence,”​ ​in​ ​​Habermas​ ​and​ ​Religion​,​ ​eds.​ ​Craig​ ​Calhoun,​ ​Eduardo​ ​Mendieta,​ ​and​ ​Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen​ ​(Cambridge,​ ​MA:​ ​Polity,​ ​2013),​ ​33. 
199​ ​See​ ​​Jürgen​ ​Habermas,​ ​“Notes​ ​On​ ​Post-Secular​ ​Society,”​ ​​New​ ​Perspectives​ ​Quarterly​​ ​25.4​ ​(2008): 
17-29. 
200​ ​With​ ​this​ ​understanding​ ​“secular,”​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​it​ ​is​ ​wholly​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​have​ ​visible​ ​participation​ ​in 
religion.​ ​For​ ​Taylor,​ ​what​ ​make​ ​this​ ​a​ ​“secular”​ ​age​ ​is​ ​the​ ​​contestability​​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​belief​ ​due​ ​to​ ​the​ ​change​ ​in 
“conditions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​belief.”​ ​Modern​ ​countries​ ​have​ ​secularized​ ​in​ ​the​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​having​ ​gone​ ​from​ ​of​ ​“a​ ​society 
where​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​God​ ​is​ ​unchallenged​ ​and​ ​indeed,​ ​unproblematic,​ ​to​ ​one​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​is​ ​understood​ ​to​ ​be​ ​one​ ​option 
among​ ​others,​ ​and​ ​frequently​ ​not​ ​the​ ​easiest​ ​to​ ​embrace.”​ ​Taylor,​ ​​A​ ​Secular​ ​Age​,​ ​3. 
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its​ ​standpoint​ ​to​ ​be​ ​axiomatic,​ ​‘the​ ​way​ ​things​ ​really​ ​are.’” ​ ​This,​ ​Smith​ ​says,​ ​is​ ​a​ ​refusal​ ​to 201
acknowledge​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​secular​3​ ​​society. 
4.2.​ ​The​ ​Study​ ​of​ ​Religion 
What​ ​are​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​for​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion 
and​ ​of​ ​the​ ​social​ ​sciences​ ​in​ ​general?​ ​Because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​a​ ​secular​3​​ ​age,​ ​Smith 
believes​ ​a​ ​post-secular​2​​ ​social​ ​science​ ​is​ ​needed. ​ ​But​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​actually​ ​even​ ​stronger. 202
The​ ​epistemological​ ​argument​ ​is​ ​that​ ​“there​ ​never​ ​has​ ​been​ ​a​ ​secular​2​​ ​social​ ​science​ ​precisely 
because​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​unbiased,​ ​a-traditioned,​ ​neutral,​ ​universal​ ​standpoint.​ ​Our​ ​theorizing,​ ​and 
even​ ​our​ ​observation,​ ​begins​ ​from​ ​and​ ​is​ ​shaped​ ​by​ ​pre-theoretical​ ​commitments​ ​and​ ​is 
indebted​ ​to​ ​traditions​ ​of​ ​rationality.” ​ ​This​ ​is​ ​amounts​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that​ ​post-foundationalist 203
epistemology​ ​​entails​​ ​post-secularism.​ ​The​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​starts​ ​from​ ​the​ ​recognition 
the​ ​secular​2​​ ​​does​ ​not​ ​exist​.​ ​For​ ​those​ ​studying​ ​religion,​ ​this​ ​is​ ​indeed​ ​an​ ​“admittedly 
contentious​ ​and​ ​provocative​ ​suggestion.” ​ ​To​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​it​ ​is​ ​resisted,​ ​Smith​ ​blames​ ​the 204
philosophical​ ​anthropology​ ​still​ ​operative​ ​in​ ​definitions​ ​of​ ​religion. 
What​ ​potential​ ​benefits​ ​are​ ​there​ ​to​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​methodology​ ​in​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of 
religion?​ ​According​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​it​ ​first​ ​“critically​ ​unmasks​ ​the​ ​naive​ ​conceit​ ​that​ ​posits​ ​any 
simple​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​‘the​ ​religious’​ ​and​ ​‘the​ ​secular’​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​of​ ​particular​ ​doctrines 
or​ ​beliefs​ ​(e.g.,​ ​concerning​ ​gods​ ​or​ ​transcendence).” ​ ​The​ ​benefit,​ ​then,​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​that​ ​it 205
removes​ ​analytically​ ​misleading​ ​labels​ ​to​ ​social​ ​phenomena.​ ​Post-secular​ ​sociological​ ​studies 
of​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​particular​ ​would​ ​then​ ​investigate​ ​beliefs​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​regardless​ ​of​ ​their 
orientations​ ​to​ ​the​ ​supernatural.​ ​Second,​ ​the​ ​focus​ ​would​ ​shift​ ​to​ ​see​ ​religion​ ​operating​ ​in​ ​the 
formative​ ​practices​ ​(liturgies)​ ​that​ ​have​ ​previously​ ​been​ ​overlooked.​ ​This​ ​means​ ​expanding 
objects​ ​of​ ​study​ ​to​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​cultural​ ​practices​ ​with​ ​no​ ​overt​ ​connection​ ​with​ ​or 
orientation​ ​toward​ ​the​ ​supernatural​ ​or​ ​transcendent,​ ​yet​ ​which​ ​are​ ​nonetheless​ ​formative​ ​in 
shaping​ ​people’s​ ​ultimate​ ​loves.​ ​In​ ​addition,​ ​it​ ​seems​ ​that​ ​sociological​ ​research​ ​on​ ​religion,​ ​in 
seeking​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​how​ ​liturgies​ ​of​ ​desire​ ​work​ ​on​ ​human​ ​bodies,​ ​would​ ​also​ ​have​ ​to​ ​be 
much​ ​more​ ​cross-disciplinary.​ ​Familiarity​ ​with​ ​cognitive​ ​psychology​ ​and​ ​neuroscientific 
201​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secular​ ​Liturgies,”​ ​164. 
202​ ​Ibid.,​ ​165. 
203​ ​Ibid. 




research​ ​and​ ​even​ ​incorporating​ ​their​ ​empirical​ ​methodologies​ ​in​ ​examining​ ​the​ ​effects​ ​of 
liturgical​ ​practices​ ​on​ ​human​ ​behavior​ ​might​ ​characterize​ ​post-secular​ ​approaches​ ​to​ ​religion. 
The​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​the​ ​philosophy​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Smith,​ ​are​ ​twofold: 
Instead​ ​of​ ​a​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​belief,​ ​“worship​ ​and​ ​liturgical​ ​practice​ ​[would]​ ​be​ ​made​ ​a​ ​more​ ​central 
object​ ​of​ ​philosophical​ ​consideration,”​ ​while​ ​“liturgical​ ​participation​ ​might​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​as 
a​ ​unique​ ​condition​ ​of​ ​possibility​ ​for​ ​philosophical​ ​reflection.” ​ ​The​ ​liturgical​ ​focus​ ​comes 206
from​ ​a​ ​turn​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the​ ​abstract​ ​universality​ ​of​ ​beliefs​ ​to​ ​“attention​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​a​ ​form​ ​of 
life​ ​will​ ​require​ ​grappling​ ​with​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​inescapably​ ​particular​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​particular 
practices.” ​ ​This​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​practices​ ​themselves​ ​stems​ ​from​ ​Smith’s​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​there 207
is​ ​an​ ​“irreducibility”​ ​to​ ​the​ ​meaning​ ​of​ ​certain​ ​practices,​ ​such​ ​that​ ​they​ ​simply​ ​cannot​ ​be 
articulated​ ​propositionally.​ ​The​ ​question​ ​immediately​ ​arises:​ ​if​ ​the​ ​meaning​ ​of​ ​a​ ​practice​ ​is 
irreducible,​ ​how​ ​can​ ​a​ ​philosopher​ ​hope​ ​to​ ​articulate​ ​it?​ ​It​ ​is​ ​a​ ​tension​ ​already​ ​noted​ ​in 
Smith’s​ ​Cultural​ ​Liturgies​ ​series​ ​in​ ​which​ ​his​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​overly​ ​cognitive​ ​accounts​ ​is 
addressed​ ​with​ ​cognitive​ ​arguments.​ ​It​ ​seems​ ​that,​ ​for​ ​Smith,​ ​though​ ​irreducible​ ​meaning​ ​is 
embedded​ ​in​ ​practices,​ ​a​ ​philosopher​ ​can​ ​nonetheless​ ​​approximate​​ ​that​ ​meaning​ ​in​ ​words. 
That​ ​is,​ ​a​ ​philosopher​ ​could​ ​heuristically​ ​articulate​ ​a​ ​worldview​ ​implied​ ​and​ ​embedded​ ​in​ ​a 
set​ ​of​ ​practices​ ​for​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​analysis,​ ​all​ ​the​ ​while​ ​holding​ ​that​ ​those​ ​practices​ ​are 
ultimately​ ​irreducible.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​already​ ​done​ ​in​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of​ ​disciplines,​ ​so​ ​it​ ​is​ ​conceivable 
that​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​useful​ ​in​ ​this​ ​case​ ​as​ ​well.​ ​That​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​the​ ​first​ ​key​ ​implication​ ​of​ ​a 
post-secular​ ​philosophical​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​religion.   208
A​ ​more​ ​radical​ ​implication​ ​of​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​philosophical​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​would 
be​ ​the​ ​exploration​ ​of​ ​how​ ​(liturgical)​ ​religious​ ​practices​ ​themselves​ ​shape​ ​and​ ​prime​ ​the 
human​ ​mind—specifically,​ ​the​ ​philosopher​ ​or​ ​researcher—to​ ​think,​ ​reflect,​ ​and​ ​judge.​ ​Smith 
calls​ ​this​ ​humans’​ ​“philosophical​ ​comportment​ ​to​ ​the​ ​world”: 
On​ ​this​ ​account,​ ​the​ ​condition​ ​of​ ​possibility​ ​for​ ​a​ ​properly​ ​religious​ ​philosophy​ ​is​ ​not​ ​just​ ​access​ ​to​ ​a 
unique​ ​set​ ​of​ ​ideas​ ​unveiled​ ​by​ ​revelation,​ ​but​ ​participation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​the​ ​community 
as​ ​a​ ​means​ ​of​ ​shaping​ ​the​ ​philosophical​ ​imagination​ ​and​ ​what​ ​constitutes​ ​'rationality.'  209
With​ ​philosophy​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​having​ ​gone​ ​through​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​which​ ​philosophy​ ​from​ ​an​ ​overtly 
religious​ ​standpoint​ ​became​ ​more​ ​accepted,​ ​Smith​ ​wants​ ​to​ ​emphasize​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of 
206​ ​Smith,​ ​“Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion​ ​Takes​ ​Practice,”​ ​135. 
207​ ​Ibid.,​ ​142. 
208​ ​Smith​ ​himself​ ​has​ ​attempted​ ​to​ ​do​ ​this​ ​with​ ​Pentecostal​ ​religious​ ​practices​ ​in​ ​​Thinking​ ​in​ ​Tongues: 
Pentecostal​ ​Contributions​ ​to​ ​Christian​ ​Philosophy​ ​​(Grand​ ​Rapids:​ ​Eerdmans,​ ​2010). 
209​ ​Smith,​ ​“Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion,”​ ​144. 
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liturgy​ ​in​ ​shaping​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​philosopher’s​ ​rationality.​ ​This​ ​an​ ​approach​ ​articulated​ ​by​ ​Peter 
Ochs,​ ​who​ ​has​ ​described​ ​Jewish​ ​Morning​ ​Prayer​ ​as​ ​a​ ​way​ ​of​ ​reorienting​ ​perception​ ​and 
judgments​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the​ ​propositional​ ​favored​ ​in​ ​secular​ ​culture. ​ ​The​ ​practice​ ​of​ ​prayer 210
itself​ ​is​ ​a​ ​way​ ​to​ ​“nurture”​ ​this​ ​type​ ​of​ ​reasoning,​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​becomes​ ​a​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​prerequisite​ ​for​ ​a 
philosopher​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​writing​ ​about​ ​and​ ​from​ ​within​ ​a​ ​tradition.​ ​Because​ ​of​ ​Smith’s 
suspicions​ ​of​ ​cognitivism,​ ​he​ ​radicalizes​ ​the​ ​approach​ ​one​ ​step​ ​to​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​liturgical 
practices​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​traditions​ ​affect​ ​human​ ​rationality​ ​​and​—more​ ​importantly—desire​ ​as 
well.​ ​The​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​would​ ​indicate​ ​“philosophical​ ​‘judgments’​ ​arise​ ​from​ ​a 
social​ ​imaginary​ ​that​ ​is​ ​profoundly​ ​shaped​ ​by​ ​ritual​ ​practices​ ​like​ ​Morning​ ​Prayer.” ​ ​This 211
obviously​ ​indicates​ ​a​ ​rather​ ​radical​ ​departure​ ​from​ ​the​ ​current​ ​methodology​ ​of​ ​philosophy​ ​of 
religion,​ ​for​ ​it​ ​indicates​ ​a​ ​need​ ​for​ ​immersion​ ​in​ ​particular​ ​practices​ ​to​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​philosophize 
about​ ​religion​ ​adequately.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​one​ ​hand,​ ​with​ ​this​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​philosophers​ ​who 
are​ ​writing​ ​outside​ ​their​ ​own​ ​traditions​ ​will​ ​in​ ​some​ ​sense​ ​be​ ​less​ ​equipped​ ​to​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​their 
topic.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​secular​ ​philosophers​ ​would​ ​then​ ​have​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​their​ ​own 
liturgical​ ​practices​ ​when​ ​assessing​ ​how​ ​their​ ​rationality​ ​and​ ​judgments​ ​are​ ​conditioned​ ​by 
their​ ​own​ ​tradition.​ ​The​ ​latter​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​encounter​ ​considerable​ ​resistance​ ​(as​ ​may​ ​the 
former),​ ​but​ ​something​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sort​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​implied​ ​by​ ​the​ ​post-secularism​ ​Smith​ ​has 
articulated. 
4.3.​ ​Public​ ​Sphere 
In​ ​the​ ​last​ ​several​ ​decades,​ ​liberal​ ​political​ ​theorists​ ​John​ ​Rawls,​ ​Martha​ ​Nussbaum, 
and​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas​ ​have​ ​moved​ ​toward​ ​more​ ​accommodating​ ​positions​ ​on​ ​the​ ​place​ ​of 
religion​ ​in​ ​secular​ ​society. ​ ​It​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​that​ ​while​ ​Smith​ ​would​ ​welcome​ ​these​ ​developments, 212
their​ ​accommodations​ ​do​ ​not​ ​go​ ​far​ ​enough.​ ​So​ ​what​ ​are​ ​the​ ​political​ ​implications​ ​Smith 
draws​ ​from​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​knowledge?  
If​ ​both​ ​secularism​ ​as​ ​a​ ​matter​ ​of​ ​policy​ ​and​ ​policy​ ​doctrine​ ​and​ ​secularization​ ​as​ ​a​ ​sociological 
expectation​ ​are​ ​undergirded​ ​by​ ​a​ ​distinctly​ ​modern,​ ​Enlightenment​ ​account​ ​of​ ​rationality​ ​as​ ​neutral, 
unbiased,​ ​and​ ​pristinely​ ​objective,​ ​then​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​such​ ​modern​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​knowledge 
210​ ​​Peter​ ​Ochs,​ ​“Morning​ ​Prayer​ ​as​ ​Redemptive​ ​Thinking,”​ ​in​​ ​Liturgy,​ ​Time,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of 
Redemption​,​ ​eds.​ ​Chad​ ​Pecknold​ ​and​ ​Randi​ ​Rashkover​ ​(Eerdmans​ ​Pub,​ ​2006):​ ​50-90.​ ​Idem.,​ ​“Philosophic 
Warrants​ ​for​ ​Scriptural​ ​Reasoning,”​ ​​Modern​ ​Theology​​ ​22,​ ​no.​ ​3​ ​(July​ ​2006),​ ​465-482. 
211​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“How​ ​Religious​ ​Practices​ ​Matter:​ ​Peter​ ​Ochs’​ ​‘Alternative​ ​Nurturance’​ ​of 
Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Religion,”​ ​​Modern​ ​Theology​​ ​24,​ ​no.​ ​3​ ​(2008):​ ​469-478. 
212​ ​Martha​ ​Nussbaum,​ ​​The​ ​New​ ​Religious​ ​Intolerance:​ ​Overcoming​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Fear​ ​in​ ​an​ ​Anxious 
Age​​ ​(Cambridge:​ ​The​ ​Belknap​ ​Press​ ​of​ ​Harvard​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2012);​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas,​ ​​Between​ ​Naturalism 
and​ ​Religion​​ ​.  
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should​ ​entail​ ​criticisms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sociological​ ​and​ ​political​ ​projects​ ​that​ ​grew​ ​out​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Enlightenment 
soil.  213
Smith​ ​is​ ​unequivocal​ ​about​ ​what​ ​he​ ​believes​ ​has​ ​been​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique 
of​ ​the​ ​secular:​ ​though​ ​secularism​ ​remains​ ​a​ ​“powerful​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​contemporary​ ​political 
rhetoric,​ ​the​ ​theoretical​ ​foundations​ ​for​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​have​ ​been​ ​systematically​ ​dismantled.”  214
The​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​a​ ​successful​ ​critique​ ​are​ ​that​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​a​ ​religiously​ ​neutral 
public​ ​sphere​ ​must​ ​be​ ​abandoned,​ ​for​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​does​ ​not​ ​exist. ​ ​“In​ ​short,​ ​​there​ ​is​ ​no 215
secular​,​ ​if​ ​by​ ​‘secular’​ ​we​ ​mean​ ​‘neutral’​ ​or​ ​‘uncommitted;’​ ​instead,​ ​the​ ​supposedly​ ​neutral 
public​ ​spaces​ ​that​ ​we​ ​inhabit—in​ ​the​ ​academy​ ​or​ ​politics—are​ ​temples​ ​of​ ​other​ ​gods.”  216
What​ ​this​ ​​should​ ​​entail​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“new​ ​space​ ​for​ ​confessional​ ​proclamation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​so-called​ ​‘public’ 
or​ ​political​ ​sphere,​ ​but​ ​at​ ​the​ ​same​ ​time​ ​a​ ​public​ ​theology​ ​that​ ​eschews​ ​the​ ​Constantinian 
project.” ​ ​The​ ​critique​ ​should​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​“breaking​ ​open​ ​the​ ​spaces​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​and​ ​political 217
sphere​ ​for​ ​religious​ ​voices​ ​and​ ​identities”​ ​in​ ​what​ ​Smith​ ​calls​ ​“a​ ​post-secular​ ​construction​ ​of 
the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​(whether​ ​the​ ​sphere​ ​of​ ​the​ ​university,​ ​political​ ​discourse,​ ​etc.).”  218
Much​ ​like​ ​the​ ​social​ ​sciences,​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​(politics, 
universities,​ ​media,​ ​etc.)​ ​would​ ​find​ ​illegitimate​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​current​ ​and​ ​advocated 
restrictions​ ​placed​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​public​ ​life.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​limitations​ ​on​ ​religious​ ​reasoning​ ​in 
the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​defended​ ​in​ ​recent​ ​decades​ ​by​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​prominent​ ​political 
philosophers,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​John​ ​Rawls​ ​and​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas,​ ​would​ ​be​ ​untenable​ ​in​ ​a​ ​post-secular 
society. ​ ​The​ ​epistemic​ ​status​ ​accorded​ ​secular​ ​values​ ​and​ ​beliefs—universal,​ ​accessible​ ​to 219
autonomous,​ ​rational​ ​individuals—would​ ​not​ ​have​ ​greater​ ​weight​ ​than​ ​those​ ​labeled​ ​religious, 
nor​ ​would​ ​citizens​ ​be​ ​required​ ​to​ ​“translate”​ ​religious​ ​arguments​ ​into​ ​secular​ ​vocabulary.​ ​If, 
as​ ​Smith​ ​argued​ ​extensively,​ ​this​ ​epistemological​ ​assumption​ ​is​ ​faulty,​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​are 
categorical:​ ​“To​ ​the​ ​extent​ ​that​ ​the​ ​postmodern​ ​critique​ ​is​ ​effective,​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​a 
213​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Globalization,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Re-enchantment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​World,”​ ​9. 
214​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​33. 
215​ ​Smith,​ ​​Who’s​ ​Afraid​ ​of​ ​Postmodernism?:​ ​Taking​ ​Derrida,​ ​Lyotard​ ​and​ ​Foucault​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Church 
(Grand​ ​Rapids:​ ​Baker​ ​Academic,​ ​2006),​ ​73. 
216​ ​Smith,​ ​​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​42. 
217​ ​Ibid.,​ ​34. 
218​ ​Ibid.,​ ​10. 
219​ ​Though,​ ​interestingly,​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​several​ ​decades​ ​both​ ​of​ ​these​ ​defenders​ ​of​ ​the​ ​liberalism​ ​and​ ​the 
modern​ ​project​ ​have​ ​become​ ​more​ ​accommodating​ ​and,​ ​indeed,​ ​positive,​ ​toward​ ​religion.​ ​For​ ​a​ ​overview​ ​of​ ​his 
shift,​ ​see​ ​Michael​ ​Reder​ ​and​ ​Josef​ ​Schmidt,​ ​“Habermas​ ​and​ ​Religion,”​ ​in​ ​Jürgen​ ​Habermas​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​​An​ ​Awareness 




neutral​ ​public​ ​space​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​sphere​ ​must​ ​be​ ​abandoned.” ​ ​Public​ ​academic​ ​institutions, 220
themselves​ ​being​ ​liturgical​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​carriers​ ​of​ ​their​ ​own​ ​particular​ ​​teloi​​ ​and​ ​“religious” 
orientation,​ ​would​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​have​ ​grounds​ ​upon​ ​which​ ​to​ ​treat​ ​“confessional”​ ​perspectives 
differently​ ​than​ ​a​ ​secular,​ ​academic​ ​perspective​ ​(legitimate​ ​fears​ ​of​ ​this​ ​possibility​ ​are 
addressed​ ​below).  
Among​ ​the​ ​challenges​ ​Smith​ ​believes​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​would​ ​address​ ​is 
that​ ​of​ ​societal​ ​diversity,​ ​“of​ ​forging​ ​a​ ​life​ ​in​ ​common​ ​in​ ​neighborhoods,​ ​communities, 
territories,​ ​and​ ​states​ ​that​ ​are​ ​populated​ ​by​ ​citizens​ ​with​ ​divergent​ ​worldviews,​ ​different 
ultimate​ ​beliefs​ ​about​ ​the​ ​Good,​ ​and​ ​different​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​rituals​ ​that​ ​they​ ​understand​ ​to 
constitute​ ​a​ ​life​ ​well​ ​lived.” ​ ​Attempts​ ​to​ ​deal​ ​with​ ​such​ ​diversity​ ​have​ ​allegedly​ ​been 221
through​ ​an​ ​imposed,​ ​hegemonic​ ​consensus​ ​that​ ​stifled​ ​difference.​ ​While​ ​noting​ ​is​ ​no​ ​shortage 
of​ ​religious​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​this​ ​(including​ ​Western​ ​Christendom),​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​“also 
secular​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​such​ ​intolerant​ ​consensus​ ​that​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​characterizes​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​emergent 
progressive​ ​intolerance​ ​that​ ​religious​ ​communities​ ​sense​ ​today.” ​ ​This​ ​is​ ​what​ ​was​ ​earlier 222
referred​ ​to​ ​as​ ​a​ ​“theocracy​ ​without​ ​a​ ​god”​ ​whereby​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​is​ ​restricted​ ​to​ ​what​ ​is 
considered​ ​“rational”​ ​by​ ​secular​ ​Enlightenment​ ​standards.​ ​The​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​would 
reject​ ​the​ ​imposed​ ​consensus. 
To​ ​meet​ ​the​ ​challenge​ ​of​ ​diversity,​ ​Smith​ ​thinks​ ​a​ ​post-secularism​ ​must​ ​be​ ​more 
persistently​ ​pluralist. ​ ​This​ ​does​ ​not​ ​entail​ ​that​ ​conceding​ ​every​ ​perspective​ ​is​ ​equally​ ​valid 223
and​ ​correct,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​neutral​ ​arbiter​ ​by​ ​which​ ​to​ ​decide.​ ​What​ ​does​ ​that​ ​mean 
in​ ​practice?​ ​Smith​ ​does​ ​not​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​detailed​ ​account​ ​of​ ​what​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​public​ ​sphere 
may​ ​look​ ​like,​ ​though​ ​one​ ​example​ ​he​ ​offers​ ​is​ ​the​ ​following:​ ​“there​ ​should​ ​be​ ​no 
disqualification​ ​of​ ​a​ ​distinctly​ ​Christian​ ​[or​ ​Islamic,​ ​Buddhist,​ ​etc]​ ​economic​ ​theory​ ​from​ ​the 
area​ ​of​ ​public​ ​discourse​ ​(in​ ​both​ ​the​ ​academy​ ​and​ ​the​ ​political​ ​square).” ​ ​At​ ​which​ ​level 224
discussions​ ​of​ ​confessional​ ​economic​ ​theories​ ​would​ ​be​ ​appropriate,​ ​Smith​ ​does​ ​not​ ​say.​ ​But 
the​ ​idea​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​be​ ​that​ ​dealing​ ​with​ ​the​ ​empirical​ ​sociological​ ​facts​ ​of​ ​pluralism​ ​is​ ​best 
achieved​ ​through​ ​openly​ ​acknowledging​ ​confessional​ ​differences​ ​and​ ​being​ ​allowed​ ​to 
maintain​ ​the​ ​particularities​ ​of​ ​one’s​ ​perspective​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere. 
220​ ​Smith,​ ​​Who’s​ ​Afraid​ ​of​ ​Postmodernism?​,​​ ​​73 
221​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Reforming​ ​Public​ ​Theology:​ ​Neocalvinism​ ​and​ ​Pluralism”​ ​(Herman​ ​Bavinck 
Lecture​ ​given​ ​at​ ​Theological​ ​University​ ​Kampen,​ ​The​ ​Netherlands,​ ​June​ ​27,​ ​2016),​ ​2. 
222​ ​Ibid.,​ ​3. 
223​ ​Smith,​​ ​Introducing​ ​Radical​ ​Orthodoxy​,​ ​147. 
224​ ​Ibid.,​ ​147. 
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How​ ​is​ ​Smith’s​ ​post-secularism​ ​different​ ​from​ ​current​ ​conceptions​ ​of​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​public 
sphere?​ ​Consider​ ​the​ ​approach​ ​advocated​ ​by​ ​Robert​ ​Audi​ ​who,​ ​along​ ​with​ ​John​ ​Rawls,​ ​takes 
a​ ​more​ ​restrictive​ ​view.​ ​He​ ​advocates​ ​limiting​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​to​ ​secular​ ​reason,​ ​which​ ​he 
defines​ ​as​ ​“one​ ​whose​ ​normative​ ​force​ ​does​ ​not​ ​evidentially​ ​depend​ ​on​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​God 
(or​ ​on​ ​denying​ ​it)​ ​or​ ​on​ ​theological​ ​considerations,​ ​or​ ​on​ ​the​ ​pronouncements​ ​of​ ​a​ ​person​ ​or 
institution​ ​qua​ ​religious​ ​authority.” ​ ​But​ ​if​ ​Smith’s​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​reason​ ​holds​ ​up,​ ​every 225
reason​ ​with​ ​“normative​ ​force”​ ​ultimately​ ​rests​ ​upon​ ​​some​​ ​faith​ ​assumptions—“theological​ ​or 
not”—so​ ​the​ ​epistemic​ ​differentiation​ ​is​ ​groundless.​ ​In​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​whether 
one​ ​believes​ ​in​ ​human​ ​dignity​ ​by​ ​virtue​ ​of​ ​a​ ​deeply​ ​held​ ​a​ ​theological​ ​conviction​ ​or​ ​the​ ​belief 
in​ ​the​ ​Kantian​ ​“moral​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​rational​ ​individuals”​ ​is​ ​irrelevant​ ​when​ ​advocating​ ​for​ ​a 
policy.​ ​The​ ​grounding​ ​can​ ​be​ ​articulated,​ ​but​ ​need​ ​not​ ​be.​ ​But​ ​to​ ​abandon​ ​the​ ​theological 
conviction​ ​or​ ​Kantian​ ​perspective​ ​would​ ​mean​ ​to​ ​​lose​ ​the​ ​grounds​​ ​for​ ​human​ ​dignity​ ​and​ ​thus 
the​ ​normative​ ​force​ ​of​ ​the​ ​reason.​ ​Political​ ​philosopher​ ​Jonathan​ ​Chaplin,​ ​taking​ ​this​ ​view, 
puts​ ​forward​ ​a​ ​helpful​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​“public”​ ​and​ ​“secular”​ ​reason. ​ ​To​ ​offer​ ​public 226
reasons​ ​in​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​political​ ​debate​ ​is​ ​merely​ ​to​ ​offer​ ​“authentic​ ​articulations​ ​of​ ​a 
community’s​ ​vision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​good,”​ ​recognizing​ ​no​ ​articulation​ ​will​ ​ever​ ​be​ ​completely 
rationally​ ​valid. ​ ​The​ ​grounding​ ​of​ ​​belief​ ​in​ ​human​ ​dignity​​ ​may​ ​be​ ​“secular”​ ​(Kantian)​ ​or 227
“religious”​ ​(theological),​ ​but​ ​advocating​ ​a​ ​policy​ ​by​ ​appealing​ ​​merely​​ ​to​ ​human​ ​dignity​ ​would 
be​ ​an​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​a​ ​“public”​ ​reason.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​face​ ​of​ ​the​ ​challenge​ ​of​ ​pluralism,​ ​Nicholas 
Wolterstorff​ ​states​ ​that​ ​the​ ​liberal​ ​and​ ​secular​ ​approach​ ​seeks​ ​“the​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​a​ ​community 
with​ ​a​ ​shared​ ​perspective,”​ ​and​ ​Smith’s​ ​post-secularism​ ​indeed​ ​implies​ ​that​ ​“we​ ​must​ ​learn​ ​to 
live​ ​with​ ​a​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​multiple​ ​communities.”  228
One​ ​fear​ ​among​ ​those​ ​who​ ​oppose​ ​the​ ​increased​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​actors​ ​and 
perspectives​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​is​ ​over​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​opening​ ​for​ ​groups​ ​with​ ​theocratic 
tendencies​ ​to​ ​gain​ ​influence​ ​in​ ​institutions​ ​and​ ​political​ ​power.​ ​As​ ​already​ ​noted,​ ​Smith​ ​is 
critical​ ​of​ ​many​ ​contemporary​ ​versions​ ​of​ ​an​ ​“anti-secularism”​ ​that​ ​amounts​ ​to​ ​a​ ​theocratic 
225​ ​Robert​ ​​Audi​ ​and​ ​Nicholas​ ​Wolterstorff,​ ​​Religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Public​ ​Square:​ ​The​ ​Place​ ​of​ ​Religious 
Convictions​ ​in​ ​Political​ ​Debate​​ ​(Lanham:​ ​Rowman​ ​and​ ​Littlefield,​ ​1997).​ ​ ​26n26. 
226​ ​Jonathan​ ​Chaplin,​ ​​Talking​ ​God:​ ​The​ ​Legitimacy​ ​of​ ​Religious​ ​Public​ ​Reasoning​ ​ ​(Theos​ ​2009),​ ​38-40. 
Chaplin​ ​comes​ ​from​ ​the​ ​same​ ​Dutch​ ​Reformed​ ​tradition​ ​and​ ​has​ ​cooperated​ ​in​ ​several​ ​publication​ ​venues. 
227​ ​Ibid.,​ ​44.​ ​Chaplin​ ​goes​ ​on:​ ​“Liberal​ ​secularists​ ​suggest​ ​it​ ​is​ ​an​ ​epistemological​ ​question:​ ​it​ ​depends 
on​ ​the​ ​inner​ ​cognitive​ ​content​ ​of​ ​the​ ​reason.​ ​It​ ​isn’t.​ ​It’s​ ​a​ ​sociological​ ​question:​ ​it​ ​depends​ ​on​ ​what​ ​the​ ​audience 
happens​ ​to​ ​know​ ​or​ ​understand​ ​or​ ​be​ ​willing​ ​to​ ​accommodate.” 
228​ ​Wolterstorff,​ ​​Religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Public​ ​Square​,​ ​154.​ ​This​ ​topic​ ​is​ ​obviously​ ​much​ ​too​ ​big​ ​and​ ​not 
sufficiently​ ​germane​ ​to​ ​fully​ ​discuss​ ​here​ ​in​ ​detail,​ ​and​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​nuances​ ​have​ ​to​ ​be​ ​omitted. 
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project​ ​to​ ​re-couple​ ​political​ ​institutions​ ​and​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​with​ ​religions​ ​and​ ​their 
institutions.​ ​He​ ​even​ ​approvingly​ ​cites​ ​Graham​ ​Ward’s​ ​assessment​ ​that​ ​“in​ ​certain​ ​countries 
of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​a​ ​good​ ​dose​ ​of​ ​secularism​ ​would​ ​break​ ​the​ ​repressive​ ​holds​ ​certain​ ​state-ratified 
religions​ ​have​ ​over​ ​people’s​ ​lives.” ​ ​Nonetheless,​ ​in​ ​Western​ ​liberal​ ​democracies​ ​in 229
particular,​ ​the​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​pluralism—being​ ​a​ ​reaction​ ​​against​​ ​the​ ​imposed 
hegemonic​ ​consensus​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular—would​ ​resist​ ​these​ ​theocratic​ ​aspirations​ ​by​ ​enabling​ ​the 
full​ ​range​ ​of​ ​traditions​ ​and​ ​communities​ ​(including​ ​secular​ ​groups)​ ​to​ ​participate.  
4.4.​ ​Religious​ ​Conflict 
Most​ ​germane​ ​to​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​conflict,​ ​and​ ​dialogue​ ​is​ ​the​ ​way​ ​in​ ​which 
Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​advocacy​ ​of 
post-secularism​ ​would​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​debates​ ​regarding​ ​religious​ ​conflict/violence.​ ​A 
preliminary​ ​note​ ​is​ ​that​ ​Smith​ ​was​ ​slated​ ​to​ ​write​ ​a​ ​book​ ​on​ ​the​ ​topic,​ ​a​ ​project​ ​that​ ​was​ ​never 
completed. ​ ​While​ ​a​ ​book-length​ ​treatment​ ​would​ ​provide​ ​more​ ​basis​ ​for​ ​analysis,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​still 230
possible​ ​to​ ​discuss​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​conflict​ ​from​ ​the 
following:​ ​1)​ ​Smith’s​ ​references​ ​to​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​and​ ​violence​ ​in​ ​his​ ​published​ ​work; 
2)​ ​the​ ​acknowledgement​ ​that​ ​a​ ​book​ ​by​ ​scholar​ ​William​ ​Cavanaugh,​ ​with​ ​whom​ ​Smith​ ​shares 
much​ ​intellectually​ ​and​ ​with​ ​whom​ ​he​ ​has​ ​collaborated,​ ​covers​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​from​ ​a​ ​perspective 
he​ ​endorses; ​ ​and​ ​3)​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​theoretical​ ​work. 231
In​ ​analysing​ ​Jacque​ ​Derrida’s​ ​“religion​ ​without​ ​religion,”​ ​Smith​ ​summarizes​ ​the 
charge​ ​that​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​violence​ ​are​ ​linked:​ ​“Religions,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the​ ​religions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Book, 
have​ ​a​ ​disturbing​ ​legacy​ ​of​ ​violence​ ​that​ ​is​ ​linked​ ​to​ ​claims​ ​of​ ​uniqueness​ ​with​ ​universal 
pretension,​ ​claims​ ​to​ ​possession​ ​of​ ​​the​​ ​Law,​ ​​the​ ​​definitive​ ​revelation,​ ​​the​ ​​Truth,​ ​​the​ ​​one​ ​and 
only​ ​Way,​ ​​the​ ​​Messiah,​ ​even.” ​ ​Here,​ ​Smith​ ​is​ ​articulating​ ​Derrida’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​yet 232
it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​common​ ​sentiment​ ​that​ ​religion’s​ ​exclusive​ ​truth​ ​claims​ ​are​ ​what​ ​lead​ ​them​ ​to​ ​violence. 
On​ ​this​ ​account,​ ​it​ ​inevitable​ ​that​ ​“determinate,​ ​content-ful​ ​religion​ ​always​ ​ends​ ​up​ ​in​ ​war, 
229​ ​Graham​ ​Ward,​ ​​True​ ​Religion​​ ​(Oxford:​ ​Blackwell,​ ​2003),​ ​ix,​ ​1.​ ​Cited​ ​in​ ​Smith,​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion, 
and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity,”​ ​116n2. 
230​ ​The​ ​intended​ ​title​ ​was​ ​​Deconstructing​ ​Myths​ ​of​ ​Religious​ ​Violence:​ ​Derrida​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Logic​ ​of 
Determination​.​ ​See​​ ​​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​“Limited​ ​Inc/arnation.,”​ ​in​ ​​Hermeneutics​ ​At​ ​the​ ​Crossroads​,​ ​eds.​ ​Bruce 
Ellis​ ​Benson,​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​ ​and​ ​Kevin​ ​J.​ ​Vanhoozer​ ​(Bloomington:​ ​Indiana​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2006), 
128-129n45.  
231​ ​Personal​ ​communication​ ​with​ ​the​ ​author. 
232​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith,​“Determined​ ​Violence:​ ​Derrida's​ ​Structural​ ​Religion,”​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Religion 
78,​ ​no.​ ​2​ ​(1998),​​ ​207. 
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precisely​ ​because​ ​of​ ​its​ ​determination​ ​to​ ​guard​ ​the​ ​contents​ ​of​ ​its​ ​positive​ ​revelation.” ​ ​The 233
appropriate​ ​response​ ​for​ ​those​ ​who​ ​seek​ ​peace​ ​and​ ​justice,​ ​then,​ ​would​ ​be​ ​to​ ​replace​ ​religion 
with​ ​something​ ​that​ ​is​ ​devoid​ ​of​ ​this​ ​determinate​ ​content.​ ​Smith​ ​says​ ​this​ ​is​ ​an​ ​attempt​ ​to 
“produce​ ​a​ ​structure​ ​that​ ​is​ ​divorced​ ​from​ ​the​ ​content​ ​of​ ​any​ ​particular,​ ​historical, 
determinate,​ ​positive​ ​religion,”​ ​a​ ​transcendence​ ​without​ ​a​ ​definite​ ​transcendent.” ​ ​But 234
Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​such​ ​a​ ​thing​ ​is​ ​an​ ​impossibility.​ ​Every​ ​religion, 
every​ ​worldview,​ ​every​ ​value​ ​and​ ​belief,​ ​is​ ​based​ ​on​ ​embodied,​ ​historical,​ ​and​ ​geographical 
elements​ ​which​ ​a​ ​human​ ​subject​ ​cannot​ ​escape.​ ​This​ ​would​ ​be​ ​true​ ​of​ ​every​ ​liturgically 
formed​ ​human,​ ​so​ ​the“very​ ​modern​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​an​ ​ahistorical,​ ​a-geographical,​ ​transcendental 
religion”​ ​is​ ​an​ ​impossibility.​ ​ ​ ​The​ ​conclusion​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​would​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​incoherent​ ​to​ ​point​ ​to 235
religion​ ​​per​ ​se​​ ​as​ ​a​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​violence. 
A​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​violence​ ​can​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of 
scholar​ ​William​ ​Cavanaugh.​ ​In​ ​​The​ ​Myth​ ​of​ ​Religious​ ​Violence​,​ ​Cavanaugh​ ​critiques​ ​the​ ​way 
in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​modernity​ ​itself.​ ​He​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Wars​ ​of​ ​Religion, 
rather​ ​than​ ​providing​ ​the​ ​impetus​ ​for​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​state​ ​to​ ​arbitrate​ ​among​ ​different​ ​religious 
confessions,​ ​were​ ​rather​ ​the​ ​​product​​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​(violent)​ ​project​ ​of​ ​nation-state​ ​building 
already​ ​underway. ​ ​The​ ​contingent​ ​configurations​ ​of​ ​power​ ​that​ ​arose​ ​in​ ​modernity, 236
Cavanaugh​ ​says,​ ​have​ ​produced​ ​the​ ​category​ ​of​ ​religion.​ ​His​ ​primary​ ​claim​ ​is​ ​that​ ​“[t]here​ ​is 
no​ ​transhistorical​ ​and​ ​transcultural​ ​essence​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​essentialist​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​separate 
religious​ ​violence​ ​from​ ​secular​ ​violence​ ​are​ ​incoherent.” ​ ​This​ ​is​ ​broadly​ ​how​ ​Smith 237
post-secularism​ ​would​ ​approach​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​vs.​ ​secular​ ​violence.​ ​The​ ​important 
question​ ​for​ ​Cavanaugh​ ​is​ ​not​ ​whether​ ​religions​ ​are​ ​or​ ​can​ ​be​ ​violent.​ ​The​ ​empirical​ ​fact​ ​of 
religious​ ​actors​ ​with​ ​religious​ ​ideologies​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​committing​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​violence​ ​is 
undeniable.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​the​ ​analytical​ ​distinction​ ​from​ ​secular​ ​violence​ ​that​ ​is​ ​at​ ​issue,​ ​which​ ​leads​ ​to 
what​ ​he​ ​sees​ ​as​ ​the​ ​most​ ​pertinent​ ​question​ ​for​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​violence:​ ​“Under​ ​what 
circumstances​ ​do​ ​ideologies​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​all​ ​kinds​ ​promote​ ​violence?”  238
233​ ​Ibid.,​ ​207. 
234​ ​Ibid.,​ ​208. 
235​ ​Smith,​ ​​Who’s​ ​Afraid​ ​of​ ​Postmodernism?​,​ ​122. 
236​ ​Led​ ​by​ ​local​ ​elites,​ ​“Absorption​ ​of​ ​church​ ​into​ ​state…​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Reformation…​ ​was​ ​a​ ​crucial 
component​ ​of​ ​rise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​state​ ​and​ ​turmoil.”​ ​William​ ​T.​ ​Cavanaugh,​ ​​The​ ​Myth​ ​of​ ​Religious​ ​Violence:​ ​Secular 
Ideology​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Roots​ ​of​ ​Modern​ ​Conflict​,​ ​(Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2009​ ​166. 
237​ ​Ibid.,​ ​3-4. 
238​ ​Ibid.,​ ​226. 
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This​ ​leads​ ​to​ ​the​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​how​ ​Smith’s​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology​ ​affects​ ​the 
study​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​violence.​ ​Recall​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​model​ ​was​ ​meant​ ​to​ ​better​ ​explain​ ​human 
social​ ​behavior,​ ​which​ ​certainly​ ​includes​ ​violence.​ ​One​ ​of​ ​the​ ​key​ ​claims​ ​of​ ​the​ ​model​ ​is​ ​that 
behavior​ ​is​ ​not​ ​driven​ ​primarily​ ​by​ ​conscious​ ​beliefs,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​by​ ​desires.​ ​This​ ​would 
indicate​ ​that,​ ​when​ ​trying​ ​to​ ​understanding​ ​violent​ ​actions,​ ​examining​ ​the​ ​religious​ ​or​ ​secular 
doctrines​ ​of​ ​a​ ​violent​ ​group​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​sufficient​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​its​ ​behavior,​ ​and​ ​certainly 
would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​the​ ​driving​ ​factor​ ​and​ ​focus​ ​of​ ​analysis.​ ​Instead,​ ​that​ ​group’s​ ​liturgical​ ​practices, 
the​ ​​teloi​​ ​they​ ​aim​ ​at,​ ​the​ ​narratives​ ​absorbed​ ​affectively​ ​through​ ​aesthetic​ ​experiences:​ ​these 
are​ ​the​ ​elements​ ​which​ ​must​ ​be​ ​studied​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​why​ ​a​ ​group​ ​resorts​ ​to​ ​violence.​ ​To 
rephrase​ ​Cavanaugh’s​ ​question​ ​above:​ ​What​ ​are​ ​the​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​which​ ​lead​ ​to 
violence?​ ​Under​ ​what​ ​circumstances​ ​do​ ​those​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​violence?  
If​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​more​ ​about​ ​ultimate​ ​desire​ ​than​ ​about​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​the​ ​supernatural,​ ​religious 
violence​ ​may​ ​be​ ​more​ ​widespread​ ​than​ ​currently​ ​thought.​ ​The​ ​violence​ ​of​ ​nationalist​ ​groups 
is​ ​perhaps​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​an​ ​ultimate​ ​desire​ ​for​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​vision,​ ​based​ ​on​ ​a​ ​narrative​ ​of 
their​ ​“imagined​ ​community,”​ ​of​ ​how​ ​their​ ​political​ ​life​ ​should​ ​be​ ​ordered.​ ​The​ ​violence​ ​of 
one​ ​ethnic​ ​group​ ​against​ ​another​ ​may​ ​be​ ​driven​ ​by​ ​an​ ​ultimate​ ​desire​ ​for​ ​the​ ​superior​ ​position 
of​ ​one’s​ ​ethnicity,​ ​an​ ​exalted​ ​position​ ​above​ ​all​ ​other​ ​ethnic​ ​identities.​ ​The​ ​violence​ ​of 
individuals,​ ​whether​ ​honor​ ​killings,​ ​domestic​ ​violence,​ ​or​ ​gun​ ​violence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States 
could​ ​be​ ​analyzed​ ​from​ ​the​ ​perspective​ ​of​ ​liturgies​ ​of​ ​desire.​ ​One​ ​could​ ​even​ ​posit​ ​that​ ​for​ ​an 
individual​ ​or​ ​group​ ​to​ ​reach​ ​the​ ​point​ ​of​ ​deciding​ ​on​ ​a​ ​violent​ ​course​ ​of​ ​action,​ ​the​ ​intensity 
of​ ​such​ ​behavior​ ​may​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​an​ ​ultimate​ ​desire​ ​of​ ​some​ ​sort​ ​​must​​ ​be​ ​operating.​ ​The​ ​rather 
interesting​ ​implication​ ​may​ ​be​ ​that​ ​while​ ​not​ ​all​ ​religion​ ​is​ ​violent,​ ​​all​ ​violence​ ​may​ ​be 
religious.​ ​​This​ ​of​ ​course​ ​would​ ​apply​ ​to​ ​any​ ​entity,​ ​whether​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​or​ ​the​ ​state​ ​that​ ​is 
currently​ ​designated​ ​“secular.”  
For​ ​those​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​not​ ​only​ ​understanding​ ​violence​ ​but​ ​also​ ​in​ ​seeking​ ​to​ ​minimize 
it​ ​and​ ​promote​ ​peace,​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​might​ ​entail​ ​analyzing​ ​the​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​liturgical 
practices​ ​that​ ​lead​ ​groups​ ​and​ ​individuals​ ​away​ ​from​ ​violent​ ​behavior.​ ​As​ ​with​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of 
violence,​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​important​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​political,​ ​economic,​ ​and​ ​social​ ​conditions 
and​ ​how​ ​these​ ​affect​ ​the​ ​efficacy​ ​of​ ​peace-promoting​ ​liturgies.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​a​ ​complicated 
task​ ​given​ ​that,​ ​as​ ​Smith​ ​mentions​ ​in​ ​his​ ​work,​ ​multiple​ ​liturgies​ ​are​ ​likely​ ​working 
simultaneously​ ​in​ ​complex​ ​social​ ​environments.​ ​Isolation​ ​of​ ​violence-​ ​and​ ​peace-inducing 
liturgical​ ​practices​ ​may​ ​thus​ ​be​ ​difficult​ ​and​ ​possibly​ ​highly​ ​dependent​ ​on​ ​context.​ ​For 
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example,​ ​while​ ​nationalistic​ ​liturgies​ ​and​ ​narratives​ ​may​ ​not​ ​to​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​violence​ ​by​ ​non-state 
actors​ ​in​ ​a​ ​stable,​ ​developed​ ​country​ ​with​ ​effective​ ​law​ ​enforcement,​ ​they​ ​may​ ​do​ ​so​ ​in​ ​a 
developing​ ​country​ ​with​ ​poor​ ​institutions.​ ​Motivation​ ​and​ ​driving​ ​factors​ ​may​ ​be​ ​mixed. 
Non-state​ ​actors​ ​engage​ ​in​ ​violence​ ​based​ ​on​ ​their​ ​particular​ ​religious​ ​practices​ ​and​ ​desires, 
while​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​may​ ​join​ ​the​ ​opposing​ ​military​ ​of​ ​nation-state​ ​which​ ​reacts​ ​against​ ​that 
religious​ ​group​ ​for​ ​various​ ​reasons.  
A​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​state​ ​violence​ ​would​ ​clearly​ ​see​ ​it​ ​as​ ​religious​ ​from​ ​a 
liturgical​ ​lens,​ ​given​ ​that​ ​a​ ​state​ ​is​ ​arguably​ ​the​ ​most​ ​powerful​ ​institution​ ​in​ ​modern​ ​societies 
(though,​ ​depending​ ​on​ ​one’s​ ​perspective,​ ​the​ ​institutions​ ​of​ ​capitalism​ ​may​ ​also​ ​have​ ​that 
title).​ ​But​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​state​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​violence​ ​also​ ​goes​ ​beyond​ ​armed 
hostilities​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​state.​ ​Related​ ​to​ ​the​ ​discussion​ ​in​ ​section​ ​4.3,​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​public 
sphere​ ​which​ ​allots​ ​minimal​ ​space​ ​to​ ​confessional​ ​identities​ ​could​ ​be​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​factors​ ​in​ ​the 
religious​ ​violence.​ ​There​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​irony​ ​here,​ ​given​ ​that​ ​the​ ​story​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular 
state​ ​is​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​​avoid​​ ​the​ ​violence​ ​seen​ ​in​ ​Europe​ ​as​ ​Catholic​ ​Christendom 
splintered​ ​into​ ​smaller​ ​confessional​ ​regions.​ ​Saba​ ​Mahmood​ ​has​ ​summarized​ ​how​ ​the​ ​strategy 
of​ ​secularism​ ​may​ ​backfire:​ ​“[T]he​ ​political​ ​solution​ ​secularism​ ​offers​ ​consists​ ​not​ ​so​ ​much​ ​in 
‘avoiding​ ​religious​ ​strife’​ ​but​ ​in​ ​making​ ​sure​ ​those​ ​religious​ ​life/forms​ ​that​ ​are​ ​deemed 
incompatible​ ​with​ ​a​ ​secular​ ​political​ ​ethos​ ​are​ ​made​ ​provisional,​ ​if​ ​not​ ​extinct.​ ​Such​ ​a​ ​strategy 
may​ ​well​ ​​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​more,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​less,​ ​religious​ ​strife.” ​ ​Why​ ​would​ ​this​ ​be?​ ​Smith’s 239
analysis​ ​offers​ ​one​ ​answer:​ ​secular​ ​European​ ​states​ ​pose​ ​a​ ​threat​ ​to​ ​minority​ ​religious 
communities​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“state’s​ ​status​ ​as​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​institution​ ​which​ ​demands 
allegiance.” ​ ​Religious​ ​conflict​ ​could​ ​then​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​a​ ​sort​ ​of​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​competing 240
demands​ ​of​ ​ultimate​ ​allegiance.​ ​The​ ​example​ ​of​ ​France,​ ​where​ ​religious​ ​particularity​ ​is 
supposed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​subordinate​ ​to​ ​the​ ​national​ ​identity,​ ​is​ ​but​ ​the​ ​most​ ​extreme​ ​example. ​ ​The 241
post-secular​ ​pluralism​ ​advocated​ ​by​ ​Smith​ ​offers​ ​an​ ​alternative​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​negotiating 
religious,​ ​national,​ ​or​ ​any​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​ultimate​ ​identity,​ ​and​ ​more​ ​research​ ​could​ ​explore​ ​new 
possibilities​ ​for​ ​how​ ​states​ ​could​ ​approach​ ​the​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​Muslim​ ​minorities​ ​in​ ​post-Christian 
239​ ​Mahmood,​ ​“Secularism,​ ​Hermeneutics,​ ​and​ ​Empire,”​ ​332n11.  
240​ ​Smith,​ ​James​ ​K.A.​ ​“Secularity,​ ​Religion,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Politics​ ​of​ ​Ambiguity,”​ ​121. 
241​ ​For​ ​an​ ​analysis​ ​of​ ​this​ ​phenomenon,​ ​see​ ​John​ ​Bowen,​​ ​Why​ ​the​ ​French​ ​Don't​ ​Like​ ​Headscarves: 
Islam,​ ​the​ ​State,​ ​and​ ​Public​ ​Space​​ ​(Princeton:​ ​Princeton​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2007),​ ​and​ ​Joan​ ​W.​ ​Scott,​ ​​The​ ​Politics 
of​ ​the​ ​Veil​​ ​(Princeton:​ ​Princeton​ ​University​ ​Press,​ ​2007). 
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societies.​ ​Perhaps​ ​new​ ​public,​ ​post-secular​ ​liturgies​ ​could​ ​be​ ​utilized​ ​to​ ​promote​ ​peace​ ​and 
cohesion,​ ​yet​ ​in​ ​subordination​ ​to​ ​the​ ​particular​ ​and​ ​primary​ ​religious​ ​confessions​ ​of​ ​citizens. 
Conclusion 
This​ ​chapter​ ​has​ ​examined​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​modern 
approach​ ​to​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​by​ ​considering​ ​what​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​would​ ​mean 
for​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​for​ ​thinking​ ​about​ ​religion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​and​ ​for​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of 
religious​ ​violence.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​found​ ​that​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​philosophy​ ​and​ ​sociology​ ​of​ ​religion 
would​ ​make​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​methodological​ ​shift​ ​toward​ ​looking​ ​at​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​and 
desire​ ​in​ ​determining​ ​what​ ​counts​ ​as​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​which​ ​elements​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​to​ ​consider.​ ​This 
would​ ​require​ ​much​ ​interdisciplinary​ ​cooperation​ ​across​ ​social​ ​and​ ​hard​ ​sciences.​ ​A 
post-secular​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​would​ ​include​ ​more​ ​openly​ ​confessional​ ​voices​ ​in​ ​academia​ ​and 
politics​ ​without​ ​a​ ​need​ ​to​ ​limit​ ​discourse​ ​to​ ​“secular”​ ​reason—though​ ​public​ ​reason​ ​​à​ ​la 
Chaplin​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​beneficial​ ​in​ ​a​ ​pluralistic​ ​society​ ​of​ ​many​ ​communities.​ ​Finally,​ ​a 
post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​religious​ ​violence​ ​would​ ​not​ ​find​ ​religion​ ​as​ ​inherently​ ​violent,​ ​but 
that​ ​all​ ​violence​ ​may​ ​be​ ​religious.​ ​A​ ​post-secular​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​may​ ​also​ ​contribute​ ​to 



















This​ ​study​ ​has​ ​used​ ​the​ ​thought​ ​of​ ​James​ ​K.​ ​A.​ ​Smith​ ​as​ ​a​ ​guide​ ​for​ ​understanding​ ​and 
challenging​ ​the​ ​concepts​ ​of​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​the​ ​secular.​ ​Using​ ​three​ ​subfields​ ​of​ ​philosophy,​ ​it 
was​ ​shown​ ​how​ ​Smith​ ​understands​ ​these​ ​concepts​ ​and​ ​their​ ​theoretical​ ​underpinnings​ ​to​ ​be 
faulty.​ ​Proposals​ ​for​ ​a​ ​post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​several​ ​issues​ ​were​ ​shown​ ​to​ ​be​ ​potentially 
fruitful​ ​lines​ ​of​ ​research.  
Chapter​ ​2,​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​a​ ​critique​ ​of​ ​the​ ​secular,​ ​found​ ​that​ ​before​ ​being​ ​political,​ ​the 
secular​ ​is​ ​an​ ​epistemic​ ​category​ ​which​ ​rests​ ​upon​ ​Enlightenment​ ​foundationalism.​ ​The​ ​status 
of​ ​secular​ ​knowledge​ ​is​ ​supposedly​ ​universal​ ​and​ ​un-traditioned,​ ​accessible​ ​by​ ​all.​ ​Smith, 
along​ ​with​ ​many​ ​others​ ​influenced​ ​by​ ​postmodern​ ​thought,​ ​finds​ ​these​ ​Cartesian​ ​approaches 
to​ ​knowledge​ ​unsustainable.​ ​A​ ​post-foundationalist​ ​approach​ ​which​ ​acknowledges 
particularity,​ ​situatedness,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​storied​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​all​ ​knowledge​ ​was​ ​a​ ​cogently​ ​proposed 
solution.​ ​Similarly,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​that​ ​the​ ​secular​ ​also​ ​has​ ​ontological​ ​assumptions​ ​of​ ​a​ ​closed, 
autonomous​ ​immanence​ ​which​ ​places​ ​“being”​ ​above​ ​transcendence.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​how​ ​this 
informs​ ​the​ ​field​ ​of​ ​natural​ ​science​ ​and​ ​leads​ ​to​ ​an​ ​atomizing​ ​social​ ​ontology,​ ​giving​ ​secular 
theorizing​ ​and​ ​science​ ​an​ ​unwarranted​ ​privileged​ ​epistemic​ ​status.​ ​Smith’s​ ​proposal​ ​of​ ​a 
reenchanted​ ​ontology​ ​was​ ​found​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​logical​ ​rebuttal​ ​to​ ​assumed​ ​immanence​ ​which​ ​could 
affect​ ​social​ ​theorizing,​ ​though​ ​not​ ​in​ ​obvious​ ​ways​ ​not​ ​covered​ ​by​ ​contemporary 
communitarian​ ​theorists.​ ​Reenchantment​ ​would​ ​mean​ ​science​ ​loses​ ​the​ ​particular​ ​status​ ​it​ ​has 
a​ ​arbiter​ ​of​ ​knowledge,​ ​though​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​point​ ​to​ ​new​ ​methodologies​ ​for​ ​natural 
science​ ​itself. 
Chapter​ ​3,​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​found​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​critique 
claims​ ​that​ ​religion​ ​relies​ ​upon​ ​an​ ​overly​ ​cognitive,​ ​belief-centered​ ​anthropology.​ ​Philosophy 
and​ ​sociology​ ​both​ ​approach​ ​religion​ ​with​ ​this​ ​methodology,​ ​determining​ ​what​ ​counts​ ​as 
religion​ ​based​ ​on​ ​beliefs​ ​(in​ ​the​ ​supernatural).​ ​This​ ​philosophical​ ​anthropology​ ​does​ ​indeed 
have​ ​problems​ ​explaining​ ​human​ ​behavior,​ ​of​ ​which​ ​religious​ ​incongruence​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​to​ ​be 
a​ ​prime​ ​example.​ ​The​ ​rest​ ​of​ ​the​ ​chapter​ ​explored​ ​Smith’s​ ​project​ ​of​ ​a​ ​liturgical​ ​anthropology, 
which​ ​posits​ ​that​ ​human​ ​beings​ ​(and​ ​their​ ​religion)​ ​are​ ​better​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​what​ ​they 
desire/love.​ ​That​ ​desire,​ ​he​ ​claims,​ ​is​ ​shaped​ ​by​ ​formative​ ​practices​ ​called​ ​“liturgies.”​ ​This 
theory​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​liturgies​ ​are​ ​essentially​ ​inescapable,​ ​being​ ​embedded​ ​in​ ​practices​ ​and 
institutions,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​all​ ​people​ ​desire​ ​​something​​ ​ultimately.​ ​Religion,​ ​then,​ ​is​ ​in​ ​all​ ​sorts​ ​of 
“secular”​ ​places​ ​and​ ​habits​ ​philosophers​ ​and​ ​sociologists​ ​would​ ​not​ ​typically​ ​consider 
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religious​ ​(shopping​ ​malls,​ ​sports​ ​stadiums,​ ​etc.).​ ​It​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​understanding​ ​of 
religion​ ​still​ ​has​ ​certain​ ​tensions,​ ​namely​ ​in​ ​whether​ ​it​ ​is​ ​defined​ ​by​ ​the​ ​liturgies​ ​practices,​ ​the 
desire,​ ​or​ ​the​ ​overall​ ​process​ ​of​ ​them​ ​interacting.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​proposed​ ​that​ ​Smith’s​ ​approach​ ​of 
religion/religiosity​ ​be​ ​made​ ​explicitly​ ​into​ ​a​ ​spectrum​ ​depending​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​formative​ ​strength 
of​ ​a​ ​given​ ​practice​ ​(Figure​ ​1).​ ​Yet​ ​the​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​understanding​ ​how​ ​humans​ ​inhabit​ ​multiple 
liturgies​ ​simultaneously​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​challenge​ ​for​ ​Smith’s​ ​theory​ ​in 
understanding​ ​behavior. 
Chapter​ ​4​ ​assessed​ ​how​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​Smith’s​ ​analysis​ ​point​ ​to​ ​a​ ​need​ ​for​ ​a 
post-secular​ ​approach​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere,​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​conflict. 
Post-secularism​ ​was​ ​a​ ​defined​ ​a​ ​normative​ ​approach​ ​which,​ ​more​ ​than​ ​the​ ​Habermasian 
notion​ ​of​ ​an​ ​attitudinal​ ​shift,​ ​abandons​ ​the​ ​superior​ ​status​ ​of​ ​secular​2​​ ​and​ ​gives​ ​equal​ ​status​ ​to 
all​ ​traditions.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​religion,​ ​this​ ​was​ ​shown​ ​to​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​“secular”​ ​liturgies​ ​would 
no​ ​longer​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​non-religious​ ​by​ ​sociologists​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​liturgical​ ​practices​ ​would 
be​ ​considered​ ​(and​ ​practiced!)​ ​by​ ​philosophers.​ ​The​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​would​ ​allow​ ​space​ ​for 
confessional​ ​identities,​ ​arguments,​ ​and​ ​theories​ ​and​ ​yet​ ​still​ ​value​ ​a​ ​“public”​ ​reason​ ​as 
articulated​ ​by​ ​Jonathan​ ​Chaplin.​ ​A​ ​post-secular​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​conflict​ ​would 
reject​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​religious​ ​particularism​ ​is​ ​​necessarily​​ ​violent​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​challenge 
distinctions​ ​between​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​violence.​ ​In​ ​particular,​ ​the​ ​liturgical 
anthropological​ ​model​ ​would​ ​lead​ ​researchers​ ​to​ ​ask​ ​which​ ​​practices​ ​​and​ ​​institutions​​ ​lead​ ​to 
violence—whether​ ​state,​ ​group,​ ​or​ ​individual​ ​violence—and​ ​which​ ​promote​ ​peaceful​ ​social 
cohesion.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​suggested​ ​that​ ​this​ ​model​ ​may​ ​also​ ​indicate​ ​that​ ​​all​​ ​violence,​ ​because​ ​of​ ​its 
likely​ ​connection​ ​to​ ​ultimate​ ​desires,​ ​may​ ​be​ ​religious,​ ​including​ ​all​ ​state​ ​violence.​ ​Another 
potential​ ​application​ ​was​ ​that​ ​post-secular​ ​pluralism​ ​in​ ​the​ ​public​ ​sphere​ ​may​ ​address​ ​some​ ​of 
the​ ​contemporary​ ​challenges​ ​of​ ​cultural​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​diversity​ ​and​ ​conflict​ ​in​ ​politically 
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